Economic Instruments for Air Pollution Control by Klaassen, G. & Forsund, F.R.
ECONOMY & ENVIRONMENT
Economic Instruments
for Air Pollution Control
Edited by Ger Klaassen and Finn R. F~rsund

Economic Instruments
for Air Pollution Control
edited by
Ger Klaassen
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis,
Laxenburg, Austria
and
Finn R. F0rsund
University ofOslo,
Department ofEconomics,
Oslo, Norway
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS
DORDRECHT I BOSTON I LONDON
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
LAXENBURG, AUSTRIA
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
94-33492
CIP
EconomIc lnstruments for alr pollutlon control I edlted by Ger
Klaassen and F,nn R. Fersund.
p. cm. -- (Economy & environment: v. 9)
"It consIsts of a coherent set of papers that were originally
presentet at the International Conference on 'Economic Instruments
for Alr Pollutlon Control,' held at the Internatlonal Instltute for
Applled Systems Analysls IIIASA1, Laxenburg, Austrla, 18-20 October
1993"--CIP pref.
Includes Index.
ISBN 0-7923-3151-6 (HB aCld-free paperl
1. Alr--Pollutlon--Economc aspects--Congresses. 2. Alr qualltY
management--Cost effectiveness--Congresses. 3. EmisSlon trading-
-Congresses. 4. Environmental impact charges--Congresses.
I. Klaassen, Ger, 1958- II. Fersund, Finn R.
III. International Institute for Appl led Systems Analysls.
IV. Internatlonal Conference on "Economlc Instruments for Alr
Pollution Control" (1993 Laxenburg, Austria) V. Serles.
HC79.A4E248 1994
363.73'92--dc20
ISBN 0-7923-3151-6
Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
P.O. Box 17,3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Kluwer Academic Publishers incorporates
the publishing programmes of
D. Reidel, Martinus Nijhoff, Dr W. Junk and MTP Press.
Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada
by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
!OI Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A.
In all other countries, sold and distributed
by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group,
P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved
© 1994 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
Printed in the Netherlands
Preface
International negotiations in Europe on a new protocol to control sulfur
dioxide emissions, signed in June 1994, have recognized the potential con-
tribution of economic instruments to improve the cost-effectiveness of inter-
national agreements. The protocol opens possibilities for countries to jointly
implement their emission reduction obligations, although rules and condi-
tions guiding joint implementation have to be elaborated. Such specific
rules are necessary since, in contrast to the joint implementation of car-
bon dioxide emissions (foreseen in the Framework Convention on Climate
Change) or chlorofluorocarbon quotas (included in the Montreal Protocol),
for emissions of sulfur dioxide the situation is more complex since it is a
nonuniformly dispersed pollutant whose environmental impacts depend not
only on the total volume emitted but also on the location of the source.
IIASA's Transboundary Air Pollution Project is supporting the negoti-
ations on a new sulfur protocol by means of its integrated assessment model
RAINS: the Regional Acidification INformation Simulation model. This
model forms an important tool for negotiators for examining cost-effective
strategies for reducing acidifying emissions in Europe. In this context, the
project also addresses the potential role of economic instruments, among
them joint implementation. The basic aim of this part of the research pro-
gram is to analyze what can be learned from economic theory and methods,
as well as from practical experiences, on how economic instruments can be
applied, especially for nonuniformly dispersed pollutants, at both a national
and international level.
This book is one of the results of this research effort. It consists of a
coherent set of papers that were originally presented at the international
conference on "Economic Instruments for Air Pollution Control," held at
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxen-
burg, Austria, 18-20 October 1993. The papers were selected to provide an
overview of results from theory, simulation model studies, as well as practi-
cal experiences in the application of economic instruments in both national
and international settings. The book should provide interesting reading for
economists with an interest in environmental economics, policy makers with
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a modest background in economics, and, generally, those who are interested
in the application of economic instruments.
We appreciate the help of David Pearce (University College, London)
in outlining the collection. We are highly indebted to the reviewers who
assisted us in reviewing chapters of this book. They needed only little
(economic) incentive to come up with helpful comments and suggestions
that considerably improved the quality of the book and they therefore
deserve special mentioning: Knut Alfsen (Statistics Norway), Scott Bar-
rett (London Business School), Mohammed Belhaj (Goteborg University),
Lars Bergman (Stockholm School of Economics), D. Bohi (Resources for
the Future), Janusz Cofala (nASA), Olivier Godard (Centre International
de Recherche sur l'Environnement et Ie Developpement), Bente Halvorsen
(University of Oslo), Leen Hordijk (Agricultural University Wageningen),
Ekko van Ierland (Agricultural University Wageningen), Peter Kaderjak
(Budapest University of Economics), Snorre Kverndokk (Statistics Norway),
Leonid Melnik (Sumy State University), Charles Paulsen (Resources for the
Future), David Pearce (University College London), Stef Proost (Catholic
University Leuven), Lex de Savornin Lohman (Free University Amsterdam),
Thomas Schelling (University of Maryland), Per Schreiner (ECON, Oslo),
Karl Steininger (University of Graz), Thomas Sterner (Goteborg Univer-
sity), Tom Tietenberg (Colby College), Harmen Verbruggen (Free Univer-
sity Amsterdam), Hans Vos (DHV Environment and Infrastructure), Doede
Wiersma (University of Groningen), Naomi Zeitouni (University of Haifa),
and Tomasz Zylicz (Warsaw University).
Furthermore, we gratefully acknowledge the financial support from
nASA not only for basic research but also for organizing the conference and
publication of this book. We would also like to thank Margaret Gottsleben
for her substantial assistance, Markus Amann and Janusz Cofala for their
critical comments and suggestions, Valerie Jones for editing this volume,
and nASA's Publications Department for its support in turning our draft
into camera-ready copy. We hope that the book will provide an impor-
tant contribution to the (joint) implementation of economic instruments
and traditional regulations in order to meet environmental goals without
squandering scarce natural resources.
Ger Klaassen and Finn R. F¢rsund
LaxenburgjOslo
March 1994
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Introduction
Ger J(laassen
Transboundary Air Pollution Project
IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria
Finn R. F¢rsund
Department of Economics
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
Background and Objective
In 1987, the city council of Telluride, Colorado, introduced tradable permits
for woodburning. The council required every fireplace or woodburning stove
to meet tight emission standards and to have a permit to operate. New stove
owners were only allowed to burn wood if they could acquire two permits
from existing owners who were willing to sell. As a result, the price per
permit rose to over $1,400 and the air pollution problem diminished to
the extent that the town now meets the federal air quality standards for
particulate matter (Elman et ai., 1992). This is just one example of how
economic instruments for air pollution control can work in practice.
Economists have a long tradition of advocating the use of economic
instruments, such as emission charges or tradable emission permits. Eco-
nomic theory links the choice of instruments to the fact that pollution is
an externality that leads to an inefficient or suboptimal allocation of scarce
resources. Consequently, corrective devices are necessary to establish an
optimal solution: an outcome that maximizes the benefits or welfare of so-
ciety. The solution to this problem is straightforward. Polluters need to
be confronted with a (Pigovian) tax equal to the marginal external costs or
marginal damage of their pollution in order to induce them to take account
of the full social costs of their activities (Cropper and Oates, 1992). The
classic case for emission charges is that the environmental authority can
announce the optimal charge level without knowledge of the source's cost
functions, as long as the damage function is linear, and the location of the
VB
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sources is irrelevant for the degree of damage (Bohm and Russell, 1985).
If the sources minimize costs in response to the optimal charge, the charge
combines static efficiency and information economy. Instead of setting the
Pigovian tax at the optimal level, the environmental agency could also issue
permits for emissions, the total number of which equals the optimal emission
level, and then allow sources to bid for them. In theory, both quantity and
price approaches would yield the same result in terms of efficiency in a
setting of perfect information. In spite of the increased willingness to per-
form contingent valuation studies, however, it is hard to be sanguine about
the possibilities to determine optimal emission levels. A more practical
approach would be to set environmental quality standards and to achieve
these standards at minimum cost. The basic argument in favor of emission
charges is that it brings about that allocation of control efforts among pol-
luters that minimizes the costs of pollution control without the costs being
known by the authorities. Under the assumption that each source will seek
to minimize its costs, it can be proven in a straightforward way that the
imposition of a uniform charge per unit of emission will achieve the cost-
minimum solution. In the case of imperfect knowledge of pollution control
costs, a trial-and-error procedure is needed to meet the environmental goal
(Baumol and Oates, 1988). When location starts to matter, this iterative
procedure is expected ultimately to meet the goals, but opinions diverge
on whether the cost-effective outcome can be attained (Bohm and Russell,
1985; Ermoliev et al. , 1993). Similarly, it can be shown that, under a num-
ber of restrictive conditions, trading of such emission permits can attain the
cost minimum. These conditions are that sources minimize their pollution
control costs (Le., the sum of expenditures on abatement measures and of
the net revenues from trading permits), that the permit market is compet-
itive, and that transaction costs are negligible (Montgomery, 1972). This
result is obtained irrespective of whether we deal with tradable emission
permits or tradable deposition permits.
Evidence from empirical simulation models tends to support the cost-
effectiveness claims of economic theory. In an overview of 17 studies,
Tietenberg (1985) reports that a shift from regulations (including uniform
percentage reductions) to a tradable permit system could cut pollution con-
trol costs by 10%-90%. In half of the studies examined the costs savings
are more than 40 percent. Welsch (1989), in a study on national uses of
tradable sulfur emission permits for power plants in 13 countries in West-
ern Europe, concludes that, depending on the percentage reduction desired,
cost savings of 1%-85% are possible.
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Practical experiences with the use of economic instruments seem to bear
out the Chinese proverb that forecasting is difficult especially if one wants
to forecast the future, rather than to confirm the validity of economic theory
and simulation models. With a few exceptions (such as lead trading in the
USA), the cost savings of emission trading realized in practice have been
lower than expected (Hahn and Hester, 1989). The product and emission
charges that are applied in practice usually have no or an unknown incen-
tive impact and predominantly serve revenue-raising purposes (Opschoor
and Vos, 1989). This is not to say that economic textbooks and model
predictions are wrong; the problem is more that economic instruments are
rarely applied in the ways envisaged by the models. Economic instruments
are usually crafted on top of existing regulatory frameworks instead of being
applied in the pure textbook way. High transaction costs, uncertain prop-
erty rights, as well as regulatory constraints, imply that in reality emissions
trading has not achieved the cost savings that are possible under any lin-
ear programming optimization model. Charges face similar problems. The
additional cost burden of taxes may be opposed by polluters. Environmen-
talists and regulatory authorities might be hesitant to give too much leeway
to polluters (Opschoor and Vos, 1989), or may express concerns about the
associated (administrative) costs and enforcement problems involved with
the implementation of radical economic incentives. Consequently, charges
are hardly ever high enough to induce changes in behavior. Recent develop-
ments, however, suggest that we might be experiencing more radical shifts
toward the implementation of economic instruments. The passage of the
1990 Clean Air Act amendments in the USA gave way to the trading of
sulfur allowances between utilities all over the country. On the other side
of the Atlantic, Sweden has implemented high charges on its sulfur dioxide
and nitrogen oxides emissions, at levels that are explicitly designed to have
an incentive impact. The optimal mix of instruments might be shifting to-
ward the use of economic instruments in a purer form. It is clear, however,
that in examining the potential use of economic incentives, it makes sense to
combine the results of theoretical and simulation models with an assessment
of what happens in practice.
In principle, the analysis of the performance of economic instruments in
a national context is fully transferable to the regulation of transboundary
pollution in an international context. In contrast to the national case, how-
ever, there is no international government that can impose emission charges
or establish tradable emission rights. This will require the cooperation of
sovereign nations that now can only be expected to cooperate if it will make
them better off. The presence of transboundary externalities does imply
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that gains can be made from cooperative agreements, although there are
also incentives for countries not to cooperate (Barrett, 1990; Baumol and
Oates, 1988). One fairly general result from economic theory is that, in or-
der to realize the potential welfare gains from the cooperative approach, side
payments have to be made to those countries that lose from the full cooper-
ative approach relative to the noncooperative approach (Folmer and Musu,
1992). A second general conclusion is that uniform percentage emission re-
ductions are not only inefficient and too expensive, but in an international
context they also create incentives for countries not to participate in such
agreements (Hoel, 1992). This is the point where economic instruments
can play an important role. As in the national context, emission taxes and
emission trading have the advantage that they cut the costs of achieving en-
vironmental objectives. Exactly because of this feature, they also increase
the chance that more countries will be better off. Although both the tax and
the tradable permit systems do possess the desirable property that they can
meet a given environmental goal at minimum cost, they might however raise
the compliance costs for some countries (Barrett, 1992). In this case, the
tax revenues, the initial distribution of permits, or the revenues from selling
them, inevitably have to be used as additional instruments in compensating
the potential losers in an international agreement.
Again, empirical simulation models lend support to the maintained ad-
vantages of economic instruments in an international context. Rose and
Stevens (1993), for example, find that the potential gains from worldwide
carbon dioxide permit trading are substantial, and that abatement cost sav-
ings are on the order of 25%-35%. Moreover, none of the countries/regions
they examined appeared to be a net loser. Maler (1990) analyzes the net
benefits from imposing a uniform tax of DM4,000 per ton of sulfur dioxide
exported by each country in Europe. He discovers that the aggregate ben-
efits from this export tax are only 1% lower than the total benefits from
the full cooperative solution, but stresses that tax revenues need to be used
to compensate the losing countries. Klaassen et al. (1994) explore the im-
plications of implementing sulfur emissions trading in a European context.
They conclude that emissions trading, with a special exchange rate regime,
might cut pollution control costs compared to uniform cutback, without, at
least in this specific example, violating a given set of deposition goals.
Empirical evidence to support theoretical and modeling results is scarce.
This should come as no surprise since the international application of eco-
nomic instruments has so far been limited. The Montreal Protocol, signed
in 1987 to protect the ozone layer, however, is an exception. This Pro-
tocol contains provisions that allow countries to transfer their production
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quotas for chlorofluorocarbons and halons to other parties and enable EC
member countries to jointly implement their allocated consumption quotas.
Although Bohm (1990) heavily criticizes the Montreal Protocol for its ineffi-
ciency, transfers of production quotas actually took place and the relatively
small transaction costs suggest a relatively efficient outcome. Furthermore,
joint implementation or tradability of agreed emission ceilings is a subject
of intense debate not only in the context of the Framework Convention on
Climate Change but also in the negotiations on a second sulfur protocol in
Europe. In summary, in an international context economic instruments are
expected not only to promote efficiency and cost-effectiveness, but also to
have attractive distributional consequences. Experience will have to show
to what extent these features hold in international practice.
Against this mixed bag of results from theory and simulation models on
the one hand, and empirical evidence on the other, the purpose of this book
is to give an overview of what can be learned from both economic theory
and simulation models, as well practical experience, on the use of economic
instruments, in both national and international contexts. The emphasis of
the book is on local air pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide, rather than global
pollutants such as carbon dioxide or chlorofluorocarbons. Local pollutants
are pollutants for which the environmental impacts depend not only on the
total volume emitted, but also on the location of the source. The book
mainly deals with the use of economic instruments for air pollution control.
Structure of the Book
The book consists of three parts. Part I examines theoretical aspects and
the results of simulation modeling of economic instruments in national con-
texts. Part II focuses on practical, national experiences with economic
instruments, and Part III features international applications of economic
incentives, particularly emissions trading and joint implementation, and ex-
plores theoretical issues, modeling results, and practical design issues.
Part I starts with a review by Atkinson of the theoretical properties
as well as the results of empirical simulation models on tradable discharge
permits (Chapter 1). Atkinson examines the impact of both constraints on
local air quality degradation and long-range transport of acidifying pollu-
tants, as well as the effects of sequential, bilateral trading on the potential
cost savings of tradable discharge permit systems. He also discusses the
equity features of tradable discharge permit systems. After elucidating the
basic theoretical features of both ambient and emission permit systems, a
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comparison is made with tax strategies. Then the impact of local air qual-
ity concerns, long-range externalities and the bilateral, sequential nature
of trades on the cost-effectiveness of ambient permit systems in a num-
ber of simulation models is analyzed. Finally, the distributional impacts
of auctioning and grandfathering tradable permits are examined. Atkinson
concludes that constraints on local air quality degradation, as well as on
long-range transport can considerably reduce the potential cost savings of
both ambient and emission permit systems. Similarly, sequential trading,
even with full information, can erode the cost savings of tradable discharge
permits. One way out might be the use of ambient permits based on only
the most polluted receptor. Auctioning of tradable discharge licenses is ex-
pected to reduce their political acceptability since compliance costs increase.
Grandfathering appears to be called for to circumvent equity problems.
In Chapter 2, Pototschnig presents a partial equilibrium approach in
modeling the use of economic incentives for controlling acidifying sulfur
emissions resulting form large combustion plants in the United Kingdom.
After sketching the relevant policy background and the arguments for intro-
ducing economic incentives, the author goes on to describe the simulation
model used for the different sectors: a model simulating the dispatch merit
order for the electricity supply industry and a cost minimization approach
for refineries and other industries. The results of the simulation exercise
are coupled with a description of practical aspects surrounding the use of
tradable emission permits. The author concludes that the use of tradable
emission permits would be more appropriate than charges. The potential
cost savings of introducing tradability of existing emission quotas for only
the electricity supply sector would be limited, due to the similarities in the
power station mix among the electricity suppliers. Extending the market
to refineries and other industries would considerably increase the savings in
resource costs.
In Chapter 3, Robinson, Geoghegan and Subramanian leave the narrow
realms of a partial equilibrium approach and apply a general equilibrium
model to the air quality problem in the Los Angeles basin in order to sim-
ulate the direct and indirect economic impacts of emission taxes on air
pollution. They start with a discussion of existing regulatory instruments
and the new market-based program to control air pollution in the Los Ange-
les region, and then summarize existing general equilibrium models, specific
features of their regional model, and the way in which pollution abatement
is treated. The results of imposing emission charges on sulfur dioxide, nitro-
gen oxides and reactive organic gases on levels of pollution, control costs,
and regional value added are described for two cases: with and without
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technical pollution control measures. The authors find that for levels of
emission reductions up to around 30%, total pollution control costs as well
as the negative impacts on regional value added, are relatively small. This
is so because these levels can be attained with technical abatement mea-
sures only. More significant reductions would require much higher emission
charges to induce the necessary structural changes in the regional economy.
Part II starts with an overview by Opschoor of the application of eco-
nomic instruments in OECD countries, especially for air pollution control
followed by four chapters containing country-specific case studies.
In Chapter 4, Opschoor describes the current application of economic
instruments in OECD countries, and discusses the developments in their
use since the publication of the first OECD survey in 1987. After describ-
ing the various instruments, Opschoor provides a comprehensive overview of
the use of emission and product charges, deposit-refund systems, tradable
permits, and enforcement incentives, especially for air pollution. Subse-
quently, the rationales for using economic and financial instruments are
explored, and finally, the observed changes in instrument use are related to
changes in policy context. Opschoor concludes that the use of economic in-
struments, particularly of product charges and deposit-refund systems, has
increased since 1987. Half of the product and emission charges employed
today are intended to change behavior, although in most cases the data do
not allow straightforward conclusions to be drawn on the actual incentive
impact. Opschoor concludes that new elements have emerged in discussions
on economic instruments, including explicit reference to institutional fail-
ure, the relevance of the policy context for instrument choice, awareness of
uncertainty, interest in harmonization, the need for pragmatism, and the
growing demand for financing environmental measures. The relative role
for economic instruments and direct regulation might be changing in favor
of the former. It is also clear, however, that economic instruments tend to
remain complements to rather than substitutes for traditional regulatory
approaches.
In Chapter 5, Lovgren describes and analyzes the rather unique expe-
rience in Sweden, with its relatively high emission charges for sulfur and
nitrogen oxides and the differentiation of the tax on diesel fuels. First,
Lovgren provides an overview of the economic incentives for air pollution
currently being used in Sweden against the background of the Swedish en-
ergy demand structure and environmental problems. Then, she describes
the design of the sulfur tax, its impact on emissions, and its administra-
tive practicability. Subsequently, the nitrogen oxides charge on combustion
plant emissions is treated, and the monitoring requirements, administration
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costs, and the environmental impacts are assessed. The differentiation of
the tax on diesel fuels constitutes the final part of her contribution. Lovgren
is of the opinion that, although they were combined with traditional forms
of regulation, the sulfur tax, the nitrogen oxides charge, and the differenti-
ation of the tax on diesel fuels were the major forces behind the emission
reductions observed.
The development of emissions trading for air pollution control in the
USA, as an additional asset in the policy makers' ongoing search for an
optimal portfolio of instruments, is examined by Kete (Chapter 6). After
describing the Clean Air Act, she turns to a discussion of the US experience
with economic instruments, especially the emissions trading and marketable
permit programs. In doing so she sketches the evolution of the US Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's (EPA) emissions trading policy of the 1970s
up to the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990. The latter, with its endorse-
ment of sulfur emissions trading between utilities all over the USA, has been
one of the most rigorous attempts to apply a tradable permit system. She
concludes that the US acid rain sulfur trading program differs fundamen-
tally from the EPA's emissions trading program. Because of its carefully
designed institutional structure the acid rain program is expected to lead to
a smoothly functioning market in emission permits, while ensuring that the
programs goals are met and that both local and regional environmental pro-
tection are not affected. This is achieved by combining existing air quality
provisions and technology-based (emission) standards with rigorous control
mechanisms such as permanent emission caps, explicit emission baselines,
continuous emission monitoring, emission tracking, and enforcement penal-
ties well above the marginal control costs.
Chapters 7 and 8 deal with the application of economic instruments in
countries in transition to a market economy. The implementation and effec-
tiveness of damage-based air pollution taxes and environmental investment
funds in Estonia is the subject of the contribution by Kallaste (Chapter 7).
First, he describes the use of economic instruments in environmental pol-
icy in Estonia: emission charges, administrative charges, tax differentiation,
subsidies, and noncompliance fees. Then he explains how, interestingly, the
emission charge for air pollution is based on a weighted average of the vol-
ume of the emissions, the size of the polluted area, land use in the polluted
area, and the risk to human health of the pollutants emitted. Subsequently,
the impacts of these charges on actual firm behavior are examined. Fi-
nally, the operation of the Estonian Environmental Fund as the institution
that collects and redistributes the revenues from economic instruments is
addressed. Kallaste's major conclusion is that the air pollution charges
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introduced in Estonia were set too low to effectively lead to a reduction in
pollution. This low charge level was a political decision to avoid closure
of industries. The effectiveness of the system has been further eroded by
extremely high levels of inflation and monetary reforms, and is still being
undermined by Estonia's slow development to a market economy, implying
that elements of the former centrally planned economy, such as soft budget
constraints, centrally fixed prices and investments, still exist in many sectors
of the economy.
The difficulties associated with the application of economic instruments,
especially emission charges for air pollution under conditions of economic
reform, are also the subject of the contribution on Russia by Golub and
Strukova (Chapter 8). The main question they address is the extent to
which the introduction of economic instruments has created incentives for
polluters to alter their behavior. They start by describing the command-
and-control system in place before the introduction of economic incentives.
Subsequently, they describe the introduction ofan experiment with emission
fees based on damage estimates or on the level of expenditures necessary
for pollution control, and the adoption and recent modification of these
fees for the whole of Russia. Finally, they estimate the impacts of the
fee system on expenditures for environmental protection and on emissions.
They conclude that although the command-and-control system was unable
to solve many environmental problems in the former Soviet Union, to some
degree it did prevent further deterioration. The introduction of fees did
lead to an increase in the number of enterprises with agreed emission levels
and standards, but in spite of economic decline, the pollution intensity per
unit of GNP has increased and the share of investments in pollution control
abatement in GNP has dropped. The environmental management system
and the fees have not been very effective in protecting the environment. The
fees are not high enough to provide the revenues necessary for environmental
protection because in many cases the fees could not be collected due to the
insolvency of many enterprises. Furthermore, the fees do not appear to have
created incentives for firms to invest in pollution control equipment, and in
most cases have led to an increase in output prices rather than increased
environmental investments.
Part III contains four studies dealing with international aspects of the
implementation of economic instruments. The efficiency gains and distri-
butional implications of joint implementation and tradable emission quotas
for controlling greenhouse gases are examined by Bohm in Chapter 9. After
a comparison of the pros and cons of different carbon taxes compared to
quantity controls, Bohm asks whether joint implementation can be efficient,
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monitored reliably, and can evolve into a system of tradable emission quo-
tas. Subsequently, he discusses the impact of abatement costs and increased
fossil fuel use on the distributional implications of quota tradability for both
developing and industrialized countries. In conclusion, Bohm maintains that
a serious drawback of joint implementation is the difficulty of estimating the
net emission reduction from individual projects. Joint implementation does
seem to be politically acceptable and appears to be an easy way to start,
although it is doubtful whether this will lead to a significant increase in effi-
ciency. In contrast to joint implementation, Bohm expects quota tradability
to improve efficiency, especially if developing countries could be encouraged
to participate.
In a theoretical contribution, Nentjes analyzes the extent to which var-
ious motives influence the effects of financial transfers on the welfare gains
of parties to international agreements (Chapter 10). Nentjes starts with a
survey of the essential concepts of a cooperative and noncooperative Nash-
Cournot equilibrium and market equilibrium in the context of a two-country
model of reciprocal transboundary pollution. Then he replaces the standard
assumption that countries are only interested in their own costs and level
of pollution, with the alternative assumptions that some countries are also
concerned about the environmental quality in other countries. The question
now is to what extent this alternative assumption leads to a modification of
the standard results. Nentjes proceeds to show that international care can
lead to a change in the rate of exchange of reciprocal emission reduction
commitments in favor of the other country. Alternatively, as a joint im-
plementation project, the country that cares can pay for taking additional
pollution control abroad, while simultaneously increasing its own emissions.
Practical aspects and simulation models of controlling sulfur emissions
in Europe are dealt with in Chapters 11 and 12. F0rsund and Naevdal
model sulfur emissions trading in Europe and discuss possible administra-
tive frameworks within which this could take place (Chapter 11). Against
the background of the negotiations on a new sulfur protocol in Europe, the
authors first review the theory of emissions trading for regional pollutants,
such as sulfur, where the location of the source is relevant. They then dis-
cuss the conditions necessary for making emissions trading between parties
to the protocol worthwhile, and propose the use of exchange rates to guide
bilateral trades. Subsequently, centralized and decentralized administrative
frameworks for dealing with trades are described. Finally, they describe the
results of a model that simulates emissions trading as a bilateral, sequential
process under various assumptions on the initial distribution of emission
reduction commitments. In their model, trading takes place according to
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exchange rates to account for the fact that sulfur emissions disperse nonuni-
formly. They conclude that agreement on environmental objectives and the
minimum-cost solution is needed for the implementation of their system of
emissions trading with fixed exchange rates. Their model results suggest
that the exchange rate emissions trading they propose would be especially
attractive from a cost-effectiveness point of view if the initial distribution
of emissions does not deviate too much from the optimum solution.
In Chapter 12, Burtraw seeks to analyze whether countries or individual
companies should be trading sulfur emission permits in Europe and what
the impact would be on allocative efficiency and cost-effectiveness (pro-
ductive efficiency). First, Burtraw compares the productive efficiency of
allowing countries or individual firms to trade. After a short discourse on
the role of spatial considerations, the author reports on the simulation of
sulfur emissions trading in Europe exploring the performance of bilateral,
sequential trading by both individual enterprises and national governments.
Last, but not least, the impact of the choice of trading agents on alloca-
tive efficiency is examined. Burtraw concludes that it is not obvious whether
cost-effectiveness would be achieved if individual firms rather than countries
were to be the trading agents, although placing permits in the hands of in-
dividual enterprises would ensure that incentives to cut costs would remain
in place. His simulation model results confirm that trading between enter-
prises outperforms trading between national governments. He also finds it
to be unlikely to be rational for individual countries to adopt an incentive-
based approach that promotes allocative efficiency, since this might result
in disadvantages in international trade.
Concluding Remarks
The chapters collected in this book suggest the following conclusions. Con-
straints on local air quality and long-range transport of pollutants, the se-
quential character of trades, and the restriction of trade to sectors with
small differences in marginal costs, might considerably reduce the expected
cost savings from tradable discharge permits. To satisfy equity concerns,
grandfathering of tradable permits seems warranted. As long as environ-
mental objectives can be attained with technical means at relatively low
cost, general equilibrium or macroeconomic impacts also tend to be small,
since structural changes hardly occur.
The practical application of economic instruments in OECD countries,
especially the use of product and emission charges, has increased. Moreover,
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more than in the past, these charges are explicitly designed to have an in-
centive impact although the actual incentive impacts are still largely uncer-
tain. In applying economic instruments, there is a need for pragmatism and
greater attention to the policy context in which they are applied. It is in-
creasingly being recognized that economic incentives are complementary to
rather than substitutes for regulation. The Swedish experience with sulfur
and nitrogen oxides charges shows that charges, combined with regulation,
can be set so as to achieve the desired environmental impacts. The expe-
riences in Russia and Estonia, however, suggest that pollution taxes may
fail to affect behavior, especially in countries in transition due to the lack of
political will to set charges at levels that may lead to the closure of firms,
hyperinflation and monetary reforms, as well as the lack of competition and
the continued prevalence of centralized planning in major industrial sec-
tors. Even in the US market economy, radical reforms in the application of
emissions trading under the 1990 Clean Air Act, in order to ensure fluid per-
mit markets, are combined with command-and-control elements such as air
quality and emission standards and rigorous monitoring and enforcement.
In the international context, trading of carbon quotas holds the promise
of being more efficient than joint implementation, especially if developing
countries can be encouraged to participate. Concern for the environment
in other countries forms an additional incentive for joint implementation
of emission reductions but care for other countries' pollution control costs
might have the opposite impact. Sulfur emissions trading in Europe can
be used to promote the cost-effectiveness of a new sulfur protocol but re-
quires agreement on the objectives and the use of exchange rates reflecting
the atmospheric dispersion of sulfur. Trades can proceed decentralized or
centralized, but trading between individual firms is expected to outperform
trading between national governments in terms of cost-effectiveness. As
with the national application of economic instruments, learning-by-doing
seems to be required at the international level, to find both the optimal mix
of instruments and the most appropriate institutional design.
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Chapter 1
Tradable Discharge Permits:
Restrictions on Least-Cost
Solutions
Scott E. Atkinson
Department of Economics
University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA
Abstract
Conceptually, tradable discharge permit systems have the potential to yield the
least-cost solution to achieve ambient standards. Empirical evidence indicates that
command-and-control solutions are substantially less cost-effective. Despite this,
few emissions trades have been made in the USA or Europe. This paper attempts
to explain this phenomeno'n by measuring the substantial reductions in potential
cost savings due to restrictions on local environmental degradation, the generation
of externalities, and the nature of real-world trading of permits. We model the ef-
fects of zonal trading, emissions trading rules, and limits to acid deposition, as well
as the bilateral and sequential nature of actual emissions trades. We also examine
compromise systems that recoup some of these losses. Schemes to optimally se-
quence trades capture only some of the potential cost savings of an ambient permit
system. However, an ambient permit system based on the single worst receptor
preserves most of the potential cost savings of a full ambient permit system. For
any of these systems, permits will most likely need to be grandfathered to satisfy
equity concerns.
Key words: tradable discharge permits, least-cost solutions, ambient permits,
emission permits, externalities, long-range acid deposition, emissions trading rules,
zonal trading, sequential and bilateral trading, equity.
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1.1 Introduction
Since the early 1970s, economists have modeled the costs of tradable dis-
charge permit (TDP) systems relative to those of the command-and-control
system for achieving air quality standards. Under these systems, the pol-
lution control authority is required to know the optimal number of permits
to issue, and how individual source emissions map into ambient air quality,
but does not need to know individual source marginal control costs. Sources
could be required to purchase either of two types of permits for each pol-
lutant that it discharges. Emission permits (EPs) could be required for
each unit of uncontrolled emissions, or ambient permits (APs) could be re-
quired for each unit of ambient degradation at one or more receptors. High
marginal cost of control sources purchase permits from low marginal cost of
control sources, which actually control emissions.
Proofs of the existence of a competitive least-cost equilibrium for an am-
bient permit system have been provided by Baumol and Oates (1971) and
Montgomery (1972). This system yields least-cost regional emission control
for achieving a given level of air quality measured at regional receptors.
Each source must purchase APs from each receptor that the source affects,
if the receptor registers ambient readings equal to the standard. Consider-
able empirical evidence from mathematical programming simulations, much
of which is summarized in Tietenberg (1985), indicates that savings from
adopting an AP system is substantial relative to the command-and-control
solution.
In 1975 the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initiated the
Emissions Trading Program, which was designed to allow the maximum
cost-reducing trading activity while maintaining local air quality standards
and limiting long-range pollutant deposition. The control authority can al-
low trading of EPs but must ensure "nondegradation", Le., that national
ambient standards are satisfied and that aggregate emissions do not in-
crease. To enforce national ambient standards, some states require that
emissions trades result in a net reduction in emissions; some employ trad-
ing within small zones to minimize "hot spots" (which are a violation of the
ambient standard in a region that was formerly in compliance); and others
require dispersion modeling. For nonuniformly mixed pollutants such as
sulfur dioxide (S02), nitrogen oxides, and particulates, air quality is a func-
tion of the level of emissions and their location. Therefore, whenever trades
involve discharge points with different stack heights or locations, increased
degradation of air quality is possible. Emission reduction credits are issued
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to sources which overcontrol emissions. These credits either can be used by
a firm to satisfy the standard at another discharge point or can be sold.
While cost savings have been smaller and trades fewer than expected
under the Emissions Trading Program, trading activity may increase due
to recent legislation. The Wisconsin Fox River TDP program, as described
in Hahn (1989), produced only one trade and minimal cost savings. Only
about half a dozen firms negotiated in each of two trading clusters, so that
markets were thin. Further, only pulp and paper mills were involved so
that marginal costs may have been too similar and pressures not to partic-
ipate may have been substantial. In nonattainment areas (where ambient
air quality standards are exceeded), while more trades have occurred be-
tween different sources within a given firm, fewer inter-firm trades have
been observed. Some inter-firm trading has been observed in the tetraethyl
lead trading program of 1982-1987 (Hahn, 1989). While refineries traded
and banked lead rights to achieve estimated cost savings of $228 million,
participation was limited in terms of geography and type of firm.
Recent acid rain legislation may stimulate more emission trades. To
reduce acid rain, the Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments of 1990 (Public
Law 101-549) required a reduction in S02 emissions by 10 million tons
(US Congress, 1990). This is to be implemented by giving S02 EPs to
electric utilities, which can be bought and sold nationwide or banked for
future use, thereby extending earlier efforts by the EPA to introduce the
"bubble" and "offset" policies. The former allows an existing emitter to
relax the control on one or more sources of a particular pollutant, provided
that it secures an equivalent reduction of the same pollutant from some
other nearby source. The latter allows new sources of pollution to enter
a region where ambient standards are already exceeded, provided that the
new source procures sufficient reductions in emissions from existing sources
(above their previously mandated levels) to guarantee that the air quality
will be improved as a result of the transaction.
Many characteristics of TDPs may have prevented their potential cost
savings from being realized, as discussed in Howe (1993). He compares
TDP systems versus taxes in terms of geographic applicability, predictability
of outcome, minimum cost achievement of standards, revenue generation,
dynamic adaptability to changing pollution demands, incentives to adopt
innovative pollution technology, equity, bias against new entry, and possible
causes of inefficiency.
In this paper, while I also discuss the equity features of TDPs, I differ
from Howe by concentrating on the reduction in potential cost savings of
TDP systems due to: (1) constraints on local or external environmental
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degradation, and (2) the bilateral and sequential nature of real-world trad-
ing of TDPs. In the process of minimizing control costs, the AP system
increases emissions relative to the EP and, typically, the command-and-
control systems. Further, the AP system creates strong incentives to build
taller stacks for the release of pollutants, which results in externalities in
the form of inter-country transport of pollutants. However, the Emissions
Trading Program disallows trades that increase emissions, and seeks to re-
duce long-range acid deposition. Restrictions on the AP and EP systems
can involve the use of trading zones within local airsheds and countries,
emission trading rules which employ constraints on total emissions and lo-
cal ambient degradation, and EPs for long-range deposition. We estimate
the effects of these restrictions on the potential cost savings of TDPs. An
ambient permit system based on only the most degraded air quality receptor
appears to hold promise as an administratively simple system that captures
most of the cost savings of the AP system. However, it shares the other
fundamental characteristics of the AP system. Pollution permits are typi-
cally traded in a sequential and bilateral manner. Recent research indicates
that the gains from such trade will fall considerably short of the savings
that could be obtained from instantaneous trading. A number of full and
limited-information trading systems are considered. Finally, since substan-
tial resistance to TDPs has also been raised on equity grounds, the financial
burden of auctioning and "grandfathering" of TDPs is also considered.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we
first review the formulation of the AP and EP systems and summarize their
basic theoretical and empirical properties. Section 1.3 adds an additional
perspective on TDPs by drawing a comparison with tax strategies. Sec-
tion 1.4 focuses on the role of restrictions on local degradation, externalities,
and bilateral and sequential trading in reducing the least-cost potential of
the AP system. The equity of alternative systems for distributing TDPs is
addressed in Section 1.5. A summary and suggested modifications of TDPs
follows in Section 1.6.
1.2 Pure Ambient and Emission-Based TDPs
Considerable linear programming effort has been devoted to modeling AP
and EP systems. Most of this effort has focused on two alternative ap-
proaches, differing in the structure of the constraint relationships. The AP
model employs individual-source marginal control costs and individual emis-
sion dispersion characteristics to compute the allowable source emissions
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which will achieve ambient air quality standards at least cost. The EP
model also uses individual-source marginal control costs, but assumes that
a unit of emissions will have the same impact on ambient air quality regard-
less of the source.
Although any nonlinear convex control cost function can be assumed
for the firm, we employ a quadratic function for simplicity. Then the am-
bient least-cost (ALC) problem is the solution to the following quadratic
programming problem:
min z = :~:::>jXj +Ldjx],
J
(1.1 )
subject to L aijXj ~ bi,
J
i = 1, .. . ,m, (1.2)
Xj ~ 0, j = 1, .. . ,n, (1.3)
where bi is the reduction in particulate concentration required to achieve
the standard at the ith receptor (i = 1, ... , m); cj,dj are coefficients rep-
resenting the cost of control per day for the jth source (j = 1, ... , n); x j
is the number of tons to be removed per day by the jth source; and aij is
the transfer coefficient which relates emissions from the jth source to air
quality at the ith receptor.
Equation (1.2) guarantees that reductions in ambient concentrations
will be at least sufficient to meet the standard at receptor i. The shadow
prices which solve the dual to the ALC problem become permit prices in
the AP system. Firms must purchase a permit for each receptor where they
produce ambient degradation, as long as that receptor is degraded to the
level of the ambient standard, i.e., the corresponding constraint is "binding" .
Ambient air quality standard q implies a unique by (q = 1, ... , t) at
each receptor. The volume of ambient permits to be issued at receptor i for
standard q is
Pq = u· - b~t t t , i=l, ... ,m, (1.4 )
where Ui is uncontrolled air quality at receptor i; and by is required im-
provement in air quality at receptor i for standard q.
Assuming that costs are a quadratic function of emission control, we can
write the emissions least-cost (ELC) problem as the solution to a quadratic
programming problem:
8mm z
subject to
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(1.5)
(1.6)
and (1.3), where e is the aggregate amount of regional emissions that must
be removed to meet ambient standards at the region's worst air quality
receptor.
For the ELC solution to be comparable to the ALC solution, the x j
from the ELC solution must satisfy (1.2) with at least one equality. Unless
pollutants are uniformly mixed, it will not be known a priori whether a
given e will be sufficient to accomplish this, since (1.2) is not part of the
ELC solution. If no constraint holds with equality, then e must be scaled
down. If air quality standards are violated, e must be scaled up.
There are many similarities between the AP and EP formulations and
their implicit assumptions. The objective function to be minimized in (1.1)
and the constraints in (1.3) are the same for both permit strategies. All
sources have a dynamic incentive to lower their marginal costs of control
through R&D. Both formulations assume competitive markets, the inde-
pendence of individual source control functions, rule out synergistic effects
among pollutants or individual source emissions, and assume linearities in
the transfer coefficients.
Important differences exist between the two systems as well. Under the
AP system, the control authority only has to decide on how many permits
to issue, as defined by (1.4). It is not required to know individual source
marginal control costs or transfer coefficients. The competitive market pro-
duces the primal solution by generating permit prices as defined in the dual
solution. In the EP system, since the constraint inequality in (1.2) is re-
placed by (1.5), a uniform market price obtains for all EPs. To satisfy (1.2)
with at least one equality, the control authority will most likely have to
adjust the volume of permits over time as they are traded among sources.
Atkinson and Lewis (1974, 1976) examined the costs of control of the
27 largest point source emitters of particulate matter in the St. Louis region
for the EP and AP systems. Costs under the AP strategy are substantially
less than those under the EP strategy, because of its simplifying assumption
that emissions from all sources have the same impact on air quality. There-
fore, the EP model describes the least costly control strategy to achieve a
required reduction in regional mass emissions, but not necessarily a required
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level of ambient air quality, which is achieved by the AP system. The EP
system results in substantial overcontrol of more distant sources or ones with
taller stacks, thus increasing the cost to achieve specified air quality levels.
Individual states in the USA are required to prepare so-called "command-
and-control" air quality strategies, which are State Implementation Plans
(SIPs) that provide detailed control requirements to achieve federal ambient
standards. The SIP strategy which we modeled, representative of state SIP
strategies, is far more costly than either of the TDP strategies over a wide
range of air quality. This is because both individual marginal control costs
and emission dispersion characteristics are ignored in developing the SIP
strategy. The SIP strategy is 6-10 times more costly than the AP strategy,
and 1.3-6 times more costly than the EP strategy, which enjoys one-half of
the cost savings of the AP strategy. These results are consistent with those
of McGartland and Oates (1985) and others cited in Tietenberg (1985).
The AP system has the potential to become administratively complex.
To ensure the cost-effective allocation of control responsibility among emit-
ters subject to attainment of ambient standards at all receptor locations,
the control authority would have to create separate permit markets for each
pollutant and receptor at which air quality is degraded to the level of the
ambient standard [that is, the constraint is binding in (1.2)]. While few
constraints are binding at the primary standard (designed to protect hu-
man health), nearly all are binding at the secondary standard (designed to
protect human health and welfare). The EP system is simpler, since only
one permit market is required for each pollutant.
A second potential problem with the AP system is that it meets am-
bient air quality standards at each receptor at a lower total cost than the
EP system by allowing more emissions and by more uniformly degrading
ambient air quality. While total emissions are dearly of secondary impor-
tance under the Clean Air Act, increases in emissions through trades have
not been allowed by the courts.
A potential dynamic problem with the EP system is that it may fail
to meet ambient standards as new sources enter a region. This system
guarantees that total emissions will remain unchanged as new sources enter
a region, since each new source must purchase EPs from existing sources
(offsets). If, however, the permits are purchased from emitters in relatively
dean parts of the region and are used in relatively polluted parts of the
region, hot spots may result.
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1.3 Alternatives: Tax Strategies
With limited information, the AP strategy appears to be superior to tax
strategies. Without knowledge of source marginal control costs and transfer
coefficients, control authorities would have to impose an ad hoc uniform
emissions tax. Both an EP system and a uniform emissions tax would have
to be revised iteratively to meet air quality standards, whereas to implement
the AP system, the control authority only needs to decide on the number
of permits to issue. Iterative adjustment of this number and knowledge of
individual control costs or transfer coefficients are not required. However,
tax and permit systems share the same desirable characteristics that cost-
minimizing decisions would be made internally by the firm and plants are
given the incentive to adopt the most cost-effective control technology. In
addition, the administrative costs of both TDP systems and the tax system
should be less than those of the SIP system.
A second tax strategy involves levying taxes, determined from the ALC
or ELC dual algorithms, on all source emissions. The information require-
ments are obviously far greater than with the TDP systems. The set of ALC
(ELC) taxes achieves the required ambient air quality (emission reduction)
at minimum cost, while taxing in relation to environmental degradation. An
ALC- based tax would imply different emission taxes for different sources,
since in the ALC dual solution shadow values differ across receptors and
transfer coefficients differ across sources. An ELC- based tax would imply a
uniform emissions tax for all sources, since a single, worst-air-quality recep-
tor is employed and all source emissions are assumed to be uniformly dis-
persed. These taxes reproduce the ALC and ELC primal solutions. Sources
required to control in the primal solution are taxed at a rate equal to the
marginal cost of control in the minimum-cost solution, and those not re-
quired to control are taxed at a rate less than marginal cost (to raise tax
revenues) or at a zero rate (if no additional revenues are desired). Taxing
all emissions provides dynamic incentives for all sources to undertake R&D
to lower the marginal costs of control. The tax rate itself will decline for
a given air quality improvement if lower marginal cost control devices are
adopted.
Private compliance costs comprise control costs and emissions taxes (or
permit charges), the latter of which are not social costs. However, large
compliance costs may appear inequitable and make the implementation of
a strategy infeasible politically. As an example from Atkinson and Lewis
(1976), under the ALC-based tax strategy, compliance costs per year at
the primary standard are approximately $303,750, comprising $66,332 in
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control costs and $237,418 in taxes on uncontrolled emISSIOns, compared
with $66,332 under the AP system. However, this tax strategy is less ex-
pensive than the EP system costs of $306,859, and substantially less than
the SIP strategy costs of almost $3,000,000.
1.4 Modified TDPs
We now examine a number of constraints to the AP and EP solutions which
reduce their cost savings. First, we hold emissions and air quality constant
by employing trading zones, constraints on long-range deposition, or emis-
sions trading rules. Then, we attempt to model the sequential and bilateral
nature of TDP trading.
1.4.1 Zonal TDP systems with emissions constraints
Atkinson and Tietenberg (1982) examined how TDP markets that minimize
the costs of achieving air quality standards can be simplified to reduce the
administrative burden and still capture most of the cost savings of the AP
and EP systems. A highly simplified version of the AP system, the highest
ambient permit (HAP) system, defines a single permit market in terms of
the most degraded receptor. This system can be written as:
min z
subject to
(1.7)
(1.8)
and (1.3), where b* is the greatest required reduction in pollution concen-
tration among the i receptors; and aj is the transfer coefficients relating
emissions from source j to ambient concentrations at the receptor with the
greatest required reduction in pollution concentration.
Three multiple-zone modified EP systems were also examined which
allow trades only within zones. They are characterized by the same pro-
gramming problem:
mIll Z
subject to w=I, ... ,r
(1.9)
(1.10)
and (1.3), where ew is the aggregate required emissions reduction in zone
w; and bjw equals 1 if source j is in zone w, and 0 otherwise. The value of
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ew is determined as the sum of SIP allowed emissions within each zone or
computed using an ambient rollback calculation.
The HAP system achieves the desired air quality goals at a cost only
slightly higher than the AP system. While an influx of new sources could
cause a "hot spot" problem, the probability that firms will relocate in re-
sponse to environmental costs is small. Total emissions will increase relative
to the SIP strategy.
We also examine systems that divide the region into zones to limit the
hot spot problem. The first is a system of uniform zones within which
EPs can be traded. However, this uniform zonal discharge permit (UZDP)
system increases compliance costs and fails to consistently reduce the possi-
bility of hot spots. We also consider larger zonal discharge permit systems,
each of whose zones exceed those under the UZDP system. For most ex
ante air quality levels, at least one of the larger zone systems has a lower
reading at the worst receptor than the UZDP system and yields cost savings
between those of the UZDP and HAP systems. However, total control costs
are considerably lower than under the SIP system.
All of the permit systems examined except the AP system allow air
quality at some receptors to exceed the standard. Hence, all permit systems
other than this system will require some safety margin to ensure compliance
at all receptors.
1.4.2 TDP Systems with constraints on externalities
The dramatic increase in acid rain deposition in the northeastern USA and
large parts of Canada over the past few decades has been well documented.
Although most of this increase has been traced to Midwestern sources, it is
not primarily due to increased levels of S02 emissions, as was once widely
thought; these emissions have remained relatively constant. Instead, one
major cause appear to be the more complete oxidation of S02 into sulfates
(S04) and hence acid rain, through the greater use of coal to produce elec-
tricity during summer months. A second major cause is an approximately
threefold increase in the height of emission stacks, which results in a greater
percentage of S02 emissions traveling longer distances, greater conversion
of S02 to S04 in transit, and therefore greater long-range acid deposition.
Under the pre-1990 system of controls based on SIPs, most Midwestern
sources were allowed to increase stack heights in lieu of installing S02 flue
gas desulfurization equipment (popularly known as "scrubbers"). Increased
stack heights sufficiently reduced ambient S02 concentrations at ground
level to satisfy federal ambient standards in a local airshed.
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From Atkinson (1983), greater long-range acid deposition is typically
created by a local AP system than by a local EP system, [ince total emis-
sions per unit of ground-level concentration of the pollutant is at least as
great under the former. Further, more emissions are released at a greater
stack height and more emissions are transported from the region under the
AP system. If local cost savings under this system are substantial, political
pressure for its adoption may be great. However, increased long-range acid
deposition may lead to a nonoptimal global solution. Further, when exter-
nalities are internalized under a global AP system by limiting the amount
of long-range acid deposition, the cost advantage of this system may be re-
duced sufficiently to make its adoption nonoptimal relative to a global SIP
system.
To determine the magnitude of control cost savings as well as increased
long-range acid deposition under these local and global systems, Atkinson
(1983) solved a nonlinear program using data on S02 control costs and
transfer coefficients for major point sources in the Cuyahoga County region
of the Ohio River Basin. This region is presumed to contribute significantly
to acid deposition in Canada and the northeastern USA. Local and global
solutions for the SIP strategy and both EP and AP markets were simulated.
The local solutions were obtained using the quadratic programs that yielded
the previous AP and EP solutions. The global solutions were obtained by
adding the following constraint on long-range S04 transport, which reduces
acid deposition from all sources by a prescribed amount:
(1.11)
where a v is the long-range transport coefficient mapping S02 emissions from
Cuyahoga County into flg/m 3 of S04 in the vth neighboring region; r is the
required reduction in S04 concentrations in all regions due to Cuyahoga
County S02 emissions; and xJ is the number of tons to be removed per day
by the jth source under the kth strategy (k = SIP, ELC or ALC).
Considering local strategies, the EP strategy is far more costly and the
AP strategy is far less costly than the SIP strategy to achieve local ambient
S02 standards. However, the local AP system loads the local environment
more heavily with S02 emissions at tall stack heights, relative to the current
SIP system. This substantially increase the long-range acid deposition by
the local AP system. When constraints limiting acid deposition are intro-
duced to achieve global solutions, we observe a significant reduction in the
cost savings of the AP relative to the EP and SIP strategies. The remaining
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cost savings may be insufficient to offset the increased transactions costs and
administrative costs associated with implementing the global AP strategy.
The magnitude of environmental loading under the local AP system is
consistent with results of Atkinson and Lewis (1974) and Seskin et ai. (1983).
The former find for St. Louis that the AP system removes 15% (80%) of
the particulate matter controlled by the SIP system and 20% (70%) of that
removed by the EP system at the primary (secondary) air quality standard.
1.4.3 Emissions trading rules
Since the CAA has been interpreted to rule out emissions trades that in-
crease total emissions or degrade ambient air quality, Atkinson and Tieten-
berg (1987) examined emissions trading rules that satisfy this requirement.
The nondegradation offset trading rule is modeled by adding the constraint
(1.12)
to the problem in (1.1)-(1.3), where s* is the minimum amount (in tons) by
which emissions must be reduced regionally as determined by the required
total emissions reduction under the SIP system. This system guarantees
that air quality constraints are satisfied and that total regional emissions
do not increase.
The modified pollution offset system allows trades so long as neither the
pre-trade air quality nor the ambient standards are violated. No constraint
is placed on total emissions. This system combines (1.1) and (1.3), with
L aijXj ~ max{bi , bil, i = 1, ... , n,
J
(1.13)
where bi is the required reduction in pollution concentration at receptor i
to achieve the level of air quality under the current regulatory system.
These two trading rules are alternatives to the pollution offset system
proposed by Krupnick et ai. (1983), which requires that trades cannot vio-
late ambient standards. Our analysis suggests that no single "second-best"
trading rule dominates in all circumstances. The modified pollution offset
can protect the air quality at specific receptors while facilitating trades,
but it typically does so by increasing emissions from tall stacks. Although
the nondegradation offset system has been shown to result in lower control
costs while securing a greater reduction in emissions, this result has also
been shown to be quite sensitive to the nature of the SIP system. In par-
ticular, if we base the SIP control responsibility for achieving the ambient
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standards on the proportion of uncontrolled emissions from each source be-
fore trade is allowed, then the modified pollution offset system obtains a
cost advantage. The use of either trading rule results in substantial cost
reductions relative to the SIP strategy.
1.4.4 Sequential trading
While the bubble policy has resulted in significant cost savings, it has con-
sumed only a small fraction of the trades and cost reductions that appear to
be possible from mathematical modeling of the AP and EP systems. Atkin-
son and Tietenberg (1991) attribute this divergence for nonuniformly mixed
pollutants to the nature of the actual trading process, which is sequential
and bilateral and, hence, differs considerably from the implicitly simultane-
ous trading process modeled in mathematical programming studies.
To explore this issue we employed an algorithm that mimics the essential
elements of the trading process as it actually occurs under the bubble policy.
A full-information, sequential-trading scenario is used to model bilateral
trading where cost savings are maximized. We first create a matrix of the
cost savings from each possible pairwise feasible trade, assuming that only
this trade takes place. All trades are assumed to equalize the marginal
control costs of the two trading firms.
Assume that the fitted total cost function for the jth source is
~ '2 .
Cj = (3jXj, J = 1, .. . ,n,
where ~j is a fitted coefficient. Then fitted marginal cost is
Assume that source 2 has the lower marginal cost, so that
~lXl > ~2X2'
(1.14)
(1.15)
(1.16)
By making (1.13) hold as an equality, we determine the number of permits,
T, that source 2 would sell to source 1 as
(1.17)
and solve for T as
(1.18 )
where the numerator is positive, from (1.13).
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A feasible trade is one that assures that, pre- and post-trade, the ambi-
ent standard is met. The trade producing the largest cost savings is selected
and assumed to be consummated. The emission and air quality vectors are
updated to reflect the post-trade emission patterns, and the cost savings are
recorded. The matrix is then recalculated for the remaining sources (elimi-
nating the row and column corresponding to the two trading partners who
have just traded). This recalculation is required since post-trade air qual-
ities have changed due to the rearrangement of emissions from the trade,
which changes the set of future feasible trades. This process is iterated until
the last feasible trade has been made.
Two limited-information scenarios are also considered. In the first,
trades are sequenced by selecting the firm with the lowest marginal cost
as the seller of permits in each iteration, the best set of feasible trades is
found, and trading is consummated as in the full-information process. In the
second limited-information scenario, the seller in each iteration is selected
randomly and then trades are determined as with the other scenarios.
Again using St. Louis data, the sequential, full-information system
achieves only 88% (50%) of the potential control costs savings of the AP sys-
tem relative to the SIP system to achieve the primary (secondary) standard.
The limited-information systems typically achieve less than one-half of these
savings. Thus, treating the mathematical programming equilibrium as if it
were the emissions trading equilibrium may be a serious misrepresentation
of the emissions trading process. A significant proportion of the gap be-
tween the expected cost savings and those achieved can be explained by the
dynamics of the trading process. Specifically, we showed that a sequence of
bilateral trades which conforms to current EPA regulations produces sub-
stantially less cost savings for a nonuniformly mixed pollutant than the
cost-effective allocation. A sensitivity analysis which recalculated the re-
sults for a variety of assumptions about the target air quality levels and the
nature of the trading process suggested that the results are robust, at least
for our data set.
Theoretical and empirical considerations suggest three principal reasons
why actual trades fail to capture the potential cost savings of theoretically
modeled TDPs. First, cost-effective trades that could be consummated in
a multilateral, simultaneous trading environment cannot be consummated
in a bilateral, sequential trading environment because they would violate
ambient air quality standards. Forcing each individual to trade to sat-
isfy the air quality constraint, as is done by the current policy, is a much
more restrictive condition than requiring that only the final equilibrium sat-
isfies those constraints. Second, both current practice and our simulations
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require that emissions must either be held constant or reduced by each trade.
Reaching the cost-effective allocation from the SIP allocation necessarily in-
volves some trades that allow emissions to increase; these occur when the
acquiring source is near air quality receptors that are already recording
significantly better air quality than that required by the standards. Cur-
rent practice rules out these cost-effective trades. Clearly, this constraint
is more binding on nonuniformly mixed pollutants than uniformly mixed
ones, since in the latter case the location of emissions does not matter. In
fact, most recorded trades involve the latter type of pollutants. Third, all
of the partial-information strategies require traders to secure all possible
TDPs from their trading partner in one-time trades. Greater cost savings
could result if some permits were reserved for subsequent trades.
1.5 Equity Concerns
Total compliance costs consist of all expenditures to control emissions and
payments for permits on uncontrolled emissions. If TDPs are distributed
without charge according to SIP uncontrolled emissions (that is, they are
grandfathered), compliance costs only consist of control costs and firms will
incur no additional costs relative to the SIP control strategy. However, if
the government auctions off the permits, compliance costs consist of pollu-
tion control costs and payments for permits, and individual firm as well as
regional compliance costs may rise. This is sure to elicit claims of inequity
by adversely affected firms.
Tietenberg (1985) summarizes the results of a number of studies which
compute the compliance costs of achieving a common air quality level using
the SIP system relative to systems of APs and EPs which are auctioned to
firms by the government. Typically, while AP systems reduce the financial
burden, EP systems do not.
Atkinson and Tietenberg (1984) consider a stricter test of whether
TDP systems that achieve the primary and secondary standards are Pareto-
optimal relative to the current SIP level of control (where ambient air qual-
ity exceeds the primary standard). Three administrative rules are exam-
ined for improving air quality levels to the primary or secondary standards.
The air quality degradation rule (AQDR) and the uncontrolled emissions
rule (UER) are extensions of the SIP system, which comprises the third
rule. The AQDR rule allocates individual source control in proportion to
its contribution to total ambient degradation, while the UER rule allocates
individual source control in proportion to its share in total emissions. The
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UER rule scales this control responsibility until ambient standards are met.
The EP system is modified to ensure that total emissions are the same as
those achieved with the comparable SIP rule, but the AP system ensures
only that the relevant ambient air quality standards are met and does not
guarantee comparable emissions levels. The total number of permits is fixed
by the air quality standard (in the case of APs) or the emissions target (in
the case of EPs).
Based on the St. Louis data, our calculations indicate that if APs or
EPs are grandfathered, near-Pareto optimality is achieved for the AQDR
and UER allocations to reach the primary standard relative to the initial
SIP control levels. Even if APs are auctioned, less than one-half of the
firms are adversely affected under these two allocation systems for both
TDP systems. Total regional compliance costs are reduced substantially
under both methods of permit allocation, with marginally greater reductions
under grandfathering. However, at the secondary standard, the required
reduction in emissions is so large that it swamps the potential cost savings
offered by both permit systems. Regional compliance costs and the number
of adversely affected firms are dramatically increased. Under auctioning,
the increase in regional compliance costs is 2-15 times greater than under
grandfathering. Compared with the initial SIP control levels, improving
air quality to the secondary standard will impose a large financial burden
no matter which method of allocating control responsibility and permits is
employed. However, from a comparison of the costs of SIP controls after
they have been scaled up to achieve ambient standards, and the compliance
costs of TDP systems at these same standards, TDP systems would appear
to be far more equitable. These results are highly consistent with those
obtained in Atkinson and Tietenberg (1982) for zonal permit systems.
1.6 Summary and Conclusions
Constraints on the AP and EP systems - reflecting limitations on local emis-
sions, long-range acid deposition, and bilateral/simultaneous trading - can
substantially erode the minimum-cost position of both systems to achieve
ambient standards. If TDPs are auctioned off rather than grandfathered,
the increase in compliance costs can easily threaten their political accept-
ability. Bearing this in mind, a number of conclusions and recommendations
can be drawn:
1. The AP system is substantially more cost effective than the SIP and
EP systems and is preferable as long as constraints on local increases in
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emissions and long-range pollution deposition are not binding and the
additional complexity of the AP system is not overly burdensome. The
cost of the CAA's requirement that trades cannot increase emissions is
seen to be substantial. Since there is no theorem guaranteeing that an
EP system will be at least as cost effective as the SIP system, but there
is such a theorem for the AP system, we should not eliminate the latter
from serious consideration.
2. An administratively simple HAP system, which uses the most degraded
air quality monitor, captured nearly all the cost savings of the full AP
system, but removed substantially fewer emissions than the SIP system.
As long as environmental expenses remain relatively small for firms, few
are likely to relocate in response to a single binding constraint, creating
a " hot spot" problem. The cost of constraining emissions to their SIP
level is shown to be substantial.
3. The zonal EP systems we examined capture only a fraction of the po-
tential cost savings and often do little to improve the hot spot problem.
4. For plants with tall stacks, our results indicate that constraints on long-
run deposition substantially reduce the cost advantage of the AP system
relative to those of the SIP system. This is consistent with the heavy
environmental loading from tall stacks under the AP system without
such constraints. Research involving the effects of an HAP system for
achieving local standards and limiting long-range deposition seems to
be called for.
5. The nondegradation offset trading rule captures a large portion of the
cost savings of the AP system, without increasing emissions above the
SIP levels. The cost of a requirement that each trade be subject to offset
ratios of one or larger would most likely be substantial. The properties
of a system combining the nondegradation offset trading rule with a
single (or limited number of) long-range deposition permit(s) should be
investigated.
6. Sequential trading, even with full information, appears to reduce sub-
stantially the cost savings of TDP systems. We should examine modi-
fied systems that move closer to simultaneous trading. For example, we
could allow and even promote repeated, simultaneous trading, with the
right to modify initial agreements during a specified short period. In an
age of complex computerized stock and futures trading, we should not
assume that an AP system, with its requirements that firms purchase
permits at each binding receptor, is too complex to implement. Further,
it should be remembered that APs are required only for binding recep-
tors. We should attempt to facilitate trades by providing complete,
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low-cost information on potential trades (i.e., minimal brokerage fees)
and provide low-cost diffusion modeling to traders. Experimental eco-
nomics laboratories would appear to be an ideal location for research in
this area.
7. As ambient standards tighten from the primary to the secondary stan-
dard, and as compliance is more rigorously enforced, grandfathering of
permits appears to be necessary to avoid complaints about inequity.
Such permits must be equitably provided for new firms that enter an
area.
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Chapter 2
Economic Instruments for
the Control of Acid Rain
in the UK
Alberto Pototschnig
London Economics, London, UK
Abstract
UK environmental policy has traditionally focused on administrative controls. The
paper considers the introduction of market-based instruments in the context of the
control of S02 emissions from large combustion plants. These are responsible for
more than 80% of total emissions in the UK. The analysis focuses on England and
Wales, and considers three separate sectors: the electricity supply industry (ESI),
refineries and other industry. It looks at the options for achieving the emission
quotas for large combustion plants set by the Large Combustion Plant Directive.
Electricity generators are already allowed some discretion, subject to agreement by
the enforcing authorities, to allocate pollution control responsibilities among power
stations within each company. Given the similarity in the power station mix be-
tween National Power and PowerGen, the advantages of extending the mechanism
to include power stations of both companies would be limited. More substantial
savings can be obtained when refineries and other large industrial plants, which
have much higher abatement costs, are included in the scheme. An emission permit
scheme which includes the ESI, refineries and other industry is therefore proposed,
and is preferred to a mechanism based on emission charges. Some features of this
scheme are then discussed.
Key words: acid rain, S02 emissions, economic instruments, tradable emission
permits.
22
Economic Instruments and Acid Rain in the UK
2.1 Introduction
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Environmental objectives can be achieved through a variety of policy in-
struments: the two principal approaches are administrative controls and
market- based instruments. UK environmental policy has traditionally fo-
cused on administrative controls. The widespread use of economic instru-
ments would constitute a stark departure from the current stance.
Over the last few years, however, the use of economic instruments has
begun to gain ground in environmental policy discussions. In 1990, the gov-
ernment recognized that market-based instruments "offer the prospect of a
more efficient and flexible response to environmental issues" (Department
of the Environment, 1990a, par. 1.29). More recently, the government indi-
cated that it "believes that the time has come to deploy them more fully to
achieve environmental objectives" (Department of the Environment, 1992b,
par. 3.44).
This chapter considers these issues in the context of the control of acid
rain in the UK. It focuses on sulfur dioxide, the main source of acid rain, and
draws on the modeling work undertaken by the author and his colleagues
at London Economics, for the Department of the Environment (1992a).
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the policy context
for the control of sulfur emissions in the UK. In Section 2.3, economic
instruments for air pollution control are briefly discussed. The model used
in the simulation is presented in Section 2.4, and the results in Section 2.5.
In Section 2.6, practical aspects of a tradable permit system are discussed.
Section 2.7 presents some concluding remarks.
2.2 Acid Rain in the UK: The Problem and the
Policy Context
Acid rain arises from the deposition in various forms of pollutants such as
sulfur dioxide (S02) and nitrogen oxides (NOx ), among which S02 consti-
tutes the main source. S02 emissions in the UK fell by approximately one-
third between the 1979 peak and 1989, from 5.5 to 3.7 million tonnes. Since
1989, the economic recession has produced further reductions, and by 1991
emissions totaled 3.6 million tonnes. Large static sources - power stations,
refineries and other industrial plants with capacity in excess of 50 MWth
- are responsible for more than 83% of total emissions, a share that has
increased over the years. It seems therefore appropriate here to concentrate
on these sources. The policy context for these sources is represented by:
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• The 1988 Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD), promulgated by
the European Commission (EC, 1988) sets emission standards for new
large combustion plants and national targets for emissions from existing
ones. These targets are specified in terms of percentage reductions
from 1980 levels, and are applied in the UK through the Programme
and National Plan (Department of the Environment, 1990b). The Plan
subdivided the emission targets for the UK into quotas for the electricity
supply industry (ESI), refineries and other industries, and within the
ESI for the two main generators, National Power (NP) and PowerGen
(PG).
• The Environmental Protection Act 1990 (EPA) introduced the system
ofIntegrated Pollution Control (IPC), based on authorizations and reg-
ulation. For air pollution, IPC replaces the regulations of the Health
and Safety at Work Act 1974.
The standards for solid and liquid fuels for new plants, including those
that came into existence after 1 July 1987, imply higher percentage reduc-
tions in emissions for larger plants than for smaller ones. This is a reflection
of the economies of scale in sulfur removal, and indicates the fact that regu-
lation has been planned with some regard to the cost of emission abatement.
The sliding scale used in setting the standards does not appear, however, to
have been designed specifically to achieve economic efficiency. [1 ] Somewhat
more relaxed standards are set for new plants that burn indigenous solid fu-
els if, owing to the particular nature of the fuel, they are unable to meet the
relevant emission levels "without using excessively expensive technology".
For existing plants, Table 2.1 presents the target S02 emission quotas
for England and Wales for 1991, 1993, 1998 and 2003 set by the National
Plan, and compares them with actual emissions in 1991. Partly because of
the economic recession in the UK, the National Plan quotas are currently
higher than actual emissions.
For existing plants falling within the scope of the LCPD, the National
Plan represents the UK government's current policy. In England and Wales,
its implementation is the responsibility of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of
Pollution (HMIP), which subdivides the sectoral ceilings into allocations to
individual existing plants. This is done within the framework of the more
general environmental policy set out in the EPA, which provides for large
combustion plants to become subject to authorization under IPC. One of the
main objectives of the EPA is to ensure that "the best available techniques
not entailing excessive costs (BATNEEC) will be used for minimizing the
pollution which may be caused to the environment taken as a whole by
Economic Instruments and Acid Rain in the UK 25
Table 2.1. National Plan quotas and actual emissions in England and
Wales (in 1,000 tonnes S02)'
2,348
64
162
2,574
n.a.
n.a.
National Plan quotas
1991 1993 1995 1998 2003
NP 1,595 1,497 1,290 982 660
PG 1,077 1,019 878 669 450
ESI total 2,680 2,516 2,168 1,651 1,110
Refineries 86 86 84 82 78
Other industries 273 241 225 201 140
Total 3,039 2,843 2,477 1,934 1,328
Actual
emissions,
1991 a
a Provisional figures.
Source: Department of the Enviroment, 1990b; HMIP, 1993, Table 5.1.
the release [of presc.ribed substances], having regard to the best practicable
environmental options available" [EPA, section 7(7)].
While there is still some uncertainty about the most appropriate ap-
proach to the interpretation of BATNEEC (see Pearce and Brisson, 1993),
for our purposes it suffices to note that Process Guidance Notes, issued by
the Chief Inspector, define the standards that BATNEEC is expected to
achieve. Emission standards for new large combustion plants are the same
as those contained in the LCPD. Existing plants (those in operation before
1 July 1987) are expected to achieve the standards for new plants as soon
as the opportunity arises, and by 1 July 2001 at the latest.
Existing large combustion plants are therefore subject to the National
Plan quotas. It is expected that they will also implement BATNEEC to
achieve new plant standards by 2001 at the latest. Authorizations issued by
HMIP should contain conditions to ensure that, among other things, each
plant contributes to meeting the relevant National Plan quota. The UK has
therefore chosen to implement international commitments by retaining an
emphasis on administrative controls. The only element of flexibility so far is
that each generator in the ESI can alter, during the year, the distribution of
its overall quota among plants. In particular, subject to HMIP agreement,
it is possible for a plant to "be operated after the [quota] allocation has
been exceeded provided that [there are] equivalent offsetting decreases from
other plants under the operator's control" (Department of the Environment,
1990b, par. 19). It is in this context that the potential role of incentive-based
mechanisms has to be judged.
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2.3 Economic Instruments and the
Control of Acid Rain
Economic instruments for air pollution control may take various forms. On
purely theoretical grounds, policies based on emission charges and policies
based on tradable emission permits are recognized to lead to very similar
results. As Weitzman (1974) noted, "generally speaking it is neither easier
or harder to name the right price than to name the right quantities, because
in principle the same information is needed to correctly specify either".
Since the information available to the regulator is usually imperfect, on
practical grounds the choice is between uncertainty over costs and uncer-
tainty over levels of emissions. The issue is whether it is more appropriate
to accurately determine the level of costs that the industry would have to
afford and accept some uncertainty on the outcome in terms of emissions,
or to fix the maximum emission level and accept some uncertainty over the
costs of achieving it. In this sense, permits deliver the prespecified levels
of emissions, equal to the number of permits which have been issued, while
charges are not able to achieve the same accuracy, unless the regulator can
accurately estimate the abatement costs of all sources.
However, the quality of the ambient air, rather than emissions, is the
crucial factor affecting human health, buildings and economic activities.[2]
Air quality standards are set to prevent damage due to excessive pollution.
For pollutants that are not uniformly mixed, the relationship between emis-
sions of pollutants and the quality of the air at specific locations generally
depends on the characteristics of the emitting sources, and the meteorolog-
ical and geographical conditions in which these emissions take place.
Since economic instruments reallocate emissions among different
sources, the resource cost savings that can be achieved by the implemen-
tation of incentive-based mechanisms should be judged against the effect
on air quality, the deposition rate at different locations, and the damage
caused. In environmental policy terms, the trade-off between cost savings
and local air quality is a difficult one. Charges or permit systems may be
based on emissions of pollutants from specific sources, or on the concentra-
tion in the air, or on the deposition of the same pollutants caused by these
emissions.
To be completely effective, air quality control through economic instru-
ments based on concentration or deposition levels would have to involve as
many different charges or classes of permits as there are locations where air
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quality is monitored. Such systems are, however, very complex to imple-
ment and monitor. Furthermore, a large number of different spatial permit
markets would not achieve the thickness required for liquidity. This means
that economic instruments based on concentration or deposition levels have
never been used in practice. Nor have attempts to introduce a spatial con-
sideration in the trading of emission permits, by imposing constraints based
on air quality standards on such trading, been successful.[3]
Strictly speaking, S02 is not a uniformly mixed pollutant. However,
when emitted by high-stack sources, it spreads over large areas. The recent
report of Environment for Europe (1993) quotes studies of the transport
of acid pollutants which show that, on average, only 15%-20% of S02 and
NOx emissions remain in the local area, defined in terms of a 150 km X
150 km2. Similarly, simulation results reported in Ramus (1991) indicate
that less than 30% of the UK's S02 emissions are deposited on UK soil.
It is therefore possible to treat S02 emitted from large combustion plants
as a uniformly mixed pollutant, at least when designing policy frameworks
within individual regions or countries. The simulations presented in this
paper do not take the spatial dimension into account. Furthermore, in
our modeling we restrict our attention to one type of economic instrument,
namely emission charges. However, given the theoretical equivalence be-
tween policies based on charges and permits noted above, the results can
also be interpreted in terms of tradable permits. The choice between charges
and permits is considered in Section 2.6.
2.4 The Model
A simulation approach has been used to determine the impact of incentive-
based policies to reduce S02 emissions. Based on the data briefly described
below, the impacts of incentive-based mechanisms have been modeled by
imposing a charge, denominated in £ per tonne of S02 emitted, on different
sectors. The model and the data used in the simulation are described in
detail in Department of the Environment (1992a).
In the UK, large combustion plants account for more than 83% of S02
emissions. Among these, the ESI is responsible for the largest share. The
simulations focus on England and Wales, due to the lack of comparable
data available for Scotland, and consider three separate sectors: the ESI,
refineries, and other industries.
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2.4.1 The electricity supply industry
The organization of the ESI in England and Wales is based on a two-tier
structure, where generators sell electricity to regional electricity companies,
generally through a "Pool" system. Electricity generation is in the hands of
a small number of companies. At privatization, plants running on traditional
technologies were assigned to two private-sector operators, NP and PG,
while nuclear generation was left in the hands of the government and run
by Nuclear Electric.
The Pool creates strict links between the actions of different generat-
ing units: subject to network constraints, generating units are dispatched
to supply electricity in merit order, i.e. according to the price at which
they offer to supply. Our modeling has been based on London Economics'
electricity supply model (POOLMOD), a detailed simulator of the dispatch
merit order of all the available units in the England and Wales electricity
system. The model matches capacity to demand by using the lowest-cost
sets available in each half-hour time period.
In a competitive market, the Pool arrangements would induce gener-
ating sets to bid at their marginal costs. However, there is some evidence
from the short period since privatization that the two main generators have
at times bid at prices somewhat higher than marginal costs. In the model,
we have not taken into account the strategic considerations that may lead
to this behavior, but rather assumed that the ESI is a competitive sector.
Our base for simulation has been the ESI in England and Wales as it is
likely to be in the mid-1990s. The framework is completely static, so that
no attempt has been made to model the change in plant mix over time,
due to plant retirement and investment in new generating capacity. The
analysis is structured as follows:
• Simulation of the base mid-1990s scenario in terms of output, merit
order and S02 emissions, based on a plant-by-plant analysis of fuel
inputs. The base scenario takes into account the restructuring of the
ESI which is likely to occur after the expiry in 1993 of the (largely
politically dominated) contracts with British Coal. This will leave the
privatized generators free to switch to cheaper fuels, and to cheaper
technologies.
• Simulation, on a plant-by-plant basis, of specific alternatives for emis-
sion reductions (see Section 2.4.3) and estimation of the associated costs
taking into account the characteristics of the individual plants.
• Simulation, on a plant-by-plant basis, of the new generation profile once
the abatement option has been adopted in response to the imposition
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of an emission charge at a specific level. The choice of the emission
reduction option has an effect on the position of the plant in the merit
order and, consequently, on the frequency with which it will be called
to run. This, in turn, affects the choice between abatement techniques
(which may be characterized by both fixed and variable costs), and the
payment of the charge, which varies proportionately with emissions and,
for a fixed level of fuel sulfur content, with output.
• Generation of the new merit order and iteration to the final generator
choice, and hence generation profile. We have assumed that individual
plants seek to maximize profits. When faced with a charge on S02
emissions, each plant chooses the level of abatement that produces the
maximum level of profit. This level depends not only on the level of
the emission charge and the available abatement technologies and their
costs, but also on the choices of the other plants operating within the
Pool.
2.4.2 Refineries and other industries
The simulation of the impact of economic instruments on refineries and
other industries has been based on an inventory of large combustion plants
in 1990 made available by the Warren Spring Laboratory, Department of
Trade and Industry. The inventory contains plant-specific data on capacity
and fuel type for all boilers that fall under the LCPD.
Since we have assumed that refineries and other industry are price takers
for their output, profit maximization is equivalent to cost minimization.
These plants will therefore choose the most appropriate trade-off between
emission reduction and the payment of the charge, in order to minimize
costs for a certain given level of output.
2.4.3 Options for reducing 502 emISSIOns
S02 emissions arise from oxidation during combustion of the sulfur con-
tained in the fuel. Apart from the small proportion of sulfur retained in
the ash, there is a direct relationship between fuel sulfur content and S02
emissions. Two ways to reduce S02 emissions from power stations, refineries
and other industrial plants have been considered in the analysis:[4]
• By using low-sulfur coal in coal-fired boilers or low-sulfur oil in oil-fired
boilers, thus reducing the amount of sulfur involved in the combustion
process. With the wider adoption of environmental policies around the
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world, demand for low- sulfur fuels will increase, and a low-sulfur pre-
mium (LSP) will emerge in the market. In our simulations, we have
assumed a LSP equal to 2% for each 0.1 % reduction in the sulfur con-
tent.[5]
• By removing sulfur from the flue gases by installing flue gas desulfur-
ization (FGD) equipment. This is the most widely used approach for
controlling S02 emissions from large combustion plants. Costs for FGD
technologies exhibit economies of scale with respect to both the sulfur
content of the flue gases and the capacity of the plant. Least-cost emis-
sion abatement is therefore achieved by applying FGDs to large plants
and to those burning high-sulfur fuels.
There are other emission reduction possibilities, such as switching to a
different type of fuel with a lower sulfur content. This can be done either
by substituting the fuel used in a specific plant or by replacing a retiring
plant with a new one burning a different fuel. These options have not
been considered in the analysis. The results of the analysis may therefore
overestimate emission reduction costs.
2.4.4 Scenarios
As discussed in Section 2.2, emissions of S02 from existing large combustion
plants are subject to the emission quotas set by the National Plan. These
plants are also expected to implement BATNEEC standards not later than
1 July 2001.
Although the BATNEEC requirement greatly reduces the scope for any
incentive-based instrument, by implying that each individual source reduces
emissions as much as possible, it would be too optimistic to assume that
all (or most of) the existing large combustion plants would have achieved
new plant standards by the target date. In our simulations, therefore, we
have taken the National Plan provisions as the background against which
the potential role of policies based on economic instruments are analyzed.
Simulations have been conducted to recreate the following situations:
1. The current implementation of the National Plan, assigning separate
emissions quotas to NP, PG, refineries and other large industrial sources.
When applying for authorization under the IPC regime, NP and PG
submit their choices about the way in which they intend to achieve their
allocated quotas, whether by using low-sulfur fuels, by installing FGD
equipment, or by rearranging the generation mix. It is also possible,
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subject to HMIP's agreement, to reallocate emISSIOn quotas during
the year between plants owned by the same generator. [6] The cur-
rent regime can therefore be seen as a market mechanism of some sort,
within each company's set of plants. In our simulations, therefore, each
company is free within these quotas to decide how to allocate emissions
to individual plants.
The National Plan quotas for NP and PG are reduced by 24% be-
tween 1995 and 1998 and by 49% between 1995 and 2003. We have
therefore assumed that compliance with the National Plan implies that
each company would have to reduce emissions, with respect to our base
case, by 24% in 1998 and by 49% in 2003. The National Plan quotas for
refineries and other industries imply percentage reductions with respect
to our base case of 23% and 41 %, respectively, in 1998 and by 27% and
59%, respectively, in 2003.
2. NP and PG are allowed to trade emissions within an ESI overall quota.
Each company may choose to reduce emissions by more than the level
assigned to it by the National Plan and to sell the excess reduction to
the other company, which in turn will be able to reduce emissions by
a correspondingly lower amount. In this case, the required reductions
of 24% and 49% would have to be achieved by the ESI as a whole, but
not by the individual companies. Emission reductions required from
refineries and other industries remain unchanged.
3. A single England and Wales overall quota is implemented, within which
the power companies, refineries and other industries included in the
National Plan quotas are free to trade emissions.
Table 2.2 shows the level of (unabated) emissions from our base case
scenario and compares it with the National Plan quotas for 1995. It also
summarizes the percentage reductions from our base case which we assume
would have to be achieved under the three scenarios considered.
The base scenario simulates the starting situation, in terms of emission
levels, in which polluters make decisions about abatement actions, when
faced by an emission charge. The assumed required percentage reductions
are different from those indicated in the National Plan, since they relate to
the base levels assumed in the simulations, and not to actual emissions in
1980. Furthermore, for the ESI, the assumed required emission targets have
been derived by directly applying the percentage reductions in National
Plan quotas between 1995, 1998 and 2003 to our base case emissions, even
though the latter are not in line with the corresponding 1995 quotas.
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Table 2.2. Base case emissions, National Plan quotas, and assumed re-
quired emission reductions in England and Wales.
Emissions (1,000 tonnes 802 ) Assumed required emission
Base case National Plan reduetionsa (%)
--------'--'-------
emiSSIOns quotas 1998 2003
------ ------
1995 1995 81 82 83 81 82 83
NP
PG
Refineries
Other industries
1,311 1,290 24 } 24 49 }49
653 878 24 49
107 84 22 22 26 27 27
338 225 41 41 59 59
49
aSl = separate quotas; S2 = unified ESI quota; S3 = unified England and Wales quota.
2.5 The Results
The aim is to compare the resource costs of achieving the required emis-
sion reductions under the different scenarios. These are the net costs of the
measures aimed at reducing emissions; they exclude any additional costs
arising from the impact of environmental policies on the operation of the
power Pool system. These additional costs are highly sensitive to the nature
of competition in the electricity market which, at present, is still an unre-
solved issue. An estimate of such additional costs in the case of a perfectly
competitive E8I is included in the results presented in Department of the
Environment (1992a).
2.5.1 Separate quotas
Given the difference in the characteristics of plants in different sectors, and
in the mix of generating plants between NP and PG, the extent to which an
emission charge would affect the level of emissions varies between the two
power companies, refineries and other industries.
In the case of refineries and other industries, the cost minimization
assumption implies that plants operate at points where the marginal cost
of abatement is equal to the emission charge imposed. For the E8I, even
though the more complex interrelationship between different plants means
that profit maximization is not generally equivalent to cost minimization,
the difference between marginal abatement costs and the emission charge
level is minimal. The level of the emission charge is therefore a good ap-
proximation of the marginal cost of abatement.
The E8I is characterized by lower abatement costs than the other two
sectors. In the E8I, there is a range of charge levels over which PG's
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(marginal) abatement costs are lower than those of NP. Figure 2.1 illus-
trates the marginal abatement costs for NP, PG, refineries and other indus-
trial plants and shows the charge levels required to comply with the separate
National Plan quotas for 1998 (Figure 2.la) and for 2003 (Figure 2.16).
The National Plan assigns different emission reduction targets to the
three sectors under consideration, in an attempt to take differences in abate-
ment costs into account. Our results indicate that the National Plan has
not gone far enough in this differentiation. In the case of industrial sources,
it has gone in the opposite direction. It is true, however, that most of the
emission reductions in the industrial sector are expected to come from tech-
nological progress, which is likely to be faster in industry than in refineries
and the ESI. This aspect is not considered in the present analysis.
Marginal abatement costs corresponding to the required emission re-
duction levels are much higher for other industry and refineries than for the
ESI. Within the ESI, costs are lower for PG than for NP. There is therefore
a clear indication that pooling the quotas assigned to the power companies,
to refineries and to other industry would improve economic efficiency. We
now turn to these scenarios.
2.5.2 Unified ESI quota
NP and PG exhibit somewhat different abatement costs over the range of
emission reduction levels that are relevant for compliance with the National
Plan.
We have therefore investigated the possibility of allowing the two com-
panies freedom in achieving the overall ESI quota. Each company decides
its optimal level of emissions reduction with respect to the current charge
level. Similarly, a permit market would give each of the two generators the
possibility of exceeding or stopping short of its own quota and, respectively,
buying or selling "emission credits" to or from the other company.
The National Plan quotas imply reductions in ESI S02 emissions by
24% and 49% by 1998 and 2003, respectively. At both of these reduction
levels, PG is characterized by lower marginal costs than NP. Therefore,
starting from a situation where both companies were required to achieve
these reduction levels, the cost for PG of reducing S02 emissions by one
extra tonne is lower than the reduction in abatement costs for NP from
increasing emissions by a corresponding amount. In an emissions trading
scheme, NP would therefore be willing to pay a price for acquiring the right
to emit an extra tonne of S02 which is higher than the extra costs incurred
by PG to offset NP's increased emissions by increasing abatement.
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Figure 2.1. Marginal abatement costs and S02 emission reductions in-
duced by different levels of charges: separate quotas (a) 1998, (b) 2003.
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As the burden of abatement shifts in this way more and more from NP to
PG, PG's marginal abatement costs would increase, while NP's abatement
costs would decrease, until the point at which they are equal. This is the
equilibrium situation in the scenario where a unified ESI quota is considered.
A charge of £115/tonne S02 applied to both NP and PG would deliver
the 24% reduction in emissions from the ESI required to comply with the
National Plan quotas for 1998. This would be achieved by:
• PG reducing S02 emissions by 26%, or by 18,000 tonnes more than the
level required by its quota.
• NP reducing emissions by 22%, or by 18,000 tonnes less than the level
required by its quota.
If this result were to be achieved through a tradable permit system, it
would involve PG transferring the right to emit 18,000 tonnes to NP at the
equilibrium price of £115/tonne S02 (equal to the equilibrium marginal
abatement costs). The value of the transaction would therefore be in excess
of £2.1 million.
Similarly, a charge of £ 174/tonne S02 would be required to achieve the
National Plan ESI quota for 2003. Again:
• PG would abate S02 emissions by 60% or by 77,000 tonnes more than
the level implied by its quota.
• NP would reduce emissions by 45%, or by 77,000 less than the level
implied by its quota.
If this result were to be achieved through a tradable permit system, it
would involve PG transferring the right to emit 77 ,000 tonnes to NP at the
equilibrium price of £174/tonne S02. The value of the transfer would be
in excess of £13.6 million.
Figure 2.2 compares emissions for NP, PG and the ESI as a whole
with the level required by the National Plan quotas for 2003 and provides a
graphical representation of the levels of charges that would be required to
ensure compliance with these quotas.
2.5.3 Unified England and Wales quota
Refineries and other industries are characterized by much higher abatement
costs (per tonne of S02) than the ESI, primarily due to the smaller scale of
their plants.
In a unified England and Wales quota scenario, it is therefore econom-
ically efficient to shift some of the emission reduction responsibilities from
refineries and other industry to the ESI.
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Figure 2.2. S02 emission reductions induced by different levels of charges
and National Plan quotas: unified ESI quota, 2003.
A charge of £133/tonne S02 applied to the ESI, refineries and other
industry would deliver the 26% reduction in emission levels in England and
Wales required by the National Plan in 1998. This reduction would be
achieved entirely by NP and PG:
• PG would reduce S02 emissions by 35%, or by 85,000 tonnes more than
the level required by its quota.
• NP would reduce emissions by 29%, or by 76,000 tonnes more than the
level required by its quota.
• The ESI would therefore emit 161,000 less than its quota.
• Refineries and other industries would not reduce emissions.
If this result were to be achieved through a tradable permit system, it
would involve refineries and other industries buying "rights" to emit 24,000
and 137,000 tonnes, respectively, from the ESI, at the equilibrium price of
£133/tonne S02. The value of the transfer would amount to £21.4 million.
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Figure 2.3. S02 emission reductions induced by different levels of charges
and National Plan quotas: unified England and Wales quota, 2003.
For 2003, the required level of charge would be equal to £203/tonne
S02, and a similar pattern of emission reductions and emissions trading
would occur:
• PG would reduce S02 emISSIons by 76%, or by 181,000 tonnes more
than the level required by its quota.
• NP would reduce emissions by 52%, or by 43,000 tonnes more than the
level required by its quota.
• The ESI would therefore emit 224,000 less than its quota.
• Refineries and other industries would reduce emissions by 2% and 1%,
respectively.
If this result were to be achieved through a tradable permit system, it
would involve refineries and other industries buying "rights" to emit 27,000
and 197,000 tonnes, respectively, from the ESI at the equilibrium price of
£203/tonne S02. The value of the transfer would amount to £45.5 million.
Figure 2.3 compares emissions for the ESI, refineries, other industries
and for all sources with the level required by the National Plan quotas
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for 2003 and provides a graphical representation of the levels of charges
required to comply with these quotas. The operation of a permit system
under a unified quota is summarized in Table 2.3, where the pattern of
emission trading is illustrated.
2.5.4 Resource costs
What are the resource cost savings arising from transferring the burden of
emission reduction from one company to the other within the ESI, or from
refineries and other industry to the ESI? Table 2.4 presents the resource cost
savings that a unified ESI quota would generate. The savings in resource
costs associated with the introduction of a unified ESI quota are estimated
to be around £0.1 million per annum (p.a.) for achieving emission reduction
levels required by the 1998 quotas and £1.5 million p.a. for 2003. This is
only 0.2% and 1.5% of the total resource costs for the ESI with separate
quotas, estimated to be £32 million p.a. for 1998 and £103 million p.a. for
2003. It should be noted, however, that
• The existing quotas for NP and PG, and the interpretation we have
given to them here, already allow for an optimal allocation of emission
reduction responsibilities within each company.
• Marginal costs do not differ substantially between the two companies.
Larger savings can be achieved by widening the scope of emissions trad-
ing to refineries and other industry. Table 2.5 presents the estimates for the
resource cost savings in this case. Resource cost savings are now more sub-
stantial, due to the large differential in abatement costs between the ESI
and other sources.
To comply with 1998 emission targets under an England and Wales
unified quota, ESI emissions would be 161,000 tonnes lower than under
separate quotas, and costs correspondingly higher by £20 million p.a. But
refineries and other industry will face no need for emission reductions, and
therefore will save £5 million and £39 million p.a., respectively. The net
resource cost saving is therefore equal to £24 million p.a., or 32% of the
total resource costs under separate quotas.
To achieve the emission reduction targets for the year 2003 under an
England and Wales unified quota, ESI emissions would be 224,000 tonnes
lower than in the case of separate quotas, and resource costs correspond-
ingly higher by £42 million p.a. Refineries and other industry would save
almost all costs associated with emission abatement, which in the case of
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Table 2.3. Emission reductions and emissions trading in England and
Wales (in 1,000 tonnes S02)'
Emission reductions, 1998 Emission reductions, 2003
Required Achieved Required Achieved
under under under under
separate unified Difference separate unified Difference
quotas quota (tradeda ) quotas quota (tradeda )
NP 313 389 +76 640 683 +43
PG 155 240 +85 318 499 +181
Refineries 24 0 -24 29 2 -27
Other industries 137 0 -137 198 1 -197
Total 629 629 0 1,185 1,185 0
a+ (positive) signs denote net sellers; - (negative) signs denote net buyers.
Table 2.4. Resource cost savings from a unified ESI quota (£ million p.a.).
Emission reductions to satisfy quotas in:
Resource costs with separate quotas
NP
PG
Total
Resource costs with unified ESI quota
Resource cost savings
(as % of costs under separate quotas)
1998
21.6
10.1
31.7
31.6
0.1
0.2%
2003
71.7
31.6
103.3
101.8
1.5
1.5%
Table 2.5. Resource cost savings from a unified England and Wales quota
(£ million p.a.).
Emission reductions to satisfy quotas in:
Resource costs with separate quotas
NP
PG
Refineries
Other industries
Total
Resource costs with unified
England and Wales quota
NP
PG
Refineries
Other industries
Total
Resource cost savings
(as % of costs under separate quotas)
1998
21.6
10.1
5.4
39.2
76.3
31.4
20.5
0.0
0.0
51.9
24.4
32.0%
2003
71.7
31.6
6.4
61.7
171.4
80.3
63.5
0.5
0.3
144.6
26.8
15.6%
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the separate quotas would amount to £6 million and £62 million p.a., re-
spectively. The total resource cost saving is therefore around £27 million
p.a. This is 16% of the total resource costs involved in achieving emission
standards, estimated at around £171 million p.a.
2.6 The Implementation of Economic
Instruments
The results presented in the previous section suggest that a policy based
on economic instruments extended to include the E8I, refineries and other
large industrial sources may provide substantial resource cost savings in
achieving the National Plan emission targets. The analysis was conducted
using emission charges but the results can be interpreted in terms of emission
permits as well. We now turn to the practical issues of environmental policy,
and ask what the best options are for introducing economic instruments for
air pollution control in the UK. In particular, which type of policy should
be implemented, and what is the best way to implement the selected policy?
2.6.1 Emission charges versus tradable permits
The UK has committed itself under the LCPD to reducing 802 emissions
according to a specific target. In this case, permits are more appropriate
than charges, since they would deliver the required emission reduction levels.
Abatement costs vary over time because of technological innovation,
exchange rate fluctuations and general inflation. Charges would have to be
continuously adjusted to deliver a constant level of emissions. Furthermore,
the UK's commitment to a staged reduction in emissions would require a
frequent redefinition of the appropriate charge level. Permits avoid these
problems; a specified emission profile over time can be achieved by simply
varying the number of permits on the market.
Finally, permits may give a more flexible way of introducing market-
based instruments without imposing immediate substantial financial costs
on the polluters. This can be achieved by using appropriate allocation
schemes.
2.6.2 The implementation of a tradable permit scheme
In designing an emission permit scheme, attention should be given to the
denomination of permits and the effect of noncompliance; and the permit
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allocation method and the extent to which the permit market is open to
manipulation.
Permit Denomination and Noncompliance
Permits may be defined as giving their holders the "right" to emit a spec-
ified quantity of pollutants in a specific year, or emissions over a period of
more than one year. Multi-year permits are probably more appropriate,
provided that they confer on the holder the "right" to a decreasing level
of emissions over time. The decay rate built into the multi-year permits
should be faster than the rate of reduction in emissions to which the UK
is committed under international agreements, so that extra permits can be
issued later for subsequent years.
The local nature of the effects of S02 may further complicate the op-
eration of an effective tradable permit scheme. However, as noted in Sec-
tion 2.3, S02 emissions from high-stack sources spread over large areas,
traveling several hundred kilometers. As long as sources are located rela-
tively close to each other, emission permit trading would have immaterial
net effects on the level of deposition at any location.
Regional tradable permit schemes, for which the UK is divided into a
small number of regions, should therefore be introduced. Permit trading
could be allowed on a one-to-one basis within each region, while trading
between regions would attract a penalizing exchange rate, which reflects the
least favorable difference in the damage caused by emissions from sources
in the different regions. This exchange rate will ensure that any trade
would not increase damage at any location. The results in Section 2.5
indicate that the large savings in resource costs from a tradable permit
scheme would come from the reallocation of pollution control responsibilities
from refineries and other large industrial sources to the ESI. Most of the
savings would therefore still be available if permit trading is restricted to
the regional level, as long as each region has sources of all three types. This
scheme should be preferred to one in which each individual source is assigned
a score on the basis of the effect of its emissions on environmentally sensitive
areas, and permits traded at rates of exchange that reflect the relative scores
of the trading parties.
Whichever the permit scheme chosen, noncompliance may have adverse
effects on the market's efficiency in allocating pollution control responsibil-
ities. Noncompliant firms would internalize the possibility of being audited
and fined. They would, in general, operate at a level where the marginal
cost of abatement is not equal to the prevailing permit price. This would
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result in a suboptimal situation, in which marginal abatement costs are not
equalized across sources. As Malik (1990) has shown, it is only when either
the source's subjective probability of being audited is independent of its de-
cisions, or when this probability is a function of the level of noncompliance,
that the decision rule of the noncompliant source is the same as that of
the compliant one. There would then be no effect on the efficiency of the
solution attained by a tradable permit scheme. These considerations should
be taken into account by the authorities in devising appropriate monitor-
ing and enforcing methodologies. An auditing approach based on random
selection of sources should be favored.
Permit Allocation and Market Manipulation
In competitive markets and with negligible transaction costs, the efficiency
in the allocation of pollution control responsibility is independent of the
way in which permits are allocated (see Coase, 1960). The largest savings
in resource costs, however, would be achieved by a permit market that
includes refineries and other industries as well as the ESI; in this market,
the two electricity generators would account, at current emission levels, for
approximately 85% of the total demand for permits. Even after the permit
trading along the lines described in Section 2.5, the ESI would still hold
75% of the total number of permits in 1998 and 64% in 2003. It is therefore
likely that NP and PG would have substantial power in the permit market.
Among the sectors that would participate in the permit market, the ESI
is characterized by the lowest marginal abatement costs at current emission
levels. If permits are initially allocated according to these levels, the ESI
would act as a net seller of permits. The dominant position of the two
generators may induce them to offer on the market a lower number of per-
mits than if they were price-takers. This would result in a higher permit
price, and an inefficient allocation of pollution control responsibilities, since
marginal abatement costs would not be equalized across polluters (see Hahn,
1984). If, on the other hand, permits were auctioned off, dominant players
would tend to buy fewer permits than if they were price-takers. The result-
ing permit price would be lower, but, even in this case, full efficiency would
not be achieved. Dominant players in the permit market might also have a
strategic interest in keeping the permit price at a high level. New entrants
would have to buy a certain number of permits in the market, so a high
price could discourage entry to the market.
In England and Wales, if permits were allocated on the basis of current
emissions, both short-term considerations and the strategic considerations
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of the two electricity generators would lead to a permit price that is higher
than in a perfectly competitive situation. Under an auction system, short-
term and strategic considerations work in different directions, so that the
negative effect on efficiency would be limited. As a general simple rule,
therefore, tradable permits should be auctioned off. This would place all
market participants on the same side of the market: it would increase the
size of the market and reduce the incentives for dominant players to manip-
ulate the permit market.
Different considerations may only apply to the initial transitional pe-
riod. While permits have a value, it may take some time before experience
in the new instrument and the way in which the market operates can provide
reliable guidance on the level of permit prices. So this price, at least tem-
porarily, might be characterized by wide fluctuations. Since the purchase of
the appropriate amount of permits would constitute a substantial financial
burden for the sources, it may be appropriate for the authorities to avoid
the uncertainty in costs by issuing at least some of the initial allocation of
permits to all sources at a fixed price. Trade would then take place at the
emerging equilibrium price, but any volatility in financial costs and revenues
would be limited to the marginal quantities bought and sold. Even in this
case, the authorities may limit the extent to which dominant players may
exert market power by implementing an initial allocation which gives the
electricity generators, the dominant players in the permit market, a share
of the total supply of permits which is substantially lower than that which
would result from their current emissions.
2.7 Conclusions
While UK environmental policy has traditionally been based on adminis-
trative controls, the analysis presented in this chapter indicates that there
are important resource cost savings to be achieved by moving toward an
approach based more on economic instruments, and that includes the ESI,
refineries, and other industries.
It is suggested that permits would be more appropriate than charges in
controlling S02 emissions within the limits set by the LCPD and detailed
in the National Plan. The results indicate that if the permit market is
extended to include refineries and large plants in other industrial sectors as
well the ESI, total abatement costs in England and Wales may be reduced
by as much as 16%, or £27 million a year, by the year 2003.
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Notes
[1] HMIP (1991) recognized that, "due to its costs, it is normally more economical
to fit [sulfur] abatement equipment to larger plant" (Annex 3, par. 2.3.3). Our
FGD cost estimates, however, suggest that the average costs (per tonne of S02
removed) of achieving the required standards are still substantially higher for
small plants than for larger ones. In particular, it costs, on average, £225 per
tonne of S02 removed to reduce emissions from a 500 MW coal-fired boiler by
90%, while the average cost of reducing emissions from a 100 MW plant by
40% is around £600.
[2] It can in fact be argued that health is affected not only by ambient air quality,
but more generally by total exposure to pollutants, which includes local effects
such as indoor air quality. For a discussion of "exposure trading" see, for
example, Routmasset and Smith (1990).
[3] The US experience of the emissions trading program under the Clean Air Act
is relevant here. Trades in emission reduction credits were subject to stringent
constraints on their effect on the level of air quality, and very few trades were
executed. Hahn and Hester (1989) report that only two external offset trans-
actions, involving a level of emissions less than 1% of the total, were made in
1985.
[4] An alternative approach is the implementation of new combustion technolo-
gies with inherently lower S02 emissions, such as fluidized bed combustion.
Since these technologies are mainly applied to new plants, they have not been
considered in the present analysis.
[5] Note that England and Wales have no indigenous source of low-sulfur coal or
oil. The LSP on low-sulfur fuels which may be used in England and Wales will
be determined by demand/supply conditions on the international markets from
where such fuels will be obtained.
[6] It has been assumed, however, that NP and PG are committed under the
National Plan to install FGD equipment at Drax, Ferrybridge, and Ratcliffe-
with a total capacity of 7.6 GW - even though it is now doubtful whether PG
will honor this commitment at Ferrybridge.
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Abstract
The chapter uses a regional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the
Los Angeles basin to analyze the economic impact on the regional economy of insti-
tuting a "marketable permit" scheme to reduce air pollution. The model includes
16 producing sectors and considers three pollutants: nitrogen oxides, reactive or-
ganic gases, and sulfur dioxide. The model also includes abatement technologies
in a nonlinear programming framework embedded in the general equilibrium sim-
ulation model. The key empirical finding is that for levels of abatement that are
technically feasible, the total cost of abatement in the region is relatively small,
of the order of a few hundred million dollars. With abatement, eliminating about
30% of emissions can be done with little reduction in regional product (1%-2%).
After abatement possibilities are exhausted, additional reductions in emissions re-
quire much higher emission charges, leading to major changes in the structure of
production in the region away from polluting sectors. The costs are also higher.
Key words: general equilibrium (CGE) model, Los Angeles basin, SCAQMD,
RECLAIM, NAAQS, GAMS, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, reactive organic gases.
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This chapter describes a regional, environmental, computable general equi-
librium (CGE) model for the Los Angeles basin in southern California de-
signed to investigate the economic impacts and policy implications of insti-
tuting the proposed "marketable permit" scheme to reduce air pollution in
Los Angeles. In Section 3.2, we discuss the severe air pollution problems
in Los Angeles, the existing regulatory framework, and the newly proposed
market-based program to bring the area into attainment for federally man-
dated levels of air quality. In Section 3.3, we briefly survey environmental
CGE models and present our model. The full set of model equations are pre-
sented in an appendix. We then present some illustrative empirical results
from our CGE model. We conclude by discussing the model's limitations
and outlining steps for further research.
3.2 Air Pollution in Los Angeles
Los Angeles continues to be the most problematic air quality control region
in the USA. In the 1990 federal Clean Air Act amendments, Los Angeles
had the dubious distinction of being the only area in the USA with the
designation of "extreme" for its level of ozone, and the area with the longest
time available - 20 years - to attain the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for ozone. These standards were originally set after
the 1970 Clean Air Act amendments, and Los Angeles continues to have
difficulty in attaining them. The original response to these standards was
to set up a command-and-control (CAC) strategy, where the technology for
pollution abatement was specified by the regulatory agency. This approach
did succeed in reducing pollution somewhat, but at great cost, and the
standards still were not all met. There has been growing interest in using
a market-based approach, which economists have long advocated as a more
efficient way to achieve target levels of pollution abatement. For surveys,
see Tietenberg (1985) and Hahn and Hester (1989). Montgomery (1972)
provides a theoretical treatment.
On 1 January 1994, the South Coast Air Quality Management District
(SCAQMD) implemented a market-based system using emission permits in
order to meet air quality standards in an economically efficient manner. This
system regulates the precursors to ozone: nitrogen oxides (NOx), reactive
organic gases (RaG); and sulfur dioxide (Sax). The initial market includes
only NO x and sax; RaG will be considered later. Ozone is not directly
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emitted by sources; rather, it is created by chemical reactions among these
precursors in the presence of sunlight. The new approach to air pollution
reduction in the Los Angeles basin, RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air Incen-
tives Market), is designed to give firms flexibility in attaining the region's
air quality goals. Firms can choose to add more stringent controls, reformu-
late products, and/or acquire emission reduction credits (ERCs) to achieve
these goals. Firms willing to reduce their emissions below the level required
by the district will earn ERCs, which they can sell to other firms that find it
relatively more expensive to reduce emissions internally. Under this system,
economists argue that the target level of emission reduction will be reached
at a lower total cost than under command-and-control regulation.
The firms that are required to be in the new program are those sta-
tionary sources that currently have district permits for NOx and sax and
also have annual emissions of greater than 2-4 tons per year (depending on
the sector). For NOx , these include 390 facilities covering 64% of permitted
emissions; and for sax, 41 facilities covering 83% of permitted emissions,
which are mostly refineries, electric utilities, and chemical plants. Each reg-
ulated facility will have an initial allocation of emissions and its own rate of
reduction. The annual rate of reduction for 1994-2003 is 8.3% for NO x and
6.8% for sax. For NOx, the state and federal standards are expected to be
met by 1995. The federal NAAQS and the state standard for ozone are not
expected to be met until 2010. The area is expected to come into compli-
ance for sax by 2005. The district has estimated that RECLAIM will cost
42% less than the command-and-control strategy now in place (SCAQMD,
1993).
3.3 The LA-CGE Model
We begin with a review of existing environmental CGE models, all of which
are economy-wide models. We then present our regional environmental
CGE model: Section 3.3.1 first provides a short description of the regional
CGE model, and Section 3.3.2 a more detailed description of the pollution
abatement model.
3.3.1 Environmental CGE models
In a seminal article, Leontief (1970) presented a multisector input-output
model that incorporated environmental externalities. There was an active
literature in the 1970s using input-output models to analyze pollution. This
work led to the development of economy-wide, environmental CGE models.
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The literature on multisector environmental models is briefly surveyed by
Robinson (1990), who formulates a small CGE model based on the Leontief
model to explore issues of optimal abatement policy using pollution taxes.
Some of these models focus on analyzing the impact of the Clean Air Act
(e.g., Hollenbeck, 1979; Hazilla and Kopp, 1990). Jorgenson and Wilcoxen
(1990a,b) developed a dynamic CGE model of the USA to explore the costs
to the US economy of environmental regulations.
Pollution control regulations influence not only firms that are directly
affected by the regulations, but also other, perhaps nonpolluting, firms that
do business with the regulated industries. Aggregate pollution generation
is obviously strongly influenced by changes in the sectoral structure of pro-
duction, which, in turn, depend on changes in the structure of demand for
final and intermediate goods. Changes in production structure will also
be affected by the workings of factor markets. By including multisectoral
goods and factor market linkages, a CGE model captures both the direct
and indirect effects of changes in government policy. These general equilib-
rium linkages work through changes in prices, both of goods and factors of
production, upstream of and downstream from the regulated sectors. Such
price changes in linked markets are potentially important and difficult, if
not impossible, to analyze in a partial equilibrium framework.
CGE models were first formulated for national economies. Dervis et
al. (1982) provide a textbook description of CGE models. A CGE model
simulates a market economy where prices and quantities adjust to clear
markets for goods and factors of production. It includes consumers, whose
decisions determine the demand for final goods, and profit-maximizing pro-
ducers, whose decisions determine the supply of goods and the demand for
intermediate and primary inputs. The government appears explicitly, gen-
erating revenue through various taxes, purchasing goods, and saving (or
dissaving). The rest of the world is treated as a supplier of imports and a
buyer of exports. A CGE model is complete in that it captures all trans-
actions in the circular flow of income. The model used here is Walrasian
in that it determines only relative prices, and the absolute price level is set
exogenously.
The LA-CG E model is closest in spirit to a series of environmental
economy-wide models developed by Lars Bergman (1988, 1990, 1991), who
took an energy model and adapted it to include air pollution. Bergman
(1990) estimates the impact on Sweden of achieving an 80% reduction in
SOx and a 30% reduction in NOx emissions between 1980 and 1993, while
keeping CO2 emissions at their 1988 levels. In his model, he simulates the
operation of an emissions permit market. He specifies an initial supply
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of permits that is equal to the total amount of permitted pollution and
then solves for their price in equilibrium, under various assumptions about
abatement costs and the tightness of the constraints.
3.3.2 The Los Angeles regional CGE model
Our regional CGE model includes the counties of the South Coast Air Qual-
ity Management District (SCAQMD, consisting of Los Angeles, Orange,
Riverside, and San Bernadino counties). Many CGE models focus on is-
sues of international trade (for a survey of trade issues in CGE models,
see Robinson, 1989); the LA-CGE model adapts a standard trade model
to the requirements of a regional model. Locally produced commodities are
assumed to be imperfect substitutes for imported commodities, whether im-
ported from the rest of the USA or from foreign countries. Similarly, goods
produced in LA and exported are distinguished from goods produced and
sold in the region. The responsiveness of trade ratios to changes in the ratio
of local and external prices is determined by sectoral substitution elastic-
ities. Sectors with low elasticities and low trade shares (e.g., the service
sector) are relatively sheltered from the external market. The local price
for sectors with high trade shares and/or high substitution elasticities will
be largely determined by the external price, with exports and/or imports
varying to clear the local market.
Our regional LA-CGE model has a number of special features, given
that the region is embedded in a national economy. For example, unlike a
national model, Los Angeles is assumed not to have its own currency, so
its exchange rate in the model is fixed with respect to that of the USA.
In addition, the region's aggregate producer price index is exogenous and
fixed at unity. Therefore, the region's balance of trade is then determined
endogenously. On the trade side, we assume high substitution elasticities
for the manufacturing sectors, but also specify some imports as completely
noncompetitive; that is, they are not produced in the LA region.
Two alternative specifications can be used for the labor market. In
one, wages are exogenous and migration is assumed to clear the regional
labor market. This may be a more realistic approach than assuming flexible
market-clearing wages for some categories of labor which are highly mobile,
such as highly skilled workers and professionals. The low-skilled and poor
are probably less mobile in the short to medium run. In any case, the
empirical results indicate little change in the aggregate real wage, so either
fixing the real wage rate or the employment level has very little impact.
However, the model in its current form does not disaggregate labor by skill
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category, which might have a greater impact on the wage rate outcome. The
results presented here use the full employment variant of the model.
Aggregate investment in a small regional economy is not necessarily de-
termined by aggregate regional savings. Aggregate investment is exogenous
in the model, with capital flows from the rest of the country ("foreign sav-
ings") balancing savings and investment in the LA region. The model is run
in comparative statics mode, assuming fixed sectoral capital stocks that are
not affected by investment in the current period.
3.3.3 The pollution abatement model
We consider three pollutants, NOx, sax and RaG. The objective is to re-
duce aggregate emissions of each pollutant at least cost to meet exogenously
specified emission targets. It was shown by Montgomery (1972) that this
objective can be met through a system of tradable emission permits when
there is perfect information on costs. Baumol and Oates (1971) consider the
case with imperfect information and show that an iterative procedure can
be used to determine an emission charge that would have the same effect
as allowing a market in emission permits. In a static framework with per-
fect information, a system of emission charges is equivalent to a system of
emission permits. The only difference lies in the wealth effects, which would
differ depending on the initial allocation of permits and the redistribution
scheme according to which the emission charge revenue is returned to pol-
luters. In a dynamic context, other differences between emission charges
and permits are in how they affect firms' incentives to search for better
abatement technology and in how oligopolistic firms respond under these
schemes (see Milliman and Prince, 1989; Malik, 1990).
Pollutant emissions are modeled as follows. Pollutants are produced
by "control categories," which are usually sources or processes, such as a
cement kiln (a source) or surface coating of wood furniture (a process). In
a given sector, several control categories produce any particular pollutant.
It is assumed that each control category's share in total emissions before
abatement for a given sector and pollutant is constant at its value in the
base year (1989). In addition, total emissions in any given sector are strictly
proportional to output in that sector. For simplicity, consider the single-
pollutant case. For each control category (denoted by k), at most three
abatement technologies (denoted by t) are available; these are referred to as
the least stringent, mid-level, and most stringent technologies. Abatement
follows a Leontief technology. For each control category and technology pair
(k, t), the maximum possible reduction in emissions is a fraction D:kt of the
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initial emissions. In this range, the marginal cost of abatement is constant
and is equal to the unit cost of the inputs required in the abatement process.
Notice that this marginal cost is the same across all sectors.
Since the marginal cost of abatement is constant for a given control
category and technology, a firm facing an emission charge will abate to the
fullest possible extent if the emission charge exceeds the marginal cost of
abatement. Correspondingly, any technology with marginal cost exceeding
the emission charge will not be used by the firm. Let Xi be output and Qi
be emissions in sector i. There is a fixed emission coefficient, f3i' so that:
(3.1 )
Of these emissions, a fraction (Jik is from control category k. The max-
imum possible level of abatement of emissions from this control category in
this sector is (Xkt(JikQ i. Abatement Aikt is either zero or takes this maximum
value. This is expressed using binary variables Ykt; Ykt = 1 if emissions in
control category k are abated using technology t, and Ykt = 0 otherwise.
We have:
(3.2)
Total abatement in sector i is simply the sum of abatement over all
control categories and technologies. The total emissions after abatement
are:
(3.3)
In addition, there is one other constraint. It is possible that two different
abatement technologies for a particular control category may be mutually
exclusive; Le., the reduction achieved from the more stringent technology
cannot be added to that achieved by the less stringent one. For such control
categories, only one of Akl' Ak2, or Ak3 can be nonzero. This can be readily
expressed in terms of the binary variables Ykt whenever the technologies are
mutually exclusive:
Ykl + Yk2 + Yk3 :::; 1. (3.4)
Since abatement follows a Leontief technology, the marginal cost of
abatement Pkt is the value of inputs required for one unit of abatement:
Pkt = L PktiPi· (3.5)
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Here Pkti is the demand generated in sector i by a unit increase in
abatement for control category k and technology t, and Pi is the price of
good i.
A firm facing an emission charge Pa per unit of pollutant emitted will
use a particular abatement technology only if its marginal cost does not
exceed the emission charge:
Ykt = 0 if Pkt > P a ,
Ykt = 1 if Pkt ::; Pa.
(3.6)
(3.7)
The inequality in equation (3.7) must be modified when the technologies
are mutually exclusive. In this case, if Pkt ::; Pa' only one of Ykl, Yk2, or Yk3
can be positive. This case is not considered further here because it appears
that for all control categories in the pollutants that we are considering, the
technologies are additive and not mutually exclusive.
Because sectoral output and pollution emissions are linearly related
(equation 3.1), the emission charge of Pa per unit of pollutant translates
into a tax Ti per unit of output given by:
The cost of abatement in sector i is:
Ci = E PktAikt.
k,t
(3.8)
(3.9)
Pollution-intensive sectors thus pay a higher tax on their output, but
this is modified by a factor that accounts for how effective abatement is in
reducing emissions in that sector. The tax is collected by the government,
which then proceeds to hand it back (net of abatement costs) as a lump-
sum transfer to firms. The outcome is identical to that under a system of
marketable permits for a particular initial distribution of emissions permits,
which determines the lump-sum transfer shares.
The emission charge has two effects. At the sectoral level, it induces
firms to choose an appropriate abatement technology. The emission charge
also translates into a sector-specific per-unit tax on sectoral output. When
this tax is at a low level, structural change is minimal and almost the entire
reduction in emissions is obtained through abatement. However, abatement
possibilities are soon exhausted, as will be seen below, and further reductions
in emissions can be obtained only through relatively large structural changes
induced by large changes in relative prices between sectors.
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3.3.4 Implementation
The LA-CGE mode is implemented using the GAMS (general algebraic
modeling system) modeling language (Brooke et at., 1988). The abatement
model is an activity analysis optimizing model, which has to be integrated
into the CGE market simulation model. The difficulty is that complemen-
tary slackness conditions such as equations (3.6) and (3.7), which really
involve dual variables, cannot be included directly in the primal of a pro-
gramming model. However, it is easy to show that the following nonlinear
programming problem will generate a solution that satisfies the inequalities
in equations (3.6) and (3.7):
max L Aikt
i,k,t
s.t. PktYkt ::; PaYkt and
The maximand is the sum of abatement over all sectors, control categories
and technologies. The condition that PktYkt ::; PaYkt leads precisely to the
inequality in equation (3.6) while the condition that P kt (1 - Ykt) ::; P a(1 -
Ykt) leads to the inequality in equation (3.7). Generalizing to the many-
pollutant case is straightforward because there is no interaction between
abatement for different pollutants and the objective function is additive.
The inequalities above are now specified for each pollutant and the objective
function becomes the sum of abatement over all pollutants, sectors, control
categories, and technologies. The per-unit tax on output is now obtained
by summing up the tax from equation (3.8) over all pollutants. Once the
emission charge for each pollutant is specified, the model solves for the
resulting abatement.
While this optimization problem (including the constraints of the CGE
model) is a mixed binary (integer) nonlinear programming problem, one can
ignore the binary nature of the Ykt and treat them as continuous variables
ranging between 0 and 1. Nonbinary values for the Ykt can occur only when
the abatement cost and emission charge coincide. Although abatement costs
for many control categories are identical in the data for the base year, away
from the initial equilibrium these ties are broken because sectoral prices
change. No more than one or two of the Ykt are found to be nonbinary,
which is a small price to pay for the reduction in solution time resulting
from ignoring the binary nature of these variables.
In addition, if target levels are specified for the total emissions of each
pollutant, minimizing a suitable objective function subject to inequalities
(3.5) and (3.6) will give the emission charges required to meet those emission
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Table 3.1. Sectoral composition of emissions and value added and sectoral
import shares (in %).
Sectoral composition
Value Import
Sector Sector name NOx RaG sox added shares
AGFD Agriculture and food 1.4 0.9 1.4 1.9 68.7
OILGAS Mining, oil, and gas 8.7 7.3 6.1 1.1 97.8
LMANUF Light manufactures 3.1 6.6 0.5 3.0 58.5
WOOD Wood and furniture 0.3 11.1 0.0 0.8 56.0
CHEM Chemicals 1.8 6.1 5.7 1.8 66.3
PETR Petroleum products 24.1 12.2 39.8 1.1 9.7
GLASS Glass and cement 9.4 1.1 6.6 0.5 79.8
SVCS Other services 5.1 2.9 1.3 50.9 3.9
UTIL Utilities 27.6 3.1 32.2 1.4 23.4
PDUR Producer durables 6.1 25.4 1.3 12.6 67.9
CDUR Consumer durables 0.3 2.2 0.0 0.4 84.1
TRADE Trade 1.0 4.7 0.6 13.5 2.8
PERS Personal services 0.2 2.6 0.2 0.6 7.9
REPAIR Automobile repair 0.2 4.6 0.0 1.5 0.0
AIRTR Air transportation 10.8 9.0 4.1 0.6 7.1
PUBADM Public administration 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0
Note: Import shares are shares of total supply coming from outside the Los Angeles
region. Sectoral share columns sum to one except for rounding.
targets. Suitable objective functions are total emission charge revenue, total
cost of abatement, and (the negative of) real regional GDP. In the single-
target case, one can also minimize the emission charge itself. In general,
the solutions from these different objective functions will not coincide when
targets are specified for all three pollutants because the three targets may
not be binding constraints at the same time.
3.3.5 The data
The base year for the economic data is 1990, which is the latest year for
which the database developed by the US Forest Service (called IMPLAN)
provides input-output data at the county and state levels. The IMPLAN
database contains a 528-sector input-output table, including demand ma-
trices for competitive imports and a vector of total noncompetitive imports
by use.[l] These were aggregated to 16 sectors (shown in Table 3.1).[2] The
prime consideration in the choice of this aggregation was to identify sectors
which are major producers of NOx, sax, and RaG.
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Table 3.2. Maximum abatement by sector (% of initial emissions).
NOx RaG sox
Technology Technology Technology
Sector 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
AGFD 13.5 22.2 27.2 24.8 25.9 26.1 25.5 33.2 33.2
OILGAS 19.0 30.0 37.8 1.4 1.4 1.4 19.5 26.4 26.4
LMANUF 16.9 26.7 33.4 24.1 32.0 46.1 38.9 46.6 46.6
WOOD 29.4 33.3 35.2 16.5 18.2 18.2 75.0 75.8 75.8
CHEM 10.6 14.3 16.5 17.2 18.5 20.0 0.6 0.7 0.7
PETR 67.3 71.4 73.4 0.9 0.9 0.9 50.4 63.9 69.1
GLASS 66.5 70.7 72.7 25.2 26.1 26.9 74.2 77.1 77.1
SVCS 24.0 32.7 37.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 33.2 36.5 36.5
UTIL 32.0 42.9 45.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 4.6 4.6
PDUR 26.2 31.2 33.9 40.7 43.9 44.0 37.7 43.5 43.5
CDUR 28.8 32.1 33.9 20.1 36.4 94.4 21.2 22.9 22.9
TRADE 51.3 57.1 57.9 17.5 21.0 24.0 49.3 52.5 52.5
PERS 22.2 29.7 35.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 12.3 14.9 14.9
REPAIR 54.8 60.3 60.7 3.0 17.6 27.6 85.7 86.7 86.7
AIRTR 9.4 9.6 9.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 10.7 14.2 14.2
Note: Full sector names are given in Table 3.1.
Data on emissions of these pollutants for 65 industry groups and on
abatement costs and input requirements for 87 control categories for 1989
were provided by the California Energy Commission (CEC). These data
were also aggregated to conform to the above sectoral specification. Thus
the model mixes production structure and technology data for 1990 with
emissions and abatement data for 1989.[3J
Table 3.2 shows the maximum abatement possible (as a fraction of ini-
tial emissions) for each sector and pollutant and for each level of abatement
technology. Abatement possibilities are rather limited for many highly pol-
luting sectors. The petroleum sector, for example, produces 12% of total
ROG, but only 0.9% abatement is possible. Similarly, the utility sector
produces 32% of SOx emissions, but abatement can reduce SOx production
in this sector by only 4.6%. SOx production in the petroleum sector, on
the other hand, can be cut in half using just the least stringent technol-
ogy. Another major difference between sectors is in their import shares.
The impact of an emission charge will be stronger on a sector with a high
import share (holding pollution intensity constant). Such sectors will con-
tract substantially because domestic production can be readily replaced by
imports.
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3.4.1 The no-abatement model
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We ran a series of experiments assuming no abatement possibilities. The
no-abatement model solves in a similar manner to the abatement model, ex-
cept that the abatement related equations are dropped, all the abatement
variables are set to zero, and the optimization problem is changed to one of
minimizing the total emission charge. In this model, the only way to reduce
aggregate emissions of any pollutant is to change the sectoral structure of
production in the LA region away from pollution-intensive sectors. While
this treatment is an extreme simplification, it is useful because the model
then provides an upper bound to the estimated sectoral adjustments re-
quired to reach air quality goals. In addition, when the proposed reduction
are so stringent that abatement possibilities are exhausted, the behavior of
the model reverts to that of the no-abatement model.
In the set of experiments performed under this model, a single emission
charge is imposed on each of the three pollutants separately. The model
solves for the amounts of emissions of all pollutants and for the total emis-
sion charge revenue from taxing the single pollutant. For each pollutant, we
ran a series of experiments with increasing pollution charges, terminating
with a charge that yields a 25% reduction in the generation of that pol-
lutant. The results are presented in Figure 3.1. The charges required to
achieve a 25% reduction are: $250,000 per ton for NOx , $970,000 per ton
for sax, and $360,000 per ton for RaG.
Figure 3.1 also shows the amounts of other pollutants generated un-
der each charging scheme. The results show the strong complementarities
between NOx and sax in production. The percent of baseline emissions
produced under each of the charging schemes for NOxand sax run almost
parallel, indicating that the two pollutants are produced together in the
same sectors.
The results shown in Figure 3.1 indicate the outer bound of emission
charges required to achieve pollution reduction, given that there is no pos-
sibility of abatement. The reduction is achieved solely by changing the
structure of demand and production. In a model with abatement, the to-
tal cost figures will depend on abatement costs and will be much lower.
However, the results presented here remain relevant, since they indicate the
charges required to achieve further reduction in pollution after abatement
possibilities are exhausted.
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Figure 3.1. Emission charges and emission reductions. (a) NOx, (b) sax,
(c) RaG.
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3.4.2 The abatement model
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(a) NOx Emission Charge
Figure 3.2a shows the emission charge required for a given level of abatement
for reductions in pollution ranging up to 60%. Using the least stringent
technology, the emission charge increases smoothly to about $17,000 per ton
for a reduction of 40%. For reductions greater than 40%, the emission charge
increases sharply, shooting up to $100,000 per ton for a 45% reduction.
The reason for this is that up to this point, technologies for abatement
are available. Any further reduction in emissions can be brought about
only by changing the production structure; i.e., by decreasing output in
NOx-intensive sectors and increasing output in other sectors, and this calls
for a substantially higher emission charge. Introducing the middle-level
technology has the effect of pushing out this limit to about 45% reduction.
Finally, making available the most stringent technology flattens the curve
further, up to a reduction of about 50%.
Turning to the cost of abatement (Figure 3.2b), the curves for the three
levels of technology largely coincide up to an emission charge of $10,000
per ton. This occurs because many of the mid-level and most stringent
technologies have abatement costs above this level, and are therefore not
used until the emission charge goes beyond this point. The abatement cost
at this emission charge increases to $150 million for the most stringent
technology, corresponding to a 38% decrease in emissions.
The abatement cost is the cost to firms of abatement net of the emis-
sion charge paid by them to the regulatory authority, which is returned
to firms as a lump-sum transfer. The abatement cost represents the cost
of inputs required for abatement. When all abatement possibilities have
been exhausted, the abatement cost curve flattens out. In this range, the
amount of abatement is virtually constant and so is the cost of abatement.
The maximum abatement cost ranges from about $160 million for the least
stringent technology, to $230 million for the most stringent technology.
Figure 3.2c shows how the NOx emission charge affects regional value
added for a much wider range of emission charges, up to $350,000 per ton,
far above the marginal cost of control for most abatement technologies. In
this figure, given the wider range, the three lines for different technologies
are virtually congruent. The highest marginal cost is about $38,000 per
ton for all but one source category and technology, which has a marginal
cost of $407,000 per ton. The impact on regional value added for emissions
charges within the range of abatement costs is small. Regional value added
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falls from $350.57 billion at a zero emission charge, to $350.02 billion at an
emission charge of $40,000 per ton, well above the marginal cost of all but
one technology. Thus, with a charge of around $20,000 per ton, one achieves
about 40% reduction in emissions of NOx with little impact on regional value
added. After that, the no-abatement model starts to kick in, with a much
larger impact on regional value added for incremental reductions in NOx'
Figure 3.2d shows how the NOx emission charge affects emissions of
other pollutants. For emission charges up to $40,000 per ton, the impact on
ROG and SOx is small. This result is to be expected because the impact on
production structure of such an emission charge is small. At this emission
charge, the corresponding ad valorem taxes are small, reaching 6%-7% only
for the utilities, air transportation, and glass sectors. Finally, notice that
in both Figures 2c and 2d, the curves for the least stringent, mid-level and
most stringent technologies coincide extremely closely so that the adoption
of more stringent abatement technologies will not affect the conclusions
drawn above.
(b) ROG Emission Charge
In the case of ROG, the emission charge required for a similar reduction
in emissions is substantially higher than for NOx because the abatement
technologies have higher costs and because abatement possibilities are ex-
tremely limited in some major ROG-producing sectors (Table 3.2). The
transition from the region of low emission charges to that of high emission
charges (Figure 3.3a) is more gradual than in the case of NOx' One reason
for this result is that the range of abatement costs is broader so that there
are several high-cost technologies (with marginal costs around $100,000 per
ton) which are adopted well after the lower-cost technologies have been put
to use. In addition, there are many more control categories for ROG than
for NOx, which, combined with the greater dispersion in control costs, gives
an emission cost curve which is less flat. The maximum cost of abatement
to firms ranges from about $250 million to $370 million, depending on the
technology in use. Notice that the abatement cost curves begin to decline
when the emission charge goes above $100,000 (Figure 3.3b). At these
high levels of emission charge, the amount of ROG being produced before
abatement begins to fall quite noticeably because the charge is causing a
reduction in output in the polluting sectors. Since there is less output and
fewer emissions to be abated, the cost of abatement falls.
Figure 3.3c shows the impact of the ROG emission charge on regional
value added. At an emission charge of $120,000 per ton, regional value
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added falls from $350.57 billion to $348.60 billion at a zero emission charge.
Of course, this decrease is larger than in the case of the NOx emission charge
of $40,000 per ton considered above because the corresponding ad valorem
tax rates are higher - 17% for wood products and air transportation, and
12% for oil and gas extraction. As in the case of the NO x emission charge,
the effect of the ROG emission charge on NOx and SOx emissions is small
so long as the ROG emission charge is not extremely high. Again, the lines
for the different abatement technologies are virtually the same, given that
the scale is well beyond the range where abatement is fully utilized.
(c) SOx Emission Charge
In the case of sulfur oxides, the abatement technologies all have low marginal
costs of between $1,000 and $15,000 per ton, except for two with costs
around $60,000 per ton.[4] As can be seen from Figures 4a and 4b, re-
ductions of 30%-35% are achieved at low cost. For reductions approaching
40%, the emission charge increases steeply. Abatement costs range from
around $20 million for the least stringent technology to $48 million for the
most stringent technology. Since the abatement costs are low and the SOx
emission coefficients (in tons per million dollars of output) are small com-
pared to those for the other pollutants, the effect on regional value added
is small (Figure 3.4c). At an emission charge of $80,000 per ton, the ad
valorem tax rates are at most 3% (for petroleum, utilities, and glass and
cement sectors) and regional value added falls only by $ 0.24 billion. Again,
the impact on ROG and NOx is small.
3.5 Conclusions
The results show that regional CGE models are useful for modeling air pol-
lution control in some detail. We have succeeded in integrating a nonlinear
programming model of abatement with a multisectoral, general equilibrium,
simulation model of the LA regional economy. The simulations described
here show how different levels of abatement can be attained using emission
charges and at what cost to firms and to the regional economy. The key
empirical finding is that for levels of abatement that are technically feasible
- i.e., for which technologies exist - the costs of abatement to firms are
relatively small (of the order of a few hundred million dollars, which is less
than 1% of sales) and the reduction in regional value added is also small
(of the order of 1%-2%). After abatement possibilities are exhausted, it is
necessary to institute much higher emission charges in order to change the
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structure of production in the region away from polluting sectors. The costs
of this approach in terms oflower regional product are much greater. While
the model represents the complexity of regulatory policies in a stylized way,
these key findings are likely to be robust.
The model results suggest a number of areas for further refinement. An
important step would be to improve the treatment of SOx abatement. It
is apparently the case that for several source categories, SOx emissions can
be reduced considerably by changing from sulfur-laden fuels to natural gas.
The cost of this changeover at current prices is small. Modeling this sub-
stitution possibility would require changing sectoral intermediate demands
(the input-output coefficients) to reflect the substitution of natural gas for
other fuels and reducing the SOx emissions in the base year for the affected
source categories. There are no conceptual or serious modeling difficulties
involved here, but this step would require substantial amounts of data.
The modeling of SOx abatement in the utilities sector also needs to be
changed to take into account the fact that plant-specific data on abatement
technology are available. Since this approach would require working at the
level of individual generating plants, data on base-year emissions for each
plant would be needed. It might also be necessary at this level of detail to
take into consideration the regulated nature of this sector.
The economic data used in the model are for 1990, while the emission
data are for 1989. It would be a good idea to work with data for a single,
recent year, if possible. It would also be worthwhile to disaggregate the
economic data. For example, one might disaggregate labor by skill type to
capture distributional effects on the labor markets. Adding more sectoral
detail would permit closer integration of engineering and economic data.
Finally, the model abstracts from many of the complexities of the pro-
posed regulations for the RECLAIM and New Source Review (NSR) pro-
grams. For example, the programs exclude small producers, who are signif-
icant in aggregate economic activity in the region. There is always a trade-
off in empirical modeling between simplification and realism. Our stylized
model can certainly be expanded to capture more of the institutional details
of the programs, but the question is whether the additional detail matters
to the essential results. The model captures the major links between pol-
luting and nonpolluting sectors and the important features of abatement.
Adding more sectors or incorporating more institutional detail, while refin-
ing the analysis, also adds to the model's complexity. The modeler's art is to
achieve sufficient realism for policy relevance while retaining transparency,
so that the mechanisms at work are clearly visible and understandable.
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Notes
[1] Aggregate Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) for the counties are available
only for 1982. The 1982 Los Angeles basin SAM from IMPLAN was up-
dated to 1990 by using the IMPLAN input-output data for 1982 and 1990 and
growth rates for various state-level aggregates (from the California Statistical
Abstract).
[2] The model is formulated in such a way as to allow great flexibility in changing
the sector definitions. A 39-seetor version also exists, but only the results from
the 16-sector version are presented here.
[3] The CEC's own data on sectoral output for the Los Angeles region are likely to
be more reliable than those from the IMPLAN database. It would be worth-
while to re-base the economic data to 1989 using the CEC's sectoral output
data for 1989. However, these data would then have to be reconciled to the
IMPLAN data for other variables.
[4] The results for SOx abatement must be treated as preliminary in nature because
input substitution (natural gas for sulfur-containing fuels), which is not modeled
here, offers a low-cost and potentially effective means of abatement. In addition,
for the utility sector, the CEC data set provides cost data separately for three
different electricity generating plants. These cost data could not be used since
information on the base year SOx emissions from these plants was unavailable.
Instead, an average of these costs has been used.
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Appendix: The Los Angeles Basin CGE Model
Prices block
pm = p11JmER(l + tm)
" ,
RX- = prJ.X:Pd +pm M-
" " "pxxrJ. = prJ.X:Pd + pe E-
'& 1 t '& '& '&
pr = prER(l+ti)
pya = PX(l _ to) _ '"' _ A --P- _ Ane ER . pne _ tpol
, , 'L.JJ J' J' , ,
P = 2:i WiPt
Pik = 2:j BjiPj
Production block
X d = Ad fl- FD~if
, ,'.1 ,j
Wj' WD-j' FD- j = Vj' pya. X d, , , , ,
IDi = 2:j AijXj
xl = CET(Xfd, Ei), i E Ie
Xd = x xd i E IE
, "
Ei = Xfd . r(p{j pl), i E Ie
Xi = CES(Xfd, Mi), i E 1M
Xi = Xfd, iEIM
Mi = Xfd. fm(pl / Pt), i E 1M
Y1ent = YFK + GTent +Tpol - Cetl - Sent - Tent - Sdep
Incomes block
YF j = 2:i Wj . WDij . FDij +ER . YFj
Yllab = YFL - Tsoc
Tind = 2:i tiPtXf
Tsoe = t soe YFL
Tent = tent (YF K - Sdep + GTent )
Sdep = 2:i diPik FDiK
Sent = Sent (YFK + GTent - Tent - Sdep)
Sh = 2:h Sh YH h (1 - th)
GR = Tm + Tind + Th + Tsoc + Tent + ERKw
5 = Sh + 59 + Sdep + Sent + ERSw
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Expenditures block
PiCDi = Lh wih(l - sh)(l - th)(l - win YH h
Li PiGDi = (1 - w;c) GD tot
GR = GD tot + Sg + GTent + GTh
t:J.Si = oixl
If = (1 - wIC) (I - Li Pit:J.Si)
P;IVi = wIlf
Mnc = w;cGDtot + wIc (I - Li Pit:J.Si )
+Lh w'hc (1 - Sh) (1 - th) YHh + ER Li PtCAicxl
Market clearing
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(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
Xi = IDi + CDi + GDi + IVi + t:J.Si + ADi (35)
Li FDif = FS f (36)
Li Piwm Mi + Nf:Jt = Li prEi +Lf YFj + Sw + R + J(w (37)
GDP = Li prxl +Tind +Tm +Tpol (38)
Abatement block
Qo - 'Y' x dip - "p i
ABikpt = YkptQ?/JikpQkpt
Qp = Li Q?p - Li,k,t ABikpt
Qp :S Qp
tfOI = Lp Tplip (1 - Lk,t YkptOikpQkpt)
T "" polXdpol = L-i t i i
Pk;t . Ykpt :S Tp . Ykpt
Pk;t (1 - Ykpt) ~ Tp(1 - Ykpt)
n = Li k p t ABikpt, , ,
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Pk;t = Li bikptPi
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(39)
(40)
(41)
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Parameters
At Constant in production function
Aic Noncompetitive import coefficient in sector i
A ij Input-output coefficient
Bij Capital composition matrix
Vi] Production function parameter
Cl:kpt Emission reduction factor for pollutant p from source k using technology t
bikpt Input requirements from sector i for abatement technology t for
pollutant p and source category k
di Depreciation rate in sector i
{ji Stock change coefficient in sector i
lip Emission coefficient, tons of pollutant p per unit output in sector i
Sent Enterprise savings rate
Sh Household savings rate
tent Enterprise tax rate
th Household tax rate
ti Indirect tax rate in sector i
tocs Social security tax rate
(Jikp Share of source category p in emissions from sector i for pollutant p
wI c Share of investment demand met by noncompetitive imports
w~c Share of government demand met by noncompetitive imports
w~c Share of consumption demand met by noncompetitive imports
Wi Weights for producer price index
wI Shares by sector of origin of investment demand
w£h Budget shares for consumer demand
Sets and other miscellaneous notations
f Factors, capital (K) and labor (L)
Sectors
p Pollutants
k Emission source categories
t Abatement technologies, t = 1,2,3
IE Set of sectors with positive exports
1M Set of sectors with positive imports
I E Set of sectors with no exports
I M Set of sectors with no imports
r First-order condition for GET function for exports
fm First-order condition for GES function for imports
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Exogenous variables
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ER
FSj
GD;
GTenl
GTh
I
J(w
Pt
p;m
Pic
p;we
prm
Qp
R
WD;j
YFj
Exchange rate
Factor supply for factor f
Government demand for sector i
Government-to-enterprise transfer
Government- to- household transfer
Total investment
Foreign borrowing by government
Price of exports in sector i
Price of imports in sector i
Price of noncompetitive imports in sector i
World price of exports in sector i
World price of imports in sector i
Target for total emissions of pollutant p
Remittances to households from rest of the world
Factor price differential in sector i for factor f
Factor income for factor f from abroad
Endogenous variables
AB;kpt
AD;
CD;
f).S;
Cctl
E;
FD;j
GD?
GD tol
ID;
IV;
I j
M;
M nc
Abatement in sector i for pollutant p from source k using technology t
Demand for inputs from sector i arising from abatement activities
Consumer demand for sector i
Change in stocks for sector i
Abatement costs
Exports in sector i
Factor demand for factor f in sector i
Gross domestic product
Total government demand
Intermediate demand for sector i
Investment demand for sector i
Fixed investment
Competitive imports in sector i
Noncompetitive imports
Objective function
Aggregate price level
Price of composite commodity in sector i
Price of domestic sales in sector i
Price of capital in sector i
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pta
Pt
P abkpt
Q?p
Qp
5
Sdep
Sent
Sg
Sh
Sw
Tent
Th
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Tpo/
T soc
WJ
Xj
Xfd
X jd
YFJ
YHh
YI ent
YI/ab
t pol,
Tp
Ykpt
Sherman Robinson, Shankar Subramanian, Jacqueline Geoghegan
Price of value added in sector i
Average price of output in sector i
Cost of abatement for pollutant p from source k using technology t
Pre-abatement emissions of pollutant p in sector i
Total emissions (post-abatement) of pollutant p
Total savings
Depreciation
Enterprise savings
Government savings
Household savings
Foreign savings (current account deficit)
Taxes on enterprises
Taxes on households
Indirect taxes
Total emission charge revenue
Social security taxes
Average price for factor f
Composite commodity in sector i
Domestic sales in sector i
Domestic production in sector i
Factor income for factor f
Household income for household group h
Enterprise income
Labor income
Pollution tax in sector i
Emission charge per ton of pollutant p
Binary variable for abatement technology t, source category k,
and pollutant p
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Abstract
For the period 1987-1993, developments in the environmental policies of GEeD
countries with respect to the use of economic instruments are compared and the
differences analyzed. The focus is on applications in the field of air pollution
policies. The comparison is made on the basis of two surveys. To complete the
descriptive part, a brief survey is also presented of currently discussed and recently
introduced economic instruments. A description of economic instruments as such
and a review of rationales for employing economic and financial incentives precede
this analysis. The analysis shows that the use of economic instruments has indeed
increased since 1987, but the development has not been spectacular. Possible ex-
planations for this are presented. Also, some types of instrument have advanced
more than others and the changes differ from one set of countries to another. Prod-
uct charges (including air pollution-related ones) have become more widely used,
especially in Scandinavian countries. Moreover, growing attention is being paid
to the use of economic instruments at the international level. The incentive im-
pacts of economic (and other) instruments appear to have received relatively little
empirical attention, even though these are an important policy-relevant feature in
instrument choice.
Key words: economic instruments, environmental policy, environmental eco-
nomics, air pollution, air pollution policies.
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4.1 Introduction and Background
Economic instruments have been hailed by economists since the early days
of environmental economics, but they have had a limited impact on environ-
mental policy. Since the Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987) a general inter-
est has been aroused in what the report called "merging environment and
economics in decision making", and economic instruments were regarded
as one potential way of achieving that. One may wonder to what degree
this has altered the mixes of instruments used in environmental policies.
This chapter describes and analyzes developments in the use of economic
instruments, and attempts to look ahead to discern what possible future
they may have. The focus is on instruments used in air pollution policies,
but this is placed in the wider context of environmental policy.
Narrowly defined, policy instruments could be labeled "economic" if
they have intended and/or effective incentive impacts. Economic instru-
ments, thus defined, have indeed been applied in environmental policies of
industrialized counties for some time, but they have been rather rare. More
broadly defined, economic incentives include a number of revenue raising
or financial instruments, and the latter definition is the more common one.
In this chapter we deal with economic instruments in the broader sense.
In Section 4.2 the concept of economic instruments for environmental poli-
cies is discussed and rationales for deploying them are reviewed. Section 4.3
provides an empirical description and a qualitative analysis of the use of eco-
nomic instruments. A comprehensive overview is presented of the present
uses (in OECD member countries) of the following types of economic instru-
ments of environmental policy: charges on emissions; charges on products;
deposit-refund systems; tradable permits; and enforcement incentives. The
issue of the incentive impact of these instruments is introduced, but it ap-
pears that assessments (in an international comparative context) of such
impacts require data that are not yet available. Section 4.3 also presents
some developments over time in the use of economic instruments. It ap-
pears that some types of economic instruments have been put into practice
much more often than others, and that there are large differences between
countries in the way they are used. These differences may not be the re-
sults of coincidence, but probably reflect institutional differences between
countries and regions, that must be taken into account and which may have
significance in considerations on international harmonization. A discussion
leading to an outlook on possible future uses, and some conclusions, is given
in Section 3.4.
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This chapter is based on two surveys conducted for the OECD on the
uses of economic instruments in its member countries (Opschoor and Vos,
1989; Vos et al., 1994). The results of these two studies allow for some
longitudinal analysis, although, of course, the significance of a one five-year
period is likely to be limited.
4.2 Economic Instruments in Environmental
Policy in OECD Countries
4.2.1 Introduction
Economic instruments are considered to be capable of providing incen-
tives for technological innovation and behavioral change, and to offer good
prospects for achieving environmental objectives in a cost-effective man-
ner (Baumol and Oates, 1975). According to an official OECD statement
(OECD, 1991, par. 20) they improve the allocation and efficient use of nat-
ural and environmental resources. At UNCED a number of economically
significant positions were accepted, including the need to internalize envi-
ronmental costs, the precautionary approach to environmental change, and
the use of economic instruments (in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21).
In Section 4.2.2 economic instruments are first positioned in relation
to (environmental) policy instruments in general. Section 4.2.3 presents
a practical classification (as applied in the OECD surveys, for example)
for distinguishing between five instrument categories: charges on emissions,
charges on products (including tax rebates), deposit-refund systems, mar-
ket creation (including tradable permits and quotas), and enforcement in-
centives. Finally, in Section 4.2.4 we review the debate on the theoretical
and practical significance of economic instruments for environmental policy.
Readers who are reasonably familiar with economic instruments in general
are advised to proceed to Section 4.2.4 immediately.
4.2.2 Environmental policy instruments
In seeking to ensure the sustainable use of environmental resources and the
maintenance of stricter levels of environmental quality, environmental pol-
icy can make use of (mixes of) two basic strategies: (a) to engage in public
projects and programs aimed at preventing, compensating for, and eliminat-
ing environmental degradation, or at providing substitutes for traditional
behavioral patterns; and (b) influence the decision making process at the
micro-level, i.e., that ofthe environmentally relevant (economic) agents such
78 Hans Opschoor
as consumers, producers, and investors. The second strategy is discussed in
some detail below.
Rational decision makers will base their decisions about their activi-
ties on a comparison of the benefits and costs to them of the available and
perceived options. These decisions can be influenced in three basic ways:
(1) alteration of the set of options open to agents; and (2) alteration of
the cost and/or benefits relevant to agents; and (3) alteration of the prior-
ities and significance agents attach to environmental change (i.e., altering
the structure of agents' preferences or objective functions; Opschoor, 1990).
Route (1) involves providing new alternatives or forbidding (or licensing)
old ones. Typically, this has been the route followed by environmental pol-
icy in most industrialized countries, the so-called "command-and-control"
approach. Instruments used in this approach have included a wide range of
"direct" regulations (i.e., regulations that directly influence behavior from
an external "leverage point"), such as standards, bans, permits, zoning,
quota, use restrictions, etc. These instruments present cases of direct regula-
tion. Route (2) leads to the application of economic incentives, via markets
or otherwise. The motivation relied upon here is that if environmentally
more appropriate behavior is made more rewarding in the eyes of the agent
involved, then attitudes and behavior will "automatically" shift in favor of
these socially more desirable alternatives. Options can be made more or
less (financially or economically) attractive by applying charges or levies,
granting subsidies, implementing tax differentiation, etc. (see below for a
more complete list). Such instruments are referred to below as economic
instruments. In this way environmental concerns can in a certain sense be
"internalized" by altering the agent's context rather than the agent's value
structure or preferences. Route (3) entails approaches such as: education,
information extension, and training, but also social pressure, negotiation
and other forms of "moral suasion". Here the mechanisms include: (i) im-
proving the information base of the agent, (ii) changing perceptions and
priorities within the agent's preference structure, and (iii) expressing the
priorities and preferences of other relevant parties in a negotiating context.
The notion of an "economic" instrument has come to mean different
things in different contexts. Instruments can be labeled "economic" in a
strict sense, when they are intended to affect estimates of the costs and
benefits of alternative actions open to economic agents. The effect would
be that decision making and behavior are influenced in such a way that from
the available options the ones that are chosen are those that lead to a so-
cially more desirable situation than in the absence of the instrument; agents
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are assumed to adapt to the introduction of the instrument by preferring
the least-cost option. If economic agents indeed behave in such a way, then
environmental agencies could determine their environmental objectives and,
through such incentive-based instruments, could manipulate the economic
agents to such a degree that these environmental objectives would be at-
tained in a cost-effective way. For example, emissions trading schemes may
lead to least-cost approaches to attaining certain ambient quality standards
or overall discharge levels, if those under the scheme are interested in cost
minimization or profit maximization. Such instruments are included in the
above definition of economic instruments. Direct regulation often also has
a financial or monetary component attached to it. For instance, when a
permit is issued, firms will have to bear the costs of complying with it. In
some cases a regulation is accompanied by charges that have no intended
impact on behavior, but in reality do affect it. An example is the Dutch
water pollution charge, which was intended to recover the costs of collective
treatment but which achieved such high levels that Dutch industry to a
large degree preferred to resort to private, on-plant treatment so that they
would not have to pay the charge. Yet they do not fall within the strict
definition of economic instruments. Many actual charge systems would thus
not qualify as economic instruments under this definition. However, many
wider definitions include instruments with direct financial components. In
the OEeD reviews of the use of economic instruments a pragmatic and
fairly broad approach has been taken (see Section 4.2.3).
4.2.3 Economic instruments: A classification
Four elements had to be present for an instrument to be selected for this
survey. First, alternative behavioral options had to be available to an eco-
nomic agent. Second, there would have to be involvement of government
(related) authorities. Third, this authority would have to have an intention
of (directly or indirectly) maintaining or improving environmental quality
by applying the instrument. Finally, an impact on levels of costs or benefits
of alternative behavioral options would have to emanate from the applica-
tion of the instrument. The existence of financial stimuli (either negative or
positive) is not one of the common elements, although it is almost always
present. Apart from subsidies, five main categories of economic instruments
can be distinguished: charges on emissions, charges on products, deposit-
refund systems, market creation, and financial enforcement incentives.
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To some extent, charges may be regarded as a "price" to be paid for pollu-
tion (in a welfare economic setting, where the social costs of pollution are
considered), although in fact they very often have other functions, such as
providing a disincentive to environmentally damaging behavior, or reflect-
ing the costs of pollution or waste treatment services. Polluters have to pay
for their implicit claim on environmental "services", which thereby enters at
least in some part into private cost-benefit calculations. Charges may have
an incentive impact and a revenue- (or fund-) raising impact. The incentive
impact of charges depends on the cost and price changes brought about by
the charge. In many cases, charges mainly have a revenue-raising impact:
they are too low to have an incentive impact and the revenues are intended
for collective treatment, for research on new abatement technologies, or for
subsidizing new investment. The following types of charges are reviewed:
• Charges on emissions or effluent charges are to be paid on discharges
into the environment and are based in principle on (a proxy for) the
quantity and/or quality of discharged pollutants. Emissions charges
may take the form of "user charges": these are payments for the costs
of collective or public treatment of effluent. Tariffs may be uniform or
they may differ according to the amount of effluent treated. Such user
charges are very much like the price of any public good. Otherwise, Le.,
outside the context of the user of treatment facilities, emission-based
charges may reflect incentive aims or other revenue-raising objectives
that are not directly related to the financing of the specific pollutant-
treatment facilities upon which the charge is based.
• Product charges are charges on products that pollute in the manufac-
turing or consumption phase, or for which a disposal system has been
organized. Product charges can be based on some characteristic of a
product (e.g., on the sulfur content of mineral oil) or on the product
itself (e.g., a mineral oil charge). One form that product charges may
take in economic practice is that of tax differentiation leading to more
favorable prices for "environmentally friendly" products, and vice versa.
The sole purpose of tax differentiation is its incentive impact and this
instrument often operates budget-neutrally, while product charges could
also have a revenue-raising goal. Administrative charges such as con-
trol and authorization fees and payments for administrative services,
such as the registration of certain chemicals, or the implementation and
enforcement of regulations, are not analyzed here.
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Deposit-Refund Systems
In deposit-refund systems a surcharge is added to the price of potentially
polluting products. When pollution is avoided by returning these products
or their residuals to a collection system, the surcharge is refunded. The best
known deposit-refund system is that applied to beverage packaging.
Market Creation
One can speak of market creation when economic agents are given "rights"
for actual or potential pollution and where they can trade their "pollution
rights" or their process residuals (recycled materials). Several types exist:
• Emissions trading. In this approach, dischargers operate under some
multi-source emission limit and trade is allowed in permits adding up
to that limit. Such systems can also operate in cases of single-source
permits: if a discharger releases less pollution than its limit allows, the
firm can sell or trade the differences between its actual and allowable
discharges to another firm, which then has the right to release more than
its initial limit allows. Trades can take place within a plant, within a
firm or among different firms; in the past, most trades have occurred
within a plant or a firm.
• Trading in resource extraction quotas. Resource extraction concessions
can be issued, and trading in these could be allowed. Examples include
timber concessions in the forestry sector, or in fish catch quotas. Such
quota trading schemes are not considered here.
There may be other types of market creation that in principle could be
regarded as economic instruments of environmental policy. These include
price interventions (subsidies in case market prices fall below certain levels)
or ex ante price guarantees that create or facilitate the continued existence
of a market, and liability of polluters for environmental damage or clean-up
costs (where the liability gives rise to new insurance activities). These issues
are also beyond the scope of this chapter.
Enforcement Incentives
(Financial) enforcement incentives are sometimes regarded as legal rather
than economic instruments: noncompliance is "punished" either ex ante (by
requesting a payment that is returnable upon compliance) or ex post (by im-
posing a fine when noncompliance occurs). However, enforcement incentives
may provide an economic rationale for compliance, when noncompliance is
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a seriously considered decision alternative. Two types of enforcement in-
centives are therefore included in this overview:
• Noncompliance fees imposed when polluters do not comply with cer-
tain regulations and where the rates are more or less proportional to
noncompliance benefits reaped or environmental damage inflicted.
• Performance bonds, or payments to authorities in expectation of com-
pliance with imposed regulations. Refunds are given when compliance
has been achieved.
In Section 4.3 we attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the
use of these five types of economic instruments of environmental policy.
4.2.4 Rationales for employing economic and
financial incentives
Before describing the present use of economic instruments and putting it into
a longitudinal perspective (Section 4.3), it is perhaps appropriate to assess
the current state of the art of economic instruments (based on Opschoor
and Turner, 1994).
If, due to market failure and/or government failure, the economic pro-
cess will not automatically move the economy toward a socially optimal
allocation, then the question arises as to how to address this. Standard
economic analysis has suggested two basic routes: (i) private negotiations
and legal action, or (ii) policy interventions aiming directly at an alter-
ation of market prices (e.g., through charges), or redefining and altering the
structure of property rights (e.g., by licensing, zoning, standards, etc.). On
route (i), Coase (1960) has suggested that a bargaining approach might suf-
fice in reaching a social optimum, although there are many reasons (Pearce
and Turner, 1990; Barde, 1992) why bargains do not, and cannot, easily
occur. In their absence, there is a case for route (ii), government interven-
tion. Standard economic analysis suggests particular types of intervention,
including so-called economic instruments (Le., Pigovian charges or Baumol-
Oates charges; trading in emission rights or quotas). Economic theory
also provides a framework within which one could theoretically compare
and evaluate a number of (first- and second-best) instruments from the
viewpoints inherent in economic analysis: allocative efficiency (including
cost-effectiveness) and dynamic efficiency. Charges tend to be a lower-cost
method of achieving a given standard or emission level, than a uniform stan-
dards policy if marginal abatement costs differ between sources. Moreover,
charges are often alleged to provide stronger incentives to firms to identify
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and even develop clean technologies with lower marginal abatement costs,
since the financial reward for doing so exceeds the benefits of a standards-
based approach (at least in cases of rising marginal abatement costs). In a
dynamic setting, different environmental policy instruments have different
impacts on both the degree of technological innovation and the process of
diffusion (or penetration) of new technologies; charges are often presumed
to be capable of mobilizing technology pull and push forces relatively ef-
fectively. Marketable permits offer promises of efficiency similar to those
of charges. By giving the polluters a chance to trade their pollution emis-
sion/discharge permits, the total cost of pollution abatement down to some
predetermined acceptable level, is minimized. As long as polluters have
different costs of abatement there is an automatic market - low-cost pol-
luters will sell permits and high-cost polluters will buy them. Trading holds
the promise of a cost-effective total abatement result, as we shall see in
Section 4.3.
The Instruments Debate
UntH fairly recently, direct regulation was the almost exclusive strategy to
address environmental issues. Several developments since the late 1960s
or early 1970s may help explain why the subject of instrument choice has
gained increasing prominence on the public agenda reported above (Op-
schoor and Vos, 1989). First, increasing (and empirically based) doubts
emerged as to the effectiveness and efficiency of (further) regulation: in-
creasing enforcement problems and doubts about compliance with direct
regulation led to a tendency to favor "deregulation". Second, the budgetary
constraints faced by most governments led to an interest in instruments that
promised efficiency and "built-in" compliance, and a capacity to generate
funding. The use of environmental considerations as a rationale for impos-
ing new charges proved to add to the legitimacy (at least in the eyes of
large sections of the public) of what effectively boiled down to new taxa-
tion. Finally, a growing belief in the beneficial properties associated with
harnessing market forces emerged.
Widespread and general as these tendencies may have been, the ac-
tual development of environmental policy instruments has followed differ-
ent courses in different parts of the OEeD region. This may be due to
the diversity of political and administrative contexts that prevail in OEeD
member countries; such differences might give rise to a divergence in ini-
tial instrument preferences, that might subsequently be reinforced by the
dynamics of policy decision making.
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As far as differences in the structure of contexts is concerned, one could
refer to a number of general features such as: (i) general political outlooks,
e.g., on market intervention; (ii) the political configurations in which coun-
tries operate (e.g., the EC, EFTA/Nordic Council, NAFTA); (iii) national
political structures (federalism, etc.); and (iv) administrative cultures and
societal responses to (particular types of) intervention. But there may also
be differences in features that relate, in a more direct way, to environ-
mental policies, such as: (i) the basic tenets of environmental policy (e.g.,
quality- or source-oriented); (ii) priorities attached to environmental prob-
lems and public support for environmental policies; and (iii) distribution
of responsibilities for economic sectors (and environmental compartments)
over ministries, policy levels and agencies.
In all of these features, there are differences between the DECD member
countries, and even between subregions such as the European Union, the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), etc. Hence, one would
expect a range of different approaches. However, there appears to have been
a convergence on the basic tenets of environmental policy at a fairly early
stage. This initial convergence manifested itself in an almost "natural" de-
velopment of a command-and-control approach for environmental policy out
of its predecessors, such as policies in public health and water management,
and in the early adoption by the OECD (1972) of the "polluter-pays" prin-
ciple. Of course, as in any other policy field, there is periodic performance
review and reconsideration; in such circumstances and given the uncertain-
ties surrounding the costs and benefits of specific options in terms of policy
and instrument development, the other features may become important in
understanding the divergences in instrument development that may occur.
As we shall see, in the USA there has been a relatively long tradition in
applying trading approaches to environmental problems in an attempt to
put more flexibility into an otherwise rather rigid, command-and-control
approach. Elsewhere (as in Europe) the taxation or charging approach was
considered or even used from the early 1970s onward, with differences in
charge bases between the EC (typically on effluents) and Scandinavia (typ-
ically on products). There could even be some rigidity in the patterns of
development of sets of policy instruments that could be accounted for by
a view of decision making as one driven by rationality bounded by severe
constraints in terms of awareness of the availability of options and their
impacts, leading to a preference for options within known avenues. Such
"satisficing" approaches may have been behind the fact that, as we shall see,
in the USA most advances have been made in the development of trading
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approaches, whereas in Europe there appears to be a preference for the
taxation approach.
The fairly widespread preference for a regulatory approach as the foun-
dation of a system of environmental policy instruments that prevailed nev-
ertheless, has been an important feature. In fact, this is not as strange as it
may look from a purely economic perspective: it is understandable at least
to a very large degree from the point of view of the political acceptability of
instrument sets. One can see, the process of choosing environmental policy
instruments is influenced by the motives and interests of several important
groups of actors: government, industry, and environmentalist organizations.
Assuming that these interest groups have a "rent-seeking" behavior in a very
broad sense, one may expect support for regulatory approaches at least from
the sides of industry and governments as well as environmentalist organi-
zations, possibly at the expense of consumers (Verbruggen, 1994). In fact,
the very idea that choices between charges and standards, for example, are
made in a setting of seeking to achieve objectives by selecting the most effi-
cient instruments, may be misleading. Rather, in actual political processes
decision makers may be faced with series of very complex "packages" of
objectives, instruments, side-payments or other compensatory or mitigating
measures, etc., over very wide ranges of policy matters, and the effectiveness
and efficiency issues that environmentalists and economists always assume
to be predominant, may in reality be relatively insignificant. Policy anal-
ysis shows that there may be grounds for assuming that the policy arenas
in which instruments for water and air quality policies were shaped, might
not be conducive to incentive-based approaches, but might rather favor reg-
ulatory measures, since these are less likely to lead to unsettling conflicts
between the parties involved (de Savornin Lohman, 1994). The basis for reg-
ulatory control is some form of legislation. Compliance is mandatory and
often sanctions for noncompliance exist. While the standards approach is
biased against technological innovation (i.e., it provides no direct incentive
for regulated polluters to exceed their prescribed target level of abatement)
it still proves to be relatively attractive to control agencies. The reason for
this is that it provides a measure of "certainty" of the policy result in terms
of environmental effectiveness (as long as there is adequate monitoring/ and
enforcement). This certainty (which is the most obvious advantage of direct
regulation; Opschoor and Vas, 1989) is particularly important when persis-
tent and toxic substances are being released into the ambient environment
(Opschoor and Pearce, 1991). Other advantages of direct regulation have
been listed by Bohm and Russell (1985).
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A number of new policy tendencies have emerged that could have a
positive impact on the future role of economic instruments. First, one
may observe an increased tendency toward reduced government interven-
tion (deregulation) in the wake of the changes in central and eastern Eu-
rope at the end of the 1980s; this could lead to a more prominent role for
economic instruments, particularly charges. Charges may provide incen-
tives to change polluters' behavior in a more generic way, and may raise
revenues for (self- )financing of environmental measures. Second, there are
tendencies toward policy integration that could induce harmonization of
economic instruments applied in different policy sectors, and the develop-
ment of new, broad-based economic instruments; this is apparent from the
results of UNCED and the finally concluded Uruguay Round of the GATT
(and the intentions offurther work on trade and the environment). Finally,
in the industrialized market economies there has been a shift of attention
from curative to preventive policies, which could result in a stronger role
for instruments such as product charges and deposit-refund systems. This
tendency is associated with (and is at least partly explained by) the increase
in both the investments in and the costs of environmental protection in re-
lation to GDP (the costs have typically increased from less than 1% in the
first decades of environmental policy, to a current 2%, and beyond in the
decades ahead). Economic efficiency will increasingly become a condition of
social acceptability of environmental and sustainable development policies.
Hence, despite the justifications for direct regulation, one could expect
that economic instruments will gain support and recognition. If this is valid,
then one might see the emergence of more economic instruments, perhaps
even already in recent years, but more certainly in the years to come. Some
of the considerations of group interests and rigidities discussed above may
favor "policies-as-usual" approaches in the instrument choices that lie ahead,
but there are also strong forces in favor of convergence within the set of
economic instruments.
4.3 Analysis of Developments in
o ECD Countries
This section begins by presenting some aggregated results of the 1992 survey
of the use of economic instruments in OECD countries (Vos et al. 1994),
with a focus on air pollution. The survey registered policy instruments that
were in effect on 1 January 1992, in 23 OECD countries, and also included
"proposals", Le., instruments scheduled to be in operation on or before
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1 January 1993. Section 4.3.2 compares these results with those of the 1987
survey (Opschoor and Vos, 1989) and analyzes the changes. Section 4.3.3
discusses some implications of this analysis.
4.3.1 The use of economic instruments III GEeD countries,
1993
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the economic instruments used in the
OECD countries in 1992. For Australia, Belgium, Canada, and the USA,
instruments applied at the nonfederal level have been included. The table
should be interpreted with care, as "policy instruments" within one instru-
ment type are simply added, while in fact their relative importance differs
a great deal. For instance, the US Emissions Trading Program, covering
tens of thousands of sources, involving hundreds of trades and consisting of
various subprograms (bubbles, netting, offsets, banking), counts as "one"
tradable permit system, whereas the "plant renewal clause" in the German
air pollution legislation is essentially a netting provision and has hardly been
implemented so far.
There are some quantitative and qualitative differences between coun-
tries to which I would like to draw attention. First, while countries at
the top of Table 4.1 generally do have ambitious environmental policies,
it is not true, judging from the data for Germany, Switzerland and Japan,
that conversely, all countries with ambitious environmental policies apply
economic instruments extensively. In other words, economic instruments,
even if broadly defined to include revenue-raising instruments, have not yet
permeated on a substantial scale into the environmental policies in all en-
vironmentally aware countries. A second observation relates to the nature
of the instruments applied in various regions. When account is taken of
the number of nonfederal instruments included in the data for Australia,
Canada, and the USA, Table 4.1 shows that the Scandinavian countries are
leading in the application of economic instruments, especially charges. The
USA is ahead in the application of tradable permit systems. This suggests
that differences in the administrative or political contexts in which instru-
ments are to be applied, may have played a role in shaping the development
of the instrument mixes currently in use in the environmental policies of
various countries and regions. Third, countries appear to differ when the fi-
nancial or economic significance of economic instruments for environmental
policy are considered; this difference will be highlighted below.
One would like very much to be able to determine the economic signif-
icance of the instruments used in environmental policy, especially charges.
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Table 4.l. Economic instruments used by OECD countries, January 1992.
Charges on Charges on Deposit-refund Tradable
emissionsa productsb schemes permits
USA 5 (2) 6 (1) 4 42
Sweden 3 (2) 11 (2) 4 2
Canada 3 (2) 7 (3) 1 22
Denmark 3 (2) 10 (2) 2
Finland 3 (2) 10 (2) 2
Norway 4 (2) 8 (2) 3
Australia 5 (2) 1 (0) 3 12
Netherlands 5 (2) 4 (2) 2
Austria 3 (1) 4 (2) 3
Germany 5 (2) 3 (3) 2 1
Belgium 7 (2) 2 (2) 1
France 5 (2) 2 (1)
Switzerland 3 (2) 2 (2) 1
Italy 3 (2) 2 (0)
Iceland 1 (1) 1 (1) 2
Japan 3 (1) 1 (1)
Portugal 2 (0) 1 (1) 1
Ireland 2 (2) 1 (1)
Greece 2 (1) 1
Spain 3 (2)
UK 1 (1) 1 (1)
New Zealand 1 (1)
Turkey 1
QData in parentheses are user charges.
bData in parentheses are tax differentiations.
Source: Vos et ai, 1994.
Unfortunately, consistent data on charge revenues are not available from
the surveys, but based on what information they did yield and on OECD
tax revenue statistics, some sense of the order of magnitude can be ob-
tained (Vos et al., 1994). Most charges have been earmarked as revenue;
for some charges the way revenues are spent is unknown; in a small num-
ber of cases revenues from charges feed the general budget. In Sweden the
revenue from environmental charges (excluding user charges) in 1991 was
about 0.75% of GDP. The CO2 charge accounted for 0.65% alone. In fact,
the Swedish CO2 charge is an integral part of a system of energy taxa-
tion with substantial revenue; but general energy taxes were not included
in this survey. In Denmark, environmental charges (excluding user charges
and apart from the carbon tax) account for approximately 0.15% of GDP.
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Norwegian revenue from environmental charges (apart from user charges) is
0.75% of GDP. In the Netherlands the revenue from environmental charges,
including the water pollution charge, is 0.6% of GDP. The water pollution
charge alone accounts for 0.4%. In Finland, revenue from environmental
charges, including user charges, was 0.9% of GDP in 1992; excluding user
charges, the revenue was 0.4% of GDP. In 1991 the revenue from the CFC
and the hazardous waste charges in the USA (Superfund) amounted to 0.3%
of GDP.
Incentive Intentions and Impacts
The environmental effectiveness of a policy intervention may be expected to
be significant especially when the intervention is done in the context of the
second basic strategy mentioned in Section 4.2.1: to influence the decision
making process at the micro-level. This is what is normally meant by "in-
centive impact"; such an intervention can then be labeled "incentive-based".
An attempt was made to establish whether a specific scheme had been in-
tended as an incentive based instrument (e.g., by looking at the charge rate,
or from intentions as expressed by policy makers in policy documents), in
order to distinguish the truly economic instruments from revenue-raising
ones. Basically, one should distinguish the level of the intentions when the
instrument was established, and the level of effective impacts of the instru-
ment: they can be intended and/or shown to have incentive impacts, or
not. Thus, a two-by-two matrix of possible cases emerges (Opschoor and
Vos, 1989). A hypothesis worth testing would be that economic instru-
ments with incentives built in would have emerged more prominently since
the early days of environmental policy, now that economic analyses have
penetrated further into environmental policy, and the reasons for taking an
efficiency-oriented approach have become so much more evident.
Table 4.2 summarizes the evidence on incentive intentions and impacts
in the case of emission and product charges. We take it that in the case of
deposit-refund schemes the incentive impact is obvious and is also shown
to have worked in economic reality. It must also be noted that the table
leaves out all tax differentiation schemes on automobiles and gasoline that
actually do have incentive intentions and very often incentive impacts as
well. The work underlying the table may have been biased against imputing
the label "incentive" to the instruments considered: actual incentive effects
were recorded if either formal research has demonstrated incentive impacts
or if environmental impacts have been achieved that cannot be accounted
for by other factors. In reporting on actual incentive effects, the "unclear"
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Incentive effects of charges and taxes.
Yes
Data inconclusive
No
No data available
Emission charges
and taxes: incentive
intended (actual)
15 (3)
8 (7)
11 (-)
- (24)
Product charges (excl.
tax differentiation on
automobiles and gasoline):
incentive intended (actual)
21 (7)
7 (10)
23 (20)
- (14)
NB: All tax differentiation schemes on automobiles and gasoline (30 schemes) can be said
to at least have incentive intentions.
Source: Adapted from Vos et al., 1994.
category applies to cases where there is some, but inconclusive, evidence of
incentive effects. :For instance, if a charge is applied in conjunction with
other policy instruments, it is difficult to identify separately the effects of
the charge and the accompanying policies. Hence, the "unclear" - and
"no data" - categories are likely to contain a number of instruments with
incentive impacts. Nevertheless, it is fair to state that the number of cases
of charges with manifest incentive impacts is lower than expected, especially
with emission charges. For both emission charges and product charges, the
intentions were much more oriented toward an incentive impact, as empirical
reality convincingly corroborates. One more positive way of interpreting the
table is that possibly it takes more time and especially research for these
incentive impacts to manifest themselves in the economic process and to be
picked up through empirical analysis. Another way of interpreting it might
be that very often even when incentive intentions are present, the intensities
with which the instruments are applied (e.g., the charge rates) are such that
incentive impacts should be expected to be negligible or at least very hard
to detect: charge rates very often are too low. The available evidence on
water effluent charges, for example, indicates that the level of the charge
does indeed have an impact in terms of environmental performance of the
agents concerned (Opschoor and Vos, 1989).
There is less ambiguity about the incentive impacts of other types of
economic instruments. All deposit-refund systems reported can be assumed
to have incentive intentions. Deposit-refund schemes (mainly in the area
of beverage packaging) show return percentages varying between 40 and
100%, with an average near 80%. The US Emissions Trading Program has
achieved cost savings, but the number of trades has remained limited and
most trades have been within companies. The limited effects are due to the
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restricted scope of the program (allowing only trading of emission reduc-
tions beyond regulatory baselines), the trading rules (promoting primarily
intra-company trading), and the uncertainty created by the joint applica-
tion of discretionary command-and-control regulation alongside the tradable
permit program (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1991). The Acid Rain Control
Program, which began in 1993, has more characteristics of a full- blown trad-
able permit program. Enforcement incentives include performance bonds
and penalty fees, the rates of which are not fixed, but depend on the dam-
age inflicted or noncompliance benefits reaped. They clearly have incentive
intentions. Data on incentive effects are not available.
In conclusion, incentive impacts were intended in most schemes consid-
ered here, even with many charging schemes (although one also finds many
examples of revenue-raising instruments rather than incentive-based ones).
However, whether an instrument actually has incentive effects is another
matter: this may also depend on the intensity with which the instrument
is applied. Looking at charges in particular, it is noteworthy that even
when incentive impacts were present, the incentive effects are not always
manifest. This is mostly due to the failures to obtain empirical evidence:
data are (as yet) inconclusive or insufficiently available. Other problems
in establishing the significance of an instrument in terms of its incentive
impacts are: (i) very often there is no clear baseline or (empirical or simu-
lated) reference with which to compare the impact of the introduction of a
particular instrument; and (ii) many instruments are components of more
complex packages, and attributing the environmental effectiveness of these
packages to their specific components is not very easy. More research is
urgently needed.
Air Pollution-Related Economic Instruments
Specific air pollution-related instruments exist in the categories of charges
(both emission and product charges), tradable permits and enforcement
incentives. Details of the mechanisms upon which these instruments rely
are not provided here (see Vos et al., 1994; and other contributions to this
volume); rather the emphasis will be on some aspects of their performance
in terms of efficiency. Table 4.3 presents an overview of the air pollution
charges as covered by the OECD survey.
Some comments are appropriate here on the incentive impacts of these
emission charges. As to the Canadian charge, an incentive effect is con-
ceivable since permits are revised if applicants can demonstrate that actual
emissions are below permitted levels; there are as yet no data on actual
92
Table 4.3. Air pollution charges in six OEeD countries.
Hans Opschoor
Incentive Revenue
Country Charge base and rate Intended Actual spending
Canadaa Permit fee for air pollution
-/+ Air quality
control
France Acidifying emissions: Subsidies
ECU 19.0/ton
(S02, NOx, H2S, N20, HCI)
Japan SOx emissions: rates differ + # Compensation
regionally, between of health
ECU O.5-4.5/Nm3 damage
Portugal S02, NOx Air quality
control
Sweden NOx-emissions of energy + + Rebated to
producers: ECU 4.7/kg N02 energy
producers
(USA) Criteria pollutants,
-/+ Air quality
~ ECU 16.4/ton control
Symbols: + = yes, - = no, .. = no data available, # = unclear.
aThe instrument came into force in January 1993.
Source: Vos et al., 1994.
incentive effects. In Japan ambient concentrations of S02 have been sub-
stantially reduced, but it is unclear to what extent this has been due to the
charge. Anyhow, some incentive impact could perhaps be expected from
the charge. The incentive effect of the Swedish NO x charge has surpassed
all expectations. The charge speeded up considerably compliance with the
sharper emissions standards that will be imposed in 1995. The US air pol-
lution permit fees, imposed on 1 January 1993, are also expected to have
incentive effects.
Apart from emission charges, air pollution abatement frequently makes
use of product charges levied on products (e.g., mineral oils) or on product
characteristics (e.g., carbon or sulfur content). The so-called "tax differ-
entiations", such as those on leaded and unleaded gasoline, are normally
included in this category. Tax differentiation is typically applied in relation
to vehicles and road transport. Some 11 countries have reported vehicle sales
tax differentiation schemes based on weight, fuel efficiency, compliance with
standards, or the presence of catalytic converters. In many countries there
are regulations specifying that catalytic converters will be compulsory at
some future date, so the aim of the tax differentiation has been to speed
up the market penetration of vehicles equipped with catalytic converters.
Developments in the Use of Economic Instruments 93
Table 4.4. Rates of carbon taxes in six OECD countries.
Implicit rate of Incentivea
Country Rate per ton CO 2 existing excises Intended Actual
Denmark ECU 5.5-11.1 ECU 26.3 +
Finland ECU 1.1
for non-traffic fuels ECU 19.1
(Italy) ECU 1.7 ECU 39.9
Netherlands ECU 0.4 ECU 15.9
Norway ECU 13.8
on coal and coke ECU 32.5 +
ECU 15.7
on fuel oils
ECU 40.6
on gasoline
ECU 40.6
on natural gas
Sweden ECU 37.9 ECU 38.2 + #
aFar explanation of symbols, see Table 4.3.
Source: Hoeller and Cappel, 1992.
Differentiation of the annual vehicle tax between cars with high and low
emissions is a similar instrument. Such systems exist (or will soon be in-
troduced) in four countries; no data are available as yet on their incentive
impacts. Furthermore, all OECD countries levy excises on gasoline. In
some countries a surtax on leaded petrol is part of the gasoline excise. Rev-
enues flow into the general budget, except in Iceland where it is earmarked
for road construction and maintenance. Market shares of unleaded petrol
have risen, but this may also be due to the increasing number of vehicles
equipped with catalytic converters and regulations on this issue.
A special set of product charges related to air pollution is charges on
fossil fuels, notably carbon taxes and sulfur taxes. Carbon taxes are levied
on top of existing excises on fossil fuels. Table 4.4 provides the rates of ex-
plicit carbon taxes, and also the carbon tax rates implicit in existing excises
(d. Hoeller and Coppel, 1992). Charges in Finland and the Netherlands
are too low to have incentive effects. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden the
carbon charges have been instituted only recently so that the survey was
unable to capture any incentive impacts. In evaluating incentive effects, the
impacts of differences between countries in existing excises on fossil fuels
should not be lost sight of. In Sweden energy and CO 2 taxation is so high
that some district heating plants are changing from fossil fuels to biofuels.
Norway, Sweden, and Finland also have taxes on the sulfur content offuels.
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The Swedish scheme has been officially evaluated and appears to be highly
effective. The charge is repayable if a taxpayer can demonstrate an act ual
reduction in sulfur emissions.
Under air pollution-related product taxes, some reference should be
made to energy taxes, even though in the past they may have been in-
troduced for anything but environmental reasons. Energy taxes might be
considered at least in practice to have had substantial significance for air
pollution policy, in that they have affected energy consumption and thereby
(indirectly or directly) emissions of air pollutants. Section 4.3.2 discusses
the new generation of energy taxes, that is energy taxation with explicit
reference to environmental considerations (e.g., ecotaxation, or taxation of
energy in relation to climate or global change issues).
Finally, ozone-depleting chemicals are taxed in four countries. In Aus-
tralia, some states have imposed fees on CFCs in addition to the national
charge. The Danish and Australian charges are levied on domestic pro-
duction and imports. The Danish charge is administered alongside a set
of regulatory controls; Danish CFC consumption fell by 60% between 1986
and 1991. In the USA a charge is levied on all ozone-depleting chemicals.
The charge is applied as a complement to a system of tradable production
quotas, and is designed to skim off windfall profits created by production
limitations imposed by the tradable quota scheme. It will be raised progres-
sively in the coming years. The US charge has had incentive effects on the
use of CFCs in soft foams.
We turn now to air pollution-related economic instruments other than
charges and taxes. This brings us especially to the trading schemes for pol-
lution. By way of an introductory observation, it is to be noted that these
instruments very transparently show a feature that is much more widely
applicable: the fact that very often economic instruments are used in com-
bination with direct regulations. In the case of emissions or quota trading,
the overall levels of pollution (or reductions thereof) are exogenously deter-
mined by public authorities; within this overall level, trade is encouraged
as an instrument to achieve cost-efficiency. Germany, Canada and, notably,
the USA have tradable permit systems related to air pollution. In the
USA the aim is to reduce production and consumption of ozone-depleting
chemicals (CFCs and halons) by 20% in 1993 and 50% in 1998 (baseline
1986). Production rights have been grandfathered to existing producers on
the basis of their 1986 production levels. Consumption rights have been
allocated to producers also (as production minus exports) and to import-
ing firms. Producers' increases in their holdings are constrained as well.
To skim off producer rents created by the mandated production cutback a
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charge has been instituted. Another case in point is that of the US Acid
Rain Allowance Trading program, under which almost all emissions rights
are grandfathered on the basis of actual emissions in 1985 and average fuel
usage in 1985-1987; about 3% are sold in open auction for a pre-fixed price.
The USA also has two enforcement incentives, one of which is a noncompli-
ance fee for S02 emissions (instituted in January 1993), as a complement
to the scheme of tradable allowances that has been instituted in the revised
Clean Air Act for acid rain control. The fee is approximately 300% of the
expected market price for allowances. Much of the significance of these
trading schemes has to do with their demonstrated (as in the case of the
USA's old trading program; see, e.g., Hahn and Hester, 1989) or expected
cost-effectiveness. For instance, the new RECLAIM scheme for NO x and
SOx abatement (with reductions of up to 75% in 2003) introduced in the Los
Angeles area, is expected to give rise to efficiency gains of approximately
35% of overall additional abatement costs.
4.3.2 Changes in the use of economic instruments since 1987
If we use a loose definition of economic instruments, i.e., including financial
and fiscal instruments that may not have had the intention of modifying
the behavior of polluters and resource users, then such instruments have
been around for a long time. In a report to the OECD, Opschoor and Vos
(1989) reviewed the situation in the OECD countries in 1987, and identified
a total of 150 economic instruments (or over 10 per country surveyed), some
of which had been in use for decades. Excluding a number of instruments
that are beyond the scope of the present survey - subsidies, administrative
charges, and liability - still gives a total of nearly 100, or almost seven
per country surveyed. Of the 150 instruments identified, about 80 were
charges, about 40 were subsidies, and the remainder were other types such
as deposit-refund systems and trading schemes. Looking at the various eco-
nomic instruments in terms of their original purpose and how they actually
performed (in both cases, either providing an incentive or raising revenue),
one finds that in terms of the numbers involved, less than half of the eco-
nomic instruments reviewed had the intention of generating an economic
incentive, and over half were intended to raise revenue. Only one-third may
have effectively had some incentive impact. Thus, in 1987 environmental
policies in the OECD countries were command-and-control policies with
some financial and economic add-ons.
Comparing the 1993 survey results with those on the 1987 situation
is not straightforward. First, more countries are covered in the present
96 Hans Opschoor
Table 4.5. Comparison of the 1987 and 1992 survey results.
Charges Charges Deposit- Trad- Enforce-
on on refund able ment
emISSIOns products schemes permits incentives
1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992 1987 1992
Finland 3 3 6 10 1 3
France 5 5 1 2
Germany 5 4 2 3 1 2 1 1
Italy 3 3 2 2
Netherlands 6 5 5 4 2 2
Norway 2 4 8 8 2 3
Sweden 3 3 7 11 3 4 2 2
USA 4 5 ? 6 ? 4 3 4 1 2
Source: Vos et al., 1994.
survey: data from 23 countries are included, compared to 15 in the 1987
survey. Second, apart from the responses to the questionnaire, many more
data sources were used in 1993, whereas the earlier survey relied on official
responses and some in-depth case studies. Finally, the coverage of instru-
ments in the present survey is more restricted in that it does not deal with
subsidies, administrative charges and environmental liability. Nevertheless,
a rough comparison is possible for eight countries that were surveyed in
detail in both the previous and the present surveys (Table 4.5).
Changes have been minor in France, Germany, and Italy, moderate in
the Netherlands and Norway, and extensive in Finland, Sweden, and the
USA. A further assessment of the implications of Table 4.5 is given in Sec-
tion 4.3.3; here a few developments pertinent to air pollution policy are
underlined. Since 1987 France has instituted, among other economic in-
struments, a tax differential on leaded and unleaded gasoline. In Germany
a differentiation of vehicle taxes has been introduced. Norway has instituted
a carbon tax. Together with the Netherlands, Norway is actively promot-
ing international interest in economic incentives for abating greenhouse gas
emissions. Finland and Sweden have actually implemented a range of new
product charges, to a considerable extent with incentive purposes. Finland
has instituted charges on carbon and diesel oil. In the government service
there is a permanent committee for investigating and proposing environ-
mental charges. Before 1991 Sweden introduced a differentiation of car sales
taxes and a charge on domestic aviation fuel. In 1991 the Swedish tax sys-
tem was reformed, involving tax revenues of approximately 6% of GDP. The
reforms included a broadening of the VAT base (to include energy products,
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for example) and environmental charges on energy products, together with
reductions in personal income taxes and the existing general tax on energy
products, respectively. The new environmental charges include a carbon
tax, a tax on sulfur in fuels, a tax differentiation of petroleum products,
and a charge on NOx emissions of energy producers. Since 1987 the USA
has deployed the instrument of tradable emissions rights to control emissions
of ozone-depleting chemicals and S02. A charge on ozone-depleting chemi-
cals has been instituted, alongside the tradable consumption and production
quota system. With the revision of the Clean Air Act new opportunities
for economic instruments were created: from 1993 states were authorized
to levy permit fees on the basis of recorded emissions. The present survey
includes a number of product charges and deposit-refund schemes applied
by US states.
Current National and International Initiatives
In addition to the economic instruments in use in 1992, there has been a
further increase in political interest in employing these instruments. In at
least eight countries official task forces are carrying out (or have recently
concluded) feasibility studies, and six other countries have stated a general
intention to increase the application of economic instruments (de Savornin
Lohman, 1994).
At the national level, several developments not reflected by the sur-
vey reported here, must be mentioned. In Belgium, for example, a set of
product charges has been implemented in 1994 (on products such as dispos-
able beverage packaging, pesticides, paper, disposable razors, and cameras).
Switzerland is considering incentive charges on volatile organic compounds,
the sulfur content of heating oil, fertilizers, pesticides, and batteries. Austria
is considering a charge on wastewater, fiscal incentives to reduce chlorine
emissions, a deposit-refund scheme for refrigerators, and energy and carbon
taxes. Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are continuously adapting their sys-
tems of fiscal incentives. In Germany there has been a long-running policy
debate on economic incentives in waste management and transport. The
UK is considering charges on wastewater and in the area of waste manage-
ment. The recent introduction of another air pollution trading scheme in
the Los Angeles area has been mentioned already.
These national developments are in line with the general interest man-
ifested in UNCED documents such as Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration,
but there are some more explicit and tangible indications as well. In inter-
national forums, taxes and tradable permits for greenhouse gas abatement
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are on the agenda. For example, the European Commission has discussed
a proposal for an energy carbon tax, to be implemented conditional on the
implementation of fiscal incentives by major trading partners, and in the
USA the Clinton Administration has initiated a debate on energy taxation
(although so far this has only generated a small increase in the gasoline
tax; there may be subsequent rounds in that debate). The OECD has also
paid much attention to the use of economic instruments for abating global
environmental risks (OECD, 1992a, 1992b, 1993).
4.3.3 An assessment and discussion
Below we summarize, in three conclusions, the most important changes that
have occurred since 1987 placing special emphasis on eight countries: the
six countries that were studied in depth in 1987 ~ France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Sweden, and the USA - and Finland and Denmark, for which
sufficient information is available.
First, there have been quantitative changes in the use of economic in-
struments. Since 1987, the use of economic instruments appears to have
intensified. Comparing 1987 data with "solid" 1992 indications, the num-
ber of economic instruments used in the eight countries has grown by some
25%; including also the instruments put into operation since 1992, the num-
ber has grown by close to 50%. Looking at the totals for all OECD countries
on which we have information for 1987 and 1993, the growth in the reported
use of economic instruments would be even larger, but this might also reflect
the greater accuracy of the 1992 survey.
Second, there have been changes in the type of instrument. Instruments
that have been introduced more frequently are product charges and deposit-
refund systems. In the eight countries, comparing 1992 with 1987, the
number of these instruments increased by 35% and 100%, respectively, and
this trend appears to be continuing. It is noteworthy that emission charges
were not used more frequently in 1992, as far as we can tell, in the eight
countries, although there may have been a small increase in the reported
number since 1992. If we look at all OECD countries on which we have
information for both 1987 and the present, then there appears to have been
an increase, but again, this may also reflect the more complete survey of
instruments in 1993. Deposit-refund systems still function mainly in the
field of beverage packaging.
Finally, there have been changes in incentive impacts or the significance
of the instruments. It is clear that too little information exists to provide
firm judgments on this very important aspect. Looking at the available
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information (Le., using solid data on the 1992 instruments), we find that on
emission charges one can say with some confidence that an incentive impact
is now at least formally intended in some 45% of the charges (whereas in
some 30% it is not), but in about 90% of the cases the information on actual
incentive impacts is inconclusive or unavailable. With respect to product
charges, we know that incentive impacts were intended as often as they were
not (45% in each case). When it comes to actual incentive impacts, there are
inconclusive (or no) data on close to half of the applications, and such effects
seem to be absent in at least 40%. The lack of conclusiveness ofthe available
information has to do with the fact that very often product charges are
applied in conjunction with other instruments. The US Emissions Trading
Program has achieved cost savings, but the number of trades has been
lower than expected; more incentive impacts might be expected from the
Acid Rain Allowance Trading program. The Lead Trading Scheme has
performed quite well.
Assessment
In terms of the policy tendencies presented at the end of Section 4.2.4, the
role of charges has indeed been extended. Although an increasing number of
charge schemes now show incentive purposes, not much evidence has been
mobilized to show that these charges have actually had incentive impacts.
Nor is it likely that such instruments will replace direct regulation, as part of
a process toward reducing government intervention. Some examples of new
incentive charges are: the CO 2 charges in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden;
the Swedish NOx charge; the Danish waste disposal charge; and a number
of product charges (on fertilizers in Sweden, on ozone-depleting chemicals
in the USA, and on packaging in Finland and Norway). There may, in
all, be more charges now than there were some years ago, but this expan-
sion is restricted largely to product charges. Moreover, the revenue-raising
capabilities of these charges have remained their dominant function. Tax
differentials on the sales prices of new cars with catalytic converters and on
unleaded petrol may well have contributed to the rapid penetration of these
products on the market. The extension of the number of deposit-refund
systems might be a signal of intensified government attempts to shift re-
sponsibility for packaging waste to the societal parties concerned, and to re-
duce their own role. A remarkable development has been the introduction of
deposit-refund systems for plastic bottles. These were hardly mentioned in
the 1987 survey, whereas the present inventory shows widespread application
in at least 11 countries. On the second tendency discussed in Section 4.2.4
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(i.e., policy integration) there have also been some developments (Vos et at.,
1994), but these are hardly reflected in the role of economic instruments.
The wider attention paid to carbon taxes may be regarded as an example,
since it is an instrument of both environmental policy and of energy policy.
Although curative policy is still a major policy issue, preventive policies
have increased in importance. The fact that more product charges and
deposit-refund systems are in operation now than in 1987 may underline
this tendency.
Discussion: Instruments
There have indeed been qualitative and quantitative developments in the
use of economic instruments, in line with expectations based on some overall
policy tendencies. Yet, given the theoretical as well as political arguments
put forward in Section 4.2.4 in favor of economic instruments, the rate of
implementing incentive instruments appears to be rather slow. One ex-
planation for this might be that much of the original debate on economic
instruments has remained too remote from the realities of the economic
process and the policy arena; a more pragmatic approach would modify the
rather sweeping generalizations and expectations to more realistic propor-
tions. Discussions on the use of economic or other instruments (or mixes
thereof) are increasingly stressing the need for a more pragmatic approach.
Partly as a result of empirical studies, there is now much less dogmatism
or rhetoric in the dialogue on environmental policy instruments; this prag-
matic approach is indeed beginning to prevail. There are fewer categorical
pronouncements in favor of or against certain types of instruments; rather,
the interest is in providing realistic assessments of the pros and cons of dif-
ferent mixes of instruments in the specific policy and application contexts
within which they are to operate. Some of the main criticisms in the more
empirically oriented literature on the theoretical argumentation in favor of
economic instruments have been:
1. Economic analyses do not always convincingly reflect economic realities.
Real markets do not always work as theory assumes (because there is
very imperfect information, there are rigidities and/or transaction costs,
there are too few parties in the market, etc.). This criticism has some
merit, as empirically based doubts vis-it-vis the alleged effectiveness
and dynamic efficiency suggest. Looking at the aspect of effectiveness,
it must be realized that financial and economic instruments provide an
incentive, but the significance of the incentive depends on the elastici-
ties that operate on behavior (price elasticities, substitution elasticities,
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income elasticities), on the strength of the signal given (e.g., the level
of the charge), and on the availability of substitutes or alternative ac-
tions. Sometimes, high charges alone will not have sufficient behavioral
significance and hence their environmental effectiveness is low, or doubt-
ful. Most charges introduced so far in OECD member countries have
proven to be too low to have had an incentive impact, even if this was
intended. On the other hand, evidence on the impacts of some charges
and of energy price fluctuations suggest there is scope for effective pric-
ing policies and charges, etc. On the aspect of dynamic efficiency, some
qualifications are also called for. In the long run, this aspect is much
more important than allocative efficiency, since it relates to the devel-
opment of new innovation trajectories and the shaping of new options
in consumption, production, and investment. Until now, the impacts
of the various policy approaches on actual patterns of innovation and
diffusion of environmentally friendlier technologies are still a matter for
empirical analysis and debate (Georg and Jorgensen, 1990, p. 6; Kemp
et al., 1994).
2. Noneconomic instruments may perform equally well or even better
than economic incentives, especially from the point of view of effec-
tiveness. Looking back at the arguments in favor of direct regulation
(Section 4.2.5) and at what we have observed in relation to the devel-
opment of economic instruments so far, one may conclude that noneco-
nomic instruments do have a strong raison d'etre. In fact, they still
dominate the instruments selected, and very often economic instruments
are used merely as adjuncts to regulatory approaches. The performance
of "mixes" of instruments, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, is as
good as (if not actually better than) that of "pure" instruments, espe-
cially the purely economic ones, and there are good reasons for this.
In other words, a shift from a regulatory approach toward one based
on economic incentives alone is unlikely to occur, nor would it be de-
sirable. Combinations of instruments are preferable, and within such
"cocktails" economic incentives will playa crucial role.
3. Economic instruments cannot be as efficient as was claimed initially
by economists, since the analysis bypasses a number of issues related
to implementation and enforcement. There is growing recognition of
the diversity of application contexts and the relevance of this diversity
for instrument selection. The effects of policy instruments depend on
the economic, political, and administrative contexts in which they are
applied. The complexities of the interactions between environmental
and economic processes, as well as the dynamics of innovation, preclude
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straightforward and simple broad-brush recommendations as to which
instruments to use. These issues are gaining increasing attention in the
literature, and there are promising examples of cross-fertilization be-
tween economists and noneconomists in collaborative efforts to address
them.
4. Economic analyses and recommendations often ignore or play down re-
alities typical of the political "arena" in which (environmental) policy
is shaped in reality. One aspect of this is the issue of the distributional
implications of environmental policy and instrument choice. This issue
was touched upon in Section 4.2.4.
Discussion: Policy Interest
Some recent manifestations of the growing policy interest have been: (i)
the Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987) and the UNCED process with its
concern over how to merge environment and economics in decision making
(UNCED, 1992); and (ii) the increased tendency to rely on market-based
approaches, not only in OECD countries but also in economies in transition
and many developing countries. In addition, environmental policy attention
has shifted. Environmental policy since the end of the 1980s has become
more interested in tackling environmental problems at higher spatial levels,
at the continental and even global scale. At that level there is much less
scope for a command-and-control approach and hence economic instruments
may provide more attractive options. However, it is only fair to say that
so far the typical approach to coordination has been to adopt some time
schedule for achieving fixed abatement targets in terms of percentage re-
ductions to be applied to individual countries' emissions in some reference
year. Apart from its concern with international problems, environmental
policy has also become more interested in diffuse and mobile sources of
pollution: again types of sources for which some economic instruments (es-
pecially product charges and deposit-refund systems) could prove effective.
In current discussions on economic instruments some new elements have
emerged, or some specific aspects are now receiving much more attention
than they did in 1987. One of these is explicit reference to the link be-
tween institutional failure and environmental externalities. Environmental
degradation has its roots in the economic process (notably its relation to
types and levels of economic activities, and their development), as well as
in the way decision making on economic activities and policies has been
institutionalized. Conditions pertaining to the institutions that direct the
economic process from within (Le., the market and "market failure") are
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such that government interventions are needed to ensure the incorporation
of environmental externalities in market decisions. Also, the need to remove
old institutional failures (such as hidden or explicit subsidies) is now more
broadly recognized. A second new element is the awareness of the risk of
failure accumulation. Existing regulations and policy interventions may cre-
ate a setting in which efficiency-based consideration of environmental policy
instruments would at best indicate second-best solutions. Internalizing ex-
ternalities via economic instruments may not make much sense in a world of
seriously distorted markets (Le., in a complex situation involving multiple
market and government failures); in fact, the overall result may be ambigu-
ous. A third new element is the growing interest in harmonization. There
is a need to at least consider the harmonization of individual countries' ap-
proaches to the choice of instruments; if international trade and investment
patterns are likely to be affected. Finally, one older consideration may still
be important. There is a perhaps growing need for funds for financing envi-
ronmental measures; this need may support the use of economic instruments
- especially charges - which may have incentive side effects.
4.4 Conclusions and Outlook
Even though economic instruments are now more widely used in environ-
mental policy, and even more applications are under consideration or being
implemented, the most striking development since 1989 has been not the
growth of the use of economic instruments, but the growth of interest in
the subject of economic approaches and instruments - theoretically, empir-
ically, and in terms of policy design. This observation gives support to the
expectation that over time one may see an increased use of these instru-
ments, if pragmatic arguments can be found in their favor. This holds for
economic instruments in general, as well as for applications to air pollution
abatement.
The potential policy relevance of economic instruments for environmen-
tal policy is by now well established and no longer rests on theoretical or
academic arguments alone. The call for increasingly stringent environmental
quality standards in the short run inevitably means rising policy response
costs and therefore enhances the appeal of cost-effective market-based in-
struments. Economic instruments are potentially relevant in policy contexts
that are based on a preventive approach. Their use is therefore likely to
grow.
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There are substantial differences in the intensities with which economic
instruments are applied. Different sets of these instruments are being tried
out in various parts of the world. One can still observe a wide range of
opinions as to when and where to apply which type of instrument or mix
of instruments. The effects of policy instruments depend on the economic,
political, and administrative contexts in which they are applied. In so far
as harmonization develops, these differences may diminish.
The relative roles of economic instruments and direct regulation might
be changing, and they even might alter in favor of economic instruments,
but this is certainly not yet a very clearly observable tendency, since also the
use of other types of instruments may have evolved since 1987. Nowhere
is there an observable change toward replacing the basic command-and-
control approach with a purely economic one. Economic instruments are
mostly complements to and only sometimes substitutes for other types of
approaches. That is, they appear to operate mostly in combination with,
or in support of, other instruments such as direct regulation.
Economic instruments are now increasingly being considered for appli-
cation at the regional/global level. Global or regional energy charges or
carbon charges are being discussed, and global and tradable carbon quotas,
are being investigated.
Options for integrating environmental considerations into the policies of
other sectors are far from having been exhausted. In fact, the OEeD coun-
tries are now witnessing the beginning of such integration efforts. Economic
instruments and generally instruments that bring market signals closer to
their socially desirable levels, have important roles to play and this has in-
creasingly become common insight. Environmental taxation may be one
specific area in which this policy integration can take place, but the rela-
tionships to the fiscal framework as such remain to be worked out.
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Chapter 5
Economic Instruments for
Air Pollution Control
in Sweden
J(erstin Lovgren
Swedish Environmental Protection Agency
Solna, Sweden
Abstract
In recent years, traditional forms of regulation have been combined with economic
instruments in Swedish air pollution control policy. Major economic incentives are
provided by the sulfur tax, the nitrogen oxides charge, and the environmental clas-
sification of diesel fuels. Both economic instruments and administrative regulations
have played a part in reducing emissions, but the new economic instruments must
be considered to have been the major driving force behind the reductions. The
average sulfur content of heavy fuel oil has decreased to approximately 0.4% while
that of almost all gas oil is now less than 0.1%. Total nitrogen oxides emissions
from boilers liable to the nitrogen oxides charge have decreased by about 40%. The
tax on diesel fuels is differentiated to stimulate the use of environmentally better
grades of fuel, which are taxed at a lower rate than the standard grade. As a re-
sult, diesel fuels with better specifications than the standard grade have captured
a large fraction - about 75% - of diesel sales in only a few years.
Key words: sulfur tax, nitrogen oxides charge, diesel fuel taxes, economic incen-
tives (actual performance of).
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5.1 Introduction
Economic instruments have been successfully introduced into Swedish air
pollution control policy in the last few years. This chapter provides a brief
overview of the new incentive mechanisms and examines the performance
of three of them in some detail: the sulfur tax, the nitrogen oxides charge,
and the differentiated tax on diesel fuels.
5.1.1 Economic instruments for air pollution control:
An overview
The new economic instruments apply to energy installations and vehicles.
In 1993 a carbon dioxide tax, a sulfur tax, and a charge on nitrogen oxides
emissions were introduced, as well as systems of environmental classification
of vehicles and fuels backed by tax incentives for the use of environmentally
better products (see Table 5.1).
The introduction of the carbon dioxide tax and other environmental
taxes in 1991 were part of a far-reaching reform of the Swedish tax system,
one of the major aims of which was to reduce income taxes. The reduction
of income taxes was financed largely by increasing indirect taxes and by
broadening the base of value added tax (VAT). When the carbon dioxide
tax was introduced, existing energy taxes were cut by 50%, and VAT was
extended to apply to all forms of energy. Previously, only energy taxes had
been levied on various forms of energy. The combined effect of these changes
was a substantial rise in the overall level of fossil fuel taxes. By virtue of
the reform, a total of approximately SEK 18 billion was transferred from
income tax to various types of energy and environmental taxes (Nordiska
Ministerradet, 1991).
The energy taxes and the carbon dioxide tax generate important rev-
enues, while the sulfur tax contributes small amounts from a government
budgetary perspective. In 1992, revenues from the carbon dioxide tax were
around SEK 9 billion, while the sulfur tax contributed just below SEK 300
million (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, 1993). The nitro-
gen oxides charge does not generate any general revenue at all, as will be
explained shortly. The differentiation of the energy tax on diesel fuels was
not meant to affect tax revenue in a major way, but due to the unexpected
rise in sales of the environmentally better quality fuels, tax revenues have in
fact dropped. If market shares for fuel classes 1, 2, and 3 remain at present
levels (15%, 60%, and 25%, respectively), it is estimated that the loss of
government revenue will be around SEK 600 million per year compared to
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Table 5.1. Economic instruments for air pollution control in Sweden,
October 1993.
Carbon dioxide
tax
Sulfur tax
Nitrogen oxides
charge
Differentiated
sales tax on
light vehicles
Differentiated
tax on diesel
fuels
Differentiated
petrol tax
Year of
intro-
duction
1991
1991
1992
1993
1991
1986
Level and scope
Industry
Other sectors
All sectors
Large and
medium-sized
boilers
Reduction compared
to class 3:
Env.class 1
Env.class 2
Env.class 3
Reduction compared
to class 3:
Env.class 1
Env.class 2
Env.class 3
Tax reduction
for lead-free
petrol
SEK 80/tonne CO2
SEK 320/tonne CO2
SEK 30,OOO/tonne S
SEK 40,OOO/tonne NOx
SEK 6,OOO/vehicle
SEK 2,OOO/vehicle
SEK 0
SEK 535/m3
SEK 250/m3
SEK 0
SEK O.51/liter
1 SEK = 0.11 ECU = 0.13 US$.
a situation where only class 3 (the standard grade) were provided (Swedish
Environmental Protection Agency, 1993c).
Tests on motor vehicles have revealed that lower emission levels than
those currently required can be achieved. In response to the need for fur-
ther emission reductions, the Swedish parliament has passed a tax incentive
scheme with voluntary emission targets allowing a choice between three
levels of standards (environmental classes). This will permit the gradual
introduction of low-emission vehicles in Sweden. Tax incentives for light
vehicles became effective in 1993, and similar incentives for heavy vehicles
are scheduled for 1994. As in many other countries, lead-free petrol is taxed
at a lower rate than leaded petrol. The Swedish Environmental Protection
Agency has recently proposed a broader tax incentive scheme designed not
only to encourage the phasing out of leaded petrol, but also to improve the
properties of petrol in general.
110 Kerstin Lovgren
This chapter elaborates on those schemes that have been effective long
enough for responses to be recorded. Thus, the recent environmental classi-
fication of vehicles is excluded, as well as an analysis of the carbon dioxide
tax, since this would have to deal with energy taxes as well. Before looking
at each economic instrument, a few words on the Swedish energy struc-
ture, the environmental situation, and the development of emissions may
be helpful.
5.2 Swedish Energy Structure
Energy-intensive processes based on natural resources such as forests, iron
ore and hydropower are important within Swedish industry. Following the
oil crises of the 1970s energy efficiency improved substantially, and the share
of oil in total energy supply dropped from 70% to 45% between 1970 and
1990. The use of nuclear power has increased (Swedish Board for Industry
and Technical Development, 1991), but the Swedish parliament has decided
that the existing nuclear reactors are to be phased out, a process that will
be completed by the year 2010.
At present, Swedish electricity production is based almost exclusively on
hydro and nuclear power, each source accounting for approximately half the
electricity supply. Due to the severity of the Swedish climate the demand
for electricity for domestic heating is high. In high-density residential areas
a large part of this demand is covered by district heating.
5.3 Environmental Problems and Emissions
Deposition of sulfur exceeds critical loads in most parts of Sweden. In
the south of the country the deposition of sulfur needs to be reduced by
60%-80%. Nitrogen deposition also exceeds critical loads, especially in the
south, where deposition should be reduced by around 60% (Table 5.2).
Foreign sources dominate both sulfur and nitrogen deposition in Sweden;
the Swedish contribution to the deposition of sulfur is only around 10% and
that of nitrogen around 20%.
Emissions of sulfur dioxide in Sweden have been decreasing since the
early 1970s, and are now lower than they were in the 1950s. Total emis-
sions have decreased by almost 80% since 1980. In contrast, total Swedish
emissions of nitrogen oxides decreased very little between 1980 and 1991.
The emissions from stationary sources have been reduced by almost 50%,
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Table 5.2. Swedish contribution to sulfur and nitrogen deposition and
reduction required.
Reduction necessary to avoid
exceeding critical loads (%)
Sulfur 60-80
Nitrogen 60
Source: Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 1994.
Swedish contribution
to deposition (%)
10
20
but this reduction has been largely offset by the growth of emissions from
the transport sector (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 1994).
5.4 The Sulfur Tax
The sulfur tax, which came into force in 1991, is levied on coal, peat, and
oil consumption and corresponds to SEK 30,000 (approximately US$ 3,900)
per tonne of sulfur emitted. The tax aims at a cost-effective reduction of
Swedish sulfur emissions by 80% before the year 2000. The sulfur tax has
not replaced administrative regulations, but is complementary to them. As
a result, the tax coexists with emission standards and individual permits
for large stationary sources. When the tax was designed, it was anticipated
that administrative regulations would also have to be tightened to meet
the national target for the late 1990s. The tax was intended to achieve
reductions of approximately the same magnitude as those expected from
stricter standards, but to achieve them more rapidly.
Swedish sulfur emission standards apply to all fuels, and are being tight-
ened in line with the original plans. The general emission limits will be 0.05 g
S/MJ fuel input (annual average) for combustion plants emitting more than
400 tonnes of sulfur per year, and 0.10 g S/MJ for smaller plants (annual
average). The short-term maximum emission limits will remain at 0.19 g
S/MJ, corresponding to 0.8% sulfur in heavy fuel oil. The new standards
came into force in large parts of southern Sweden in 1993 and will apply to
all parts of the country by 1997. In addition, the limit for the sulfur content
in gas oil was reduced from a maximum of 0.3% to a maximum of 0.2% as
of 1993 (annual average limit).
5.4.1 Design of the tax system
The sulfur tax is designed as a fuel tax; the tax rate levied depends on the
sulfur content of the fuel. For practical reasons, oils containing less than
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0.1 % sulfur are not taxed. The sulfur tax is refunded to the extent that
emissions have been controlled by flue gas desulfurization or other cleaning
technologies. Thus, the tax encourages both the use of low-sulfur fuels
and investments in sulfur emission control. Fuels used by shipping or for
purposes other than energy generation (such as raw materials in industrial
processes) are not taxed. The tax revenue is part of general government
revenue.
The rather high rate of the tax must be viewed in relation to earlier
sulfur control policies and the ambitious emission reduction target. When
the tax was introduced the sulfur content of fuel oil was already low, as
were average sulfur emissions from coal-fired boilers. The sulfur tax was
designed to bring about further decreases from these low levels.
5.4.2 Results
Total Swedish emissions of sulfur dioxide from combustion in stationary
sources decreased from 54,000 tonnes in 1990 to 40,000 tonnes in 1991, a
decrease of about 25% (Statistics Sweden, 1993). Several factors contributed
to this, including the sulfur tax and the administrative regulations concern-
ing sulfur, the carbon dioxide tax and other energy taxes, and changes in
the level of industrial activity. I will not go into the changes in the overall
pattern of energy use related to changes in energy taxes and industrial ac-
tivity, but concentrate on distinguishing the effects of the sulfur tax and the
administrative regulations on more direct measures to reduce sulfur emis-
sions, such as the choice of fuel qualities and various emission reduction
measures.
In 1990, large users of heavy fuel oil in some cities had already begun
to use very low sulfur fuel, due to local restrictions or on a voluntary basis.
Consequently, the actual average content of sulfur in heavy fuel oil was
around 0.65%, somewhat lower than the maximum value. The introduction
of the sulfur tax and the tightening of the general emission standards for
combustion plants has brought the average sulfur content of heavy fuel oil
down to around 0.4%.
The effects of the introduction of the tax (in 1991) and the subsequent
tightening of emission standards (starting in 1993) cannot be clearly isolated
in this case. The combined effect has been a very rapid switch to higher-
quality heavy fuel oil containing approximately 0.4% sulfur in all parts of
the country, not just in those areas where the tighter emission standards
have come into force. Low sulfur fuels gained large market shares as early as
1991. In view of this, it seems likely that much the same changes could have
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been brought about by the sulfur tax without the subsequent tightening
of emission standards. However, the very quick convergence to the new
standard quality was probably helped by the combination of instruments.
In the case of gas oil, the specific limit for the sulfur content (maximum
0.2%) is the most stringent administrative requirement. Gas oil now con-
tains less than 0.1 %sulfur, so the effects of the sulfur tax have clearly been
dominant. The sulfur content of diesel fuels has been reduced even further,
although this has been mainly due to another incentive mechanism - the
differentiation of the tax on diesel fuel. As has already been pointed out,
the sulfur tax does not apply to oils whose sulfur content is below 0.1 %.
The use of coal and peat is rather small in the Swedish energy sector.
Coal- and peat-fired installations are faced with strict emission control re-
quirements in their permits under the Environmental Protection Act. These
permit requirements were very stringent even before 1993, so the tightening
of the general emission standards hardly affected the coal- and peat-fired in-
stallations. New emission reduction measures have been taken, however, to
improve the efficiency of sulfur removal at most installations and to increase
the use of low-sulfur coals. These emission reduction measures can in most
cases be ascribed to the sulfur tax. The introduction of stricter require-
ments in individual permits has only been important for some coal-, peat-
and oil-fired installations, since only a small fraction of permits is reviewed
each year. For the vast majority of combustion plants, the requirements for
sulfur emissions in individual permits has not changed in the last few years.
In summary, the sulfur tax seems to have been decisive in reducing emis-
sions from the combustion of coal, peat and gas oil in stationary sources.
As for heavy fuel oil, the rapid convergence to a new standard quality was
probably achieved by the combination of economic and administrative in-
struments.
When the sulfur tax rate was set, it was based upon assessments of the
marginal cost of reducing sulfur emissions in Sweden. The cost of reducing
sulfur emissions from the combustion of oil is very important in this context,
since it is dependent, among other things, on the world market prices of very
low sulfur oils in relation to other oils. The tax rate was set so as to provide
some room for increasing the relative prices of very low sulfur oils. So far,
however, relative prices have not changed to a great extent. Low sulfur
fuels have been available at fairly low cost. Therefore the average cost of
the emission reduction measures undertaken so far is probably as low as
SEK 10,000 per tonne of sulfur abated.
The administration of the sulfur tax has proved fairly simple. The same
administrative framework is used to handle the taxes on energy, sulfur, and
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carbon dioxide. The sulfur content of fuels had to be measured even before
1991 to ensure compliance with existing regulations. Approximately 65
plants per year have been reimbursed due to their sulfur reduction measures.
In 1992, eligibility for reimbursement was based on continuous monitoring of
emissions in 80%-90% of cases. Since the requirements for monitoring both
S02 and NOx emissions are similar (see Section 5.5), and plants with sulfur
reduction measures are liable to the nitrogen oxides charge, it has been
possible to coordinate monitoring of sulfur and nitrogen oxides emissions
and limit administrative costs.
5.5 The Nitrogen Oxides Charge
The nitrogen oxides charge aims at the cost-effective reduction of Swedish
nitrogen oxides emissions from combustion plants. Since vehicles are the
main source of nitrogen oxides emissions, the nitrogen oxides charge affects
a rather small portion of Swedish emissions. The importance of this charge
will increase when new electricity power plants are built, possibly by the
end of the 1990s. The national target implies that total Swedish nitrogen
oxides emissions will need to be reduced by 30% by 1995.
Many of the plants affected by the nitrogen oxides charge must also
meet requirements laid down in individual permits, but there are no general
emission standards of the type applied to sulfur. A tightening of the re-
quirements of the permits was foreseen when the new economic instrument
was introduced. The nitrogen oxides charge was set so as to achieve roughly
the same decrease as that anticipated from tightened permit requirements,
but more rapidly. Since then, permits have been reviewed in a number of
cases but, as was explained in relation to sulfur, changes in permits affect
a fairly small fraction of installations in anyone year.
5.5.1 Overall design of the charge system
The nitrogen oxides charge came into force in 1992, based on a decision
made as early as 1990. The charge is levied on large and medium-sized
combustion plants (boilers with a capacity of over 10 MW, producing more
than 50 GWh per year). In 1992 approximately 120 plants (representing
185 boilers) were affected by the charge. The charge is SEK 40,000 (about
US$ 5,200) per tonne of NOx emitted.
To avoid giving smaller plants an advantage, the revenue from the nitro-
gen oxides charge is refunded to the group of plants that pay it, in proportion
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to the amount of useful energy each plant produces. Thus, the system cre-
ates incentives both to reduce emissions and to increase energy efficiency.
Plants with comparatively low emissions will be able to make a profit, while
those with comparatively high emissions will have to make net payments.
This does not harm the incentive effects of the charge, as the amount repaid
to each plant is related to the amount of useful energy produced and is thus
independent of its efforts to reduce emissions.
5.5.2 Monitoring
The nitrogen oxides charge was the first charge to be based on measured
emissions. Emissions of nitrogen oxides can either be measured continuously
or calculated from a fixed level of 250 mg/MJ for boilers and 600 mg/MJ
for gas turbines. Since actual emissions are much lower in most cases, due
to environmental regulations, continuous monitoring is generally preferable.
The monitoring system must meet requirements on equipment, data record-
ing and data processing specified by the Swedish Environmental Protection
Agency. During 5% of the monthly operating time, emissions may be es-
timated on the basis of emission values achieved under similar operating
conditions. This allowance is made to ensure proper time to calibrate and
maintain the system. If the system is out of order or does not comply with
the requirements, emissions are estimated on the basis of the fixed emission
levels of 250 mg/MJ for boilers and to 600 mg/MJ for gas turbines.
Monitoring equipment is a large item of expenditure. The annual cost
of monitoring nitrogen oxides emissions is estimated at SEK 300,000 per
plant, which is why the charge is not levied on very small plants. For
most plants, monitoring would have been required to ensure compliance
with existing environmental protection legislation even if the charge had
not been introduced.
5.5.3 Results
The nitrogen oxides charge has already had considerable impacts on emis-
sions of nitrogen oxides from the plants which are part of the system. The
methods applied for reducing emissions can be divided into three groups:
(1) combustion improvement measures; (2) selective noncatalytic reduction
(SNCR, involving the injection of urea or ammonia); and (3) flue gas clean-
ing by selective catalytic reduction (SCR).
Combustion measures have been implemented at almost every facil-
ity. In general, these are the cheapest and most cost-effective measures,
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including 10w-NOx burners, flue gas recirculation, air staging, reburning,
and "fine tuning" of the combustion system. In many cases, simply running
the plant in an optimal way will cut emissions. To achieve this, some plants
offer bonus systems to their employees, where the size of the bonus increases
as emissions decline.
No Swedish plants had installed SNCR (injection of urea or ammonia)
before the decision was made to introduce the NO x charge. This has proved
to be an inexpensive method of reducing emissions. Today, about 20 plants
have installed SNCR, and the method is being considered for several other
plants (Energigruppen Syd, 1993; Hjalmarsson, 1992). Most of the units
affected by the charge are small by international standards, so that SCR
has been used in only a few cases. SCR has been the most cost-effective
way to reduce emissions for some coal-fired boilers (over 200 MWth) with
high initial emissions.
Total emissions from the plants liable to the charge fell from about
25,000 tonnes in the late 1980s to about 15,000 tonnes in 1992, a reduction of
roughly 40% (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 1993b). Permits
have been tightened in a few cases, but for most plants the requirements
have not been changed in the last few years. Roughly 50% of the plants
have no requirements at all as to NO x reduction in permits (Energigruppen
Syd, 1993). Thus, the nitrogen oxides charge must be considered to have
been the major driving force behind the emission reductions.
The average cost of combustion measures taken so far is estimated at
SEK 10,000-15,000 (US$ 1,300-2,000) per tonne NOx abated for energy
production, waste incinerators, and combustion plants in the pulp and paper
industry, while the corresponding cost for combustion plants in the chemical
industry is estimated at SEK 20,000 per tonne.
The average cost of cleaning measures is higher, estimated at SEK
15,000-25,000 NO x abated for waste incinerators and combustion plants
in the pulp and paper industry. For energy production the estimated av-
erage cost is SEK 35,000 per tonne. The latter cost is dominated by the
installation of "high-dust" SCR for three coal-fired boilers (Energigruppen
Syd, 1993). All the cost figures quoted for NO x abatement are based upon
10 year lifetimes of investments and an interest rate of 11%.
The cost of continuous monitoring of NO x emissions is estimated at SEK
4,000 per tonne NOx abated. However, many plants would have incurred
monitoring costs even in the absence of the charge.
Practically all waste incinerators have had to make net payments as a
result of the charge system. Within industry some plants lose and others
gain. The same applies to the production of electricity and heat (Swedish
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Table 5.3. Emissions, energy production, and payments related to the
nitrogen oxides charge in 1992.
NOx Useful Payment Repay- Net
emlS- energy of charge ment result No.
SlOns produced (SEK (SEK (SEK of
(tonnes) (GWh) million) million) million) plants
Waste incineration 1,097 1,690 43.9 27.3 -16.5 5
Energy production 8,266 21,628 330.6 349.6 19.0 53
Chemical industry 1,278 3,184 51.1 51.4 0.3 23
Metal industry 77 469 3.1 7.4 4.3 2
Pulp & paper indo 4,587 10,503 183.5 169.8 -13.7 39
Total 15,305 37,465 612.2 605.6a -6.6 122
aSEK 5 million was not paid back at the initial repayment but was kept as a reserve
pending final revision of the accounts. SEK 1.6 million was used to cover administrative
costs.
Source: Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 1993b.
Environmental Protection Agency, 1993a, 1993b). On average, waste incin-
erators and the pulp and paper industry have made net payments, while
energy producers and, to some extent, the metal industry have received
refunds (Table 5.3).
The administration of the nitrogen oxides charge is more complex than
that of the sulfur tax due to the repayment of charge revenues. Still, the
administration costs to the Environmental Protection Agency were less than
SEK 200 per tonne NOx abated in 1992. Most boiler owners have a positive
attitude to the system; it is considered fair because it gives bonuses to plants
with low emissions.
A government commission has recently proposed that the charge sys-
tem should be extended to cover even smaller combustion plants and some
industrial processes (Anonymous, 1993). According to these proposals, the
charge threshold would be reduced from a minimum annual energy produc-
tion of 50 to 25 GWh, irrespective of the size of the boiler. This would
add another 500 boilers to the charge system. In addition, some industrial
processes would be subject to the charge. A parliamentary decision on these
proposals is expected during 1994.
5.6 Differentiation of the Tax on Diesel Fuels
In January 1991 the energy tax on diesel fuels was differentiated to encour-
age the use of environmentally better grades. Diesel fuels with "standard"
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specifications belong to environmental class 3, those with better specifica-
tions to class 2, and the best grades to class 1. The environmentally better
grades are taxed at a lower rate than the standard grade.
The purpose of the differentiation of the tax on diesel fuels is to im-
prove air quality in urban areas, where vehicle emissions are the predom-
inant source of the health risks. The catalytic converters now used in
petrol-powered vehicles probably greatly reduce emissions of carcinogenic
substances from these vehicles. In future, attention will therefore have to
focus on reducing emissions of carcinogenic particles and gases from diesel-
powered vehicles. The concentrations of sulfur dioxide in Swedish urban
areas are lower that in many other countries. Historical monuments are
still being attacked by air pollution particularly in the form of sulfur diox-
ide, but concentrations of sulfur dioxide no longer present major health
risks.
5.6.1 Design of the system
Improvements in the quality of diesel fuel contribute to the reduction of
health risks and corrosion in urban areas. Problems of smoke and odor are
also lessened. The environmental classification of diesel fuels is based on
a number of parameters (see Table 5.4). A low sulfur content gives rise
to lower emissions of sulfur and particles and is essential for the efficiency
of particle filters and catalytic converters in cleaning exhaust gases. Low
contents of aromatic hydrocarbons, including polycyclic aromatic hydrocar-
bons (PAH), mean reduced emissions of substances that are hazardous to
human health. The distillation range, the cetane number (a measure of the
ignitability of diesel fuel), and density are significant factors with regard to
both emissions and engine running characteristics.
The tax differentials have been set so as to offset the extra cost of
the environmentally better grades of fuel. The system was introduced in
1991. Definitions of class 1 and class 2 fuels were upgraded in January
1992, and the tax differentials were adjusted. In October 1993, the taxation
of diesel-powered vehicles was reformed, to replace the so-called kilometer
tax by a new diesel tax. Simultaneously, the tax reduction for class 1 fuels
was increased. Table 5.4 shows the tax differentials in January 1992 and
October 1993. Apart from the energy tax and diesel tax, diesel users also
pay a carbon dioxide tax (see Table 5.5), which is the same for all fuel
classes. The diesel tax is also the same for all fuel classes.
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Table 5.4. Environmental classification of diesel fuels and tax differentials.
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Sulfur (mass content) (max, %) 0.001 0.005 0.2a
Aromatics (volume content) (max, %) 5 20
PAH (volume content) (max, %) 0 0.1
Cetane number (min) 50 47
Density (kg/m3 ) 800-820 800-820
Distillation:
Initial boiling point (min, DC) 180 180
Temp. at 95% recovery (max, DC) 285 295
Tax reduction per liter
compared to class 3:
January 1992
SEK 0.45 0.25
ECU 0.048 0.027
October 1993
SEK 0.535 0.25
ECU 0.057 0.027
a Limit value; the actual sulfur content is generally below 0.1 %.
Table 5.5. Taxes on diesel fuels used by road vehicles in Sweden as of
October 1993 (per m3 ).
Class 1 Class 2
Energy tax SEK 5 290
ECU 0.5 31
Carbon dioxide tax SEK 920 920
ECU 98 98
Diesel fuel tax SEK 1,300 1,300
ECU 138 138
Total taxes SEK 2,225 2,510
(excluding VAT) ECU 237 267
5.6.2 Results
Class 3
540
57
920
98
1,300
138
2,760
294
The differentiation of the tax on diesel fuels has affected markets very
strongly (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 1993c). In 1990, less
than 1% of diesel oil would have met the current requirements of class 1 and
class 2 fuels. In the first part of 1993, 75% of diesel fuels sold were classified
as class 1 or 2 (15% as 1 and 60% class 2). Initially, most of the environ-
mentally better fuels were imported but now some domestic refineries have
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invested in new facilities to produce their own fuels of classes 1 and 2. The
tax differentiation has encouraged research and development and Sweden
is now at the forefront in the production of environmentally better diesel
fuels.
Sulfur emissions from diesel vehicles have dropped by approximately
75%. Emissions of carcinogenic substances have also been reduced, but at
the present state of knowledge this reduction cannot be quantified. There
has also been some reduction in nitrogen oxides emissions, which will con-
tribute to lower incidences of cancer, allergies, and corrosion in urban areas.
The cost to society in the form of higher production costs in domestic
refineries or more expensive oil imports has been estimated at SEK 430
million per year. The extra costs of the environmentally better grades have
so far been lower than expected when the tax differentials were decided. One
reason is that class 1 and class 2 diesel fuels require production processes
similar to those for aviation fuel. The demand for aviation fuel has fallen
in the last few years, so that the refineries have been able to use their spare
capacity to produce class 1 and class 2 diesel fuels (Swedish Environmental
Protection Agency, 1993c). The administration of the system has worked
without any major problems. The risk of misuse of the system is regarded
as limited as the oil companies fear bad publicity. The oil companies are
positive to the system as it gives them freedom to choose the qualities of
fuel they supply.
5.7 Conclusions
Economic instruments have achieved a breakthrough in Sweden. The sulfur
tax, the nitrogen oxides charge, and the differentiated tax on diesel fuels
have resulted in sharp reductions in emissions. Many low-cost measures have
been found and the new economic instruments appear to be encouraging
innovation and technical change. For example, combustion measures and
SNCR techniques have been applied in new ways to reduce emissions of
nitrogen oxides. In short, the new instruments have so far lived up to their
theoretical potential.
In general, the economic incentive mechanisms have been well accepted.
The full repayment of the nitrogen oxides charge as well as the technique of
differentiating an existing tax, have contributed to this without increasing
the total tax burden. The Swedish government has affirmed the important
role of market mechanisms in environmental policy, as can be concluded
from several government bills recently approved by parliament (Ministry
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of Finance, 1992; Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, 1993).
New economic instruments will no doubt be introduced as complements to
the traditional regulations.
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Air Pollution Control
in the United States:
A Mixed Portfolio Approach
Nancy Kete
US Mission to the OEeD
Paris, France
Abstract
Much has been made of the experiments with emissions trading and other forms
of incentive-based regulation in the United States. This chapter takes a step back
to outline the principal program elements of the Clean Air Act, and then looks
retrospectively at some of the issues that have arisen during the past two decades
of debate on the role of emissions trading. It then goes on to differentiate that
experience from new incentive-based programs created or authorized by the 1990
amendments, especially the acid rain control program. In considering the qualities
of the acid rain program, or any other regulatory regime, the administrative struc-
ture cannot be separated from the primary objectives. The qualities that support a
functional emissions trading regime do not inhere in using incentive-based regula-
tion. They result from self-conscious, transparent decisions to build such qualities
into whatever program is chosen.
Key words: acid rain, emissions trading, Clean Air Act, regulation, economic
incentives, pollution control.
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Since at least the late 1960s, the United States has supported a cottage
industry of experts on the advantages of economic instruments for pollution
control. From the theoretical literature to public policy debates, anyone
involved or interested in environmental protection has been exposed to the
idea of cost-effective regulation through emissions trading and related policy
instruments. Yet, while the case for what I prefer to call incentive-based
regulation has been compelling in the abstract, in practice political and
practical realities have resulted in a policy "system" that includes a range
of public interventions in the economic system's air pollution behavior. Al-
though for years the debate seems to have been polarized around two al-
ternative concepts - command-and-control on the one hand, and economic
instruments on the other - in reality policy incorporates options that lie
along a continuum of responses to address air pollution problems. The air
pollution control system under the Clean Air Act (CAA) has multiple ob-
jectives and multiple response strategies to achieve them. One thesis of this
chapter is that there is no such thing as an "optimal" air pollution policy in
the sense the economists and systems analysts usually mean. At best policy
makers strive for noninferior sets - policy solutions that are not obviously
worse than alternative feasible options. Policy makers and regulators have
used and will continue to use a mix of policies and instruments to reduce air
pollution problems, and to do so in politically and economically acceptable
ways. The exact mix may change over time, and what will be considered
feasible or acceptable will evolve, but the mixed portfolio of responses is here
to stay (Hawkens, 1981). The continuum ofresponses includes, for example
information- based programs; government-industry collaboration; subsidy
removal and regulatory reform; environmental taxes; marketable permits;
emissions trading; emission limits; and best-technology requirements. Each
instrument is equally legitimate although not equally appropriate under ev-
ery circumstance (Kete, 1994).
Emissions trading and economic instruments advocacy has been weak-
ened by its often doctrinaire recommendations and criticism of the status
quo. For all the attention given to the theoretical advantages of alterna-
tive policy instruments, far too little has been paid to the institutional and
administrative details that must be worked out to make any program -
market-based or otherwise - work. Worse, what began in the 1970s as le-
gitimate regulatory reform ideas became during the 1980s regulatory relief.
Potentially constructive recommendations were thus politicized and tainted.
But the past few years have seen a renewed interest in regulatory reform
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among environmentalists and regulators who were not keen on economic
instruments before the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, and others. What
changed and why? First, regulators have learned lessons from their expe-
riences to date with economic instruments, including the work to develop
the acid rain program legislation, the implementation of the lead trading
program, and the phasing out of CFCs under the Montreal Protocol. Reg-
ulators and their critics also learned important lessons about the limits
of incentive-based approaches through, for example, the unfortunate expe-
riences associated with the "bad" bubbles of the past, under the EPA's
Emissions Trading Policy Statement. Second, the new CAA is, we hope,
better constructed to support an increase in the use of economic instruments
to help regulators meet the Act's goals and to lower the cost of doing so.
The question of whether a statutory goal could be achieved (or achieved
more effectively) under a regime that includes economic instruments is an
empirical one. Unfortunately, there is little actual experience with either
of the two distinct categories of incentive-based regulation - emission taxes
and marketable permits - and only a mixed record with a set of mechanisms
known collectively as "emissions trading", which includes bubbles, netting,
banking and offsets. Even the acid rain control program with its promising
emissions allowance system remains an incomplete experiment in regulatory
reform. It remains to be seen whether market-based regulation can achieve
public ends better than the alternatives.
This chapter discusses the institutional aspects of air pollution control,
and looks at emissions trading in this context. Economic instruments, like
all regulatory instruments, are means to an end, or ends. Thus, rather than
begin with a discussion of the use of economic instruments under the Clean
Air Act, this chapter takes the Act itself as the first subject of its inquiry.
Section 6.2 briefly describes the general framework and motivation for the
US Clean Air Act in terms of the legal and social relations embedded within
it. Section 6.3 describes the environmental quality objectives (EQOs) at the
heart of the Act. Section 6.4 takes the reader from the environmental qual-
ity objectives of the Act to the practical way in which these objectives are
to be achieved. Section 6.5 discusses the persistence of the problem of fail-
ure to meet the EQOs in many areas of the USA. Section 6.6 describes the
best available technology requirements and how they relate to the EQO de-
scribed in Section 6.3. Section 6.7 begins a discussion of emissions trading,
describing the development and controversies over the Emissions Trading
Policy Statement. Section 6.8 looks at the controversy over those aspects of
emissions trading related to new source control requirements. Section 6.9
considers the acid rain program as regulatory reform and describes the new
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acid rain control program and its emission allowance trading system. Sec-
tion 6.10 provides a discussion and summary.
6.2 The Clean Air Act 1
The Clean Air Act (CAA) is a normative response to a problem of social
cost. In brief, the purpose of the CAA is to protect and enhance the quality
of the nation's air so as to promote the public health and welfare and the
productive capacity of its population. This overall objective is (or is meant
to be) accomplished through a complex web of interrelated requirements,
including environmental quality objectives; state-developed plans to ensure
the environmental quality objectives are met; source-specific emission limits
established under the state plans; several types of technology-based stan-
dards, and finally, for electric utilities, the emission allowance system for
acid rain control.
The CAA and its implementing regulations comprise an institution -
a set of working rules - replete with mutualities and dualities, rights and
duties, privileges and exposures. Essentially, the CAA entitles the public to
breathe clean air and to enjoy an environment that has not been degraded
by air pollution; polluters thus have a corresponding duty to honor that
entitlement. However, most of the Act's requirements are mediated by the
EPA administrator's (and ultimately, the federal courts') interpretation of
what they mean. Nonetheless, it is clear that the social relation embedded
in the CAA is one of public control over the assimilative capacity of the
air. This is a definite, albeit gradual, change in the rights and duties re-
specting environmental quality and assimilation of environmental services.
Historically, industry, publicly owned sources of air pollution, and individ-
uals as owners and operators of automobiles and wood stoves, for example,
have claimed privilege over the dilution services provided by the ocean of
air in which we live, leaving the general public without power to prevent
any adverse consequences. Since 1970, the Clean Air Act and subsequent
amendments have steadily shifted the relationship between polluter and
others, providing more, and more effective, control over these activities to
ensure the achievement of the right to clean air and a healthy environment.
Still, for the most part, emitting sources generally have no direct legal duty
IThe discussion that follows is offered as a nontechnical, nonlegal guide to the workings
of the major elements of the Clean Air Act. The reader interested in the text of the law
itself, and a comprehensive presentation of its history, structure and interpretation of each
major section should see the Clean Air Deskbook (1992).
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to undertake pollution control or pollution prevention efforts beyond the
Clean Air Act's indirect requirements. (As discussed below, the acid rain
program's emission reduction requirements are a notable exception to the
general case.) Thus despite the nominal entitlement to a clean and healthy
environment, effectively the CAA imposes on the private sector a general
duty to behave in accordance with regulations promulgated by the adminis-
trator. These regulations are (at least theoretically) the institutionalization
of the general entitlement to clean air and a safe environment provided for
by the law.
Once the administrator has promulgated regulations, the implementa-
tion of many of the Clean Air Act's requirements shifts to the states under
an essentially federalist construction. Furthermore, most of the Clean Air
Act's provisions establish federal minima with the right to go farther toward
protecting public health and welfare reserved to the states and localities.
Section 6.116 of the Clean Air Act stipulates that nothing shall preclude
or deny the right of any state or political subdivision thereof to adopt or
enforce (1) any standard or limitation with respect to air pollution, or (2)
any requirement with respect to control or abatement of air pollution. As a
practical matter, however, there has not been a lot of experience with states
going beyond the federal minima.
6.3 Environmental Quality Objectives
How, specifically, are the rights and the duties of the Clean Air Act op-
erationalized? At the heart of the Clean Air Act are its environmental
quality objectives, the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS).
The NAAQS essentially are critical levels of concentrations of air pollu-
tion below which no adverse effects are presumed to occur. The NAAQS-
setting process is science-based and generally takes upwards of ten years.
At present there are six pollutants for which NAAQS have been established:
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, lead, ozone, and carbon
monoxide. The NAAQS are set in terms of concentration, e.g., parts per
million (ppm) or micrograms per cubic meter (Mg/m3 ) during a specified
measurement period, e.g., annual arithmetic mean or maximum 24-hour
concentration. The primary NAAQS are set to protect public health, with
an adequate margin of safety and the secondary NAAQS are set to protect
public welfare. The NAAQS apply everywhere in the USA, that is, they are
invariant with geography.
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6.4 From EQOs to Emissions Control:
The State Implementation Plan
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At this point the states come in. The CAA requires each state to formu-
late a State Implementation Plan (SIP) that is adequate to demonstrate
the attainment and maintenance of each NAAQS. The principal function
of the SIP is thus to ensure, through air quality modeling and monitoring,
and ultimately the setting of enforceable emission limits, that sources of
emissions individually and collectively do not cause pollution, defined as
an exceedance of the NAAQS. The Act requires that the SIP provide for
the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of the NAAQS. At a
minimum, the Act requires that a SIP include: enforceable emission lim-
itations and other control measures for sources; schedules and timetables
for compliance; appropriate measures for monitoring and modeling ambi-
ent air quality and emissions from stationary sources; and other specifics.
The enforceable emission limitations, or "SIP limits", effectively specify or
operationalize each source's duty to protect the public's right to be free of
polluted air. Once approved by the EPA administrator, the SIPs are en-
forceable under both federal and state law. The NAAQS/SIP system can
be considered, at least in theory, the first-line defense against air pollution.
Yet we see already how indirect is the relationship between the primary goal
of the Clean Air Act and any operative constraints on a source's behavior.
6.5 The Persistent Problem of Nonattainment
of the NAAQS
A notable characteristic of the system which I have just described as the
heart of the Clean Air Act, that is, the combination of the federal NAAQS
with the State Implementation Plans, is its failure to meet certain key objec-
tives. Most major American cities and metropolitan areas experience one or
more exceedances of one or more of the NAAQS each year with roughly half
of the US population estimated to be exposed to harmful levels of air pollu-
tion. Areas that fail to meet one or more NAAQS are called "nonattainment
areas". (An area may be in nonattainment for one pollutant, such as ozone
(photochemical smog), and in attainment for all the other five NAAQS.)
There are numerous reasons for this failure, not least of which was the over-
optimism on the part of Congress in 1970 and again in 1977 that attainment
and maintenance of good air quality would be achievable given the tools it
made available under the Clean Air Act. Second, despite an aggressive
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mobile source emission control program, the continual increase in the num-
ber of automobiles, the number of miles they travel, and the amount of
traffic congestion all contributed to an increase in the amount of pollution
coming from mobile sources. Despite dramatic decreases (60%-80% less
compared to cars of the 1960s) in the amount of pollution emitted from
each vehicle, congestion and growth in vehicle use have overwhelmed the
benefits of cleaner cars. In addition, the law's exceptions for small, diffuse
"area" sources put potentially beneficial controls out of the reach of regu-
lators. In 1977, the Congress amended the Clean Air Act to create, among
other things, a special section establishing requirements for nonattainment
areas (part D), but still, despite success in reducing lead and sulfur dioxide
concentrations, ozone, CO and PM-10 nonattainment problems persist.
6.6 Best Available Technology Requirements
In addition to the NAAQS and related SIP provisions, the CAA imposes
several types of technology-based standards on new and modified sources
of emissions. The new source performance standards (NSPS) provisions
under section 111 of the Act require the EPA to establish national emission
standards by source category (for example, electric utility power plants) for
each pollutant that causes or contributes significantly to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. The
legislative history of the 1970 amendments makes clear that the purpose of
this section "is to prevent the occurrence anywhere in the United States
of significant new air pollution problems arising from such sources either
because they generate extra hazardous pollutants or because they are large
scale polluters" (CRS, 1974). The legislative history further shows that
the NSPS are meant to harmonize requirements to avoid environmentally
destructive competition across the several states: "The promulgation of
federal emissions standards for new sources ... will preclude efforts on the
part of states to compete with each other in trying to attract new plants and
facilities without assuring adequate control of extra hazardous or large-scale
emissions therefrom" (CRS, 1974). The Senate Committee Report added,
in an argument in favor of long-term management of air quality resources:
"standards of performance should provide an incentive for industries to work
toward constant improvement in techniques for preventing and controlling
emissions from stationary sources, since more effective emission control will
provide greater latitude in the selection of sites for new facilities" (CRS,
1974, Vol. 1, p. 417). For these reasons, an additional relationship embedded
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in the CAA is the requirement that new sources be clean. Again, however,
the definition of "clean" must be operationalized by the EPA in setting
national standards.
A second type of technology-based standard applicable to new sources
applies on a case-by-case basis under the new source review program. The
new source review program has two parts: nonattainment area New Source
Review (NSR) and the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) pro-
gram under part C of the Act. Under both PSD and NSR the starting
place for making the case-by-case determination of what is the best tech-
nology that should be applied to the facility in question is the NSPS for the
source category. For a source proposed to be located in an attainment area
where the NAAQS are met, the PSD provisions apply and the permitting
process must determine (among other things) what the best available con-
trol technology (BACT) should be. For a source proposed to be located in
a nonattainment area the nonattainment new source review requirements
apply, and, among other things, the source is required to meet LAER - the
lowest achievable emission rate. Both BACT and LAER are determined for
the source by the permitting authority on a case-by-case basis.
The PSD program is a pollution prevention program, or a statutory
embodiment of the "precautionary principle". The social and legal rela-
tionships that are specified in part C, sections 160 and 165 of the Act state:
(1) that it is up to the state to protect public health and welfare from any
actual or potential adverse effect from air pollution, notwithstanding at-
tainment and maintenance of all national ambient air quality standards; (2)
that the Act has as an additional purpose: the preservation, protection, and
enhancement of air quality in national parks, etc.; (3) that air quality man-
agers are to ensure that economic growth occurs in a manner consistent with
the preservation of clean air resources; (4) that one state's emissions should
not interfere with any other state's PSD plan; and, (5) that no decision to
permit increased air pollution in any area is to be made without evaluation
of all the consequences of such a decision or without adequate procedural
opportunities for informed public participation in the decision-making pro-
cess. The environmental quality objectives in the PSD program include
not only the maintenance of air quality to meet the NAAQS, but also the
minimization of any other effect a proposed source's emissions might have
on, for example, soils, vegetation and visibility. With respect to national
parks, there is a special responsibility to ensure that proposed sources do
not adversely affect any air quality-related values, such as visibility, stream
chemistry, vegetation, and cultural resources and other factors that are im-
portant to the park's integrity. The BACT provision is thus an independent
130 Nancy Kete
requirement to apply the best technology to each proposed source under a
broader PSD authority to prevent all significant impacts of any new source.
In nonattainment areas, proposed new sources must not only meet
LAER but also have to obtain offsets at a greater than one-to-one ratio
for its projected emissions. The offset requirement was initiated in 1976 to
provide necessary relief in nonattainment areas where a nominal restriction
on any increase in nonattainment pollution could have meant a moratorium
on the construction or expansion of any major new facility. Under the new
law (the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments), the offset ratio varies depending
upon the severity of the nonattainment problem. Also in nonattainment
areas, existing sources may be required to use RACT (reasonably available
control technology), an exception to the general rule under the Act of apply-
ing BAT requirements to new sources only. This mention of offsets brings us
to the subject of emissions trading and the early experiences with it under
the Act. We return to a discussion of the difference in the Act's treatment
of new and existing sources in Section 6.8.
6.7 A Brief History of Emissions Trading
since 1976
If strictly applied, the pre-1977 CAA would have prohibited the construc-
tion of new major sources of any nonattainment pollutant. To avoid the eco-
nomic impact that situation would have fostered, and the backlash against
air quality requirements, the EPA developed the offset policy in 1976, cre-
ating the first prong of what would become a four-prong emissions trading
policy. The offset policy allowed proposed new sources to obtain offsetting
emission reductions from another source in the same geographic area so that,
despite the emissions from a new source, overall emissions would decrease.
The term emission reduction credit (ERC) came into being, representing the
amount of "extra" emission reductions a source can achieve beyond what it
is required to achieve under the law. ERCs became a sort of currency, al-
lowing transactions between two or more sources so that the overcontrol by
the first source could be used or credited toward the compliance obligations
of another.
The emissions trading policy was developed over ten years, with the
final Emissions Trading Policy Statement issued in 1986. The policy in-
cludes specific aspects of emissions trading: offsets, netting, bubbles and
banking. The offset program was discussed; it is the second most widely
used of the emissions trading policy programs after netting. Netting, the
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most frequently used provision under the emissions trading policy, is used
in both attainment and nonattainment areas to avoid triggering new source
review. As discussed above in the section on the technology requirement,
all major new or modified sources must undergo a preconstruction review
and permitting process. A source is considered major if it will emit more
than a specified number of tons per year of a listed pollutant, including the
six pollutants for which NAAQS exist and certain toxic air pollutants. Net-
ting allows a company to avoid triggering new source review by letting the
source average its emission increases with enforceable reductions at existing
units on the same property.
The bubble concept, unlike netting and offsetting, is at least theoret-
ically based on ambient considerations, the idea being that two or more
sources of emissions can be regarded as existing under an imaginary dome,
or bubble, under which the effect of any of the bubbled sources' emissions
on ambient air quality would be the same. Finally, the Emissions Trading
Policy Statement allows states to create a "bank" of emission reductions
that have been certified as ERCs. Banked ERCs can theoretically be used
for netting, offsetting or bubbling. To be eligible as an ERC an emission
reduction must meet four criteria:
1. Permanent: the reduction cannot be seasonal, periodic, or temporary.
2. Surplus: the reduction must not be required by any other existing re-
quirement and it must result in an actual decrease in emissions.
3. Enforceable: the reduction and its method of creation must be legally
binding and enforceable.
4. Quantifiable: the amount of the reduction must be able to be quantified
by an accepted method or calculation technique.
This brief outline of the major components of the emissions trading
program does not begin to represent the complexity of the program or the
degree of controversy that surrounded its development. A good part of the
debate over the pre-1990 emissions trading program must be understood in
the context of the weakness and flaws of the SIP process, especially given
the persistence of the nonattainment problem.
It would be difficult to overstate the controversy that surrounded the
use of emissions trading in the USA in the years between the 1977 Clean
Air Act amendments and the 1990 amendments. At the heart of the dis-
agreement was the mismatch between emissions trading proposals and the
underlying statutory goals and specific requirements which were demon-
strably not up to the task of achieving attainment for all the environmental
quality objectives in all areas. Emissions trading, by definition, embraces
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the idea that there are "extra" emission reductions that can, and should,
be achieved. But this was during a decade when the underlying goals of
the CAA were not being met. Despite some clear successes such as the lead
phase-out program, there were some serious failures, and certain problems
of public concern were not even being addressed, such as visibility degra-
dation and acid rain. There was thus widespread disagreement over what
would constitute "extra" emission reductions that could, and should, be
bubbled, netted, used as offsets or banked, instead of being used directly
for environmental improvement. "Extra" is a matter of opinion with le-
gal, economic and social dimensions. Furthermore, the fact that emissions
trading was being promoted during the Reagan Administration, which was
openly hostile to regulation in the first instance, did not increase confidence
in these proposals. Regulatory reform, or specifically, the economic reform
of environmental regulation, an idea that began under the Carter Admin-
istration in the late 1970s, became regulatory relief in the 1980s. It took
until 1988 to get reform back onto a constructive track.
One of the most contentious issues related to economic instruments
during the decade from the mid-1970s to 1986 when the Emissions Trading
Policy Statement was finalized was the problem of the "baseline". To gener-
alize, most emissions trading advocates promoted rules that would allow a
source to trade on the basis of its "allowable" emission limit (the SIP limit
referred to above), arguing that because the limits had been approved by
EPA as being adequate to attain or maintain the NAAQS, they should also
be accepted as the baseline for bubbles. In other words, they would have
interpreted the social and legal relationship established under the Act as
resting solely on what a state promulgated in the SIP, regardless of whether
the SIP could in reality achieve the health-protecting objectives of the law.
Again, to simplify, the Air Office at EPA, in recognition of the weak-
ness in real-world SIP modeling and emissions trading, advocated the use
of "actual" baselines, a requirement that admittedly was more stringent for
sources that wanted to engage in emissions trading than for others. The
exception the Office of Air and Radiation (OAR) allowed to the use of "ac-
tual" baselines would be if sources undertook detailed air quality modeling
based on their "allowable" baselines to demonstrate their maintenance of
the NAAQS, PSD increments (another EQO) and, in nonattainment ar-
eas, reasonable further progress toward attainment. The OAR, it can be
said, insisted that the purpose of the social and legal relationships between
emitter and the regulators was the one described earlier in this chapter: to
do everything possible to meet the health-protecting goals. Of course, the
emissions trading debate was much more complicated than described here,
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and interested readers have a large literature to consult. The real problem
was that the emissions trading proposals were being grafted onto a statutory
and regulatory framework that simply couldn't bear the weight.
In 1990, the amendments again revised the law to try to find a way to
accomplish the Act's primary objectives, and some of the earlier problems in
conceiving and implementing emissions trading and related instruments may
have been ameliorated by the 1990 amendments' specifications for nonat-
tainment areas. In general, the new law gives the EPA and states the
authority to develop better, more complete SIPs that cover more sources,
allow for better accountability, and require better inventories and other mea-
surement tools. Specifically, the authorities in nonattainment areas must
promulgate revisions to its SIP (whether or not they intend to pursue an
economic incentive program) that include the following: an inventory of
actual emissions from all sources; the adoption of all reasonably available
control measures, including the technology-based RACT requirements for
existing sources; provisions to ensure that reasonable further progress is
made toward attainment; a special permit program for new and modified
sources; and any other measure that may be necessary to ensure attain-
ment. In short, the new nonattainment provisions provide for much further
coverage of emissions and activities in nonattainment areas.
This reinforced institutional structure, it is hoped, will support creative
or innovative strategies that may involve economic instruments, with less
risk of erosion or delay in progress toward attainment. To that end, the
EPA has proposed a new set of rules for the development of economic in-
centive programs that may be adopted by states for certain nonattainment
areas. Under certain circumstances, states may be obligated to adopt such
a program. The proposal identifies key program provisions which must be
included to ensure that it will not interfere with other requirements of the
Act; and that emission reductions credited to the program will be: quan-
tifiable; consistent with SIP attainment and reasonable further progress
demonstrations; surplus to reductions required by, and credited to other
implementation plan provisions (to avoid double counting); enforceable at
state and federal levels; and permanent within the time frame specified by
the program.
The proposal specifies that an economic incentive program should in-
clude certain elements:
• A clearly defined purpose and goal, and an incentive mechanism that
can be rationally related to accomplishing the goals.
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• A clearly defined scope, which identifies affected sources and ensures
that the program will not interfere with any other applicable federal
regulatory requirements.
• A program baseline from which projected program results (e.g., quan-
tifiable emission reductions) can be determined.
• Credible, workable, replicable procedures for quantifying emissions
and/or emission-related parameters.
• Source requirements, including those for monitoring, record keeping,
and reporting, that are consistent with specified quantification proce-
dures and allow for compliance certification and enforcement.
• Requirements for projecting program results and for dealing with
uncertainty.
• An implementation schedule, administrative system, and enforcement
provisions for ensuring federal and state enforceability of the program.
In addition, in certain cases, the program must include audit procedures
to evaluate program implementation and track results, and reconciliation
procedures to trigger corrective actions or contingency measures to make
up any shortfall between projected emission reductions and those actually
achieved in practice.
The above list of essential elements may strike some readers as overly
regulatory, especially if they labor under the impression that incentive-based
regulation is some sort of antithesis to "command-and-control". Economic
incentive programs are meant to provide individual sources with the flexi-
bility to choose and vary their specific compliance strategies within a com-
mitment to meet specific overall goals. These programs are meant to lead
to faster and/or more cost-effective attainment of air quality goals. Which
elements in this list of general requirements are unreasonable or superflu-
ous? Is it too much to ask the drafter of an incentive program to clearly
specify goals and objectives and to relate the specifics of the proposed pro-
gram to the goals. Is it onerous to require someone getting credit under a
SIP to keep track of their performance through monitoring and reporting
requirements? If a bright idea does not work, should those who would have
benefited from its success just walk away when it fails, or should there be
contingency plans in place?
The economic incentives program proposal differentiates among three
broad categories of program: emission limiting, market response, and direc-
tionally sound. Emission-limiting strategies directly specify limits on total
mass emissions, emission-related parameters, or levels of emission reduc-
tions relative to a program baseline that are required to be met by affected
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sources. A marketable permit program such as the acid rain allowance sys-
tem would fit under this category, although the acid rain program itself
predates this rule and exists under its own statutory authority. The second
category, market response, creates incentives for affected sources to reduce
emissions without directly mandating emission-related requirements for in-
dividual sources. An emission fee system would fit under this category.
The consequence of such a program is that actual emissions from affected
sources will be unpredictable and may differ from projected emissions used
in the pre-program implementation plan. This outcome uncertainty must
be accounted for in the design of the program. Finally, economic incentive
programs which can not yield quantifiable emission reductions creditable
toward reasonable further progress or attainment demonstrations (because
they lack one or more of the basic program elements listed above) may still
be included in a SIP but may not be credited. Certain transportation con-
trol measures or labeling programs may fall into this category, depending
upon the program design.
6.8 New Source Bias Arguments and
Emissions Trading
Outside the debate over the use of economic incentives programs in nonat-
tainment areas there has been a separate debate over the difference between
the treatment of new and existing sources - in shorthand, the "new source
bias" of the Clean Air Act. Although related to the broad emissions trading
debate, it is really a narrower issue, and the acid rain control program can
be viewed as the last word (so far) on the subject.
The underlying logic of the pre-1990 Clean Air Act as far as stationary
sources are concerned is that air quality progress could be achieved with
least economic disruption if the nation focused most of its pollution control
effort on new sources, allowing old, relatively uncontrolled sources to live
out their useful lives and retire, taking their pollution with them. The CAA
focuses its pollution control requirements on new plants based on certain
assumptions about capital stock turnover; i.e., that old plants would be
retired and replaced with new ones that would be cleaner and cleaner over
time. This turns out to have been a very flawed assumption at least for fossil
fuel-fired power plants. In 1995, 25% of the installed electricity capacity
(34% of the fossil fuel-fired steam capacity) will be more than 30 years old,
and reaching the end of its nominal design life (Baylor, 1990). According
to an industry analyst: "there is no way a significant percentage of existing
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capacity can be retired during the next twenty years. It is irreplaceable in
the short term.... With little new capacity and retirement of old capacity
planned, life extension is inevitable" (Smock, 1989). Life extension is the
term used to connote the retention in service of a generating unit beyond
its original design or economic lifetime. In 1990 over two-thirds of acid
rain-causing pollution from power plants was emitted by plants constructed
before 1970.
Some critics of the Clean Air Act, who have also tended to be emissions
trading advocates, purport to demonstrate that the law's new source bias-
that is, a bias against new sources - has contributed to more overall emis-
sions by increasing the relative marginal cost of a new facility compared to
an existing one, leading firms to maintain their old, higher emitting facilities
longer. Clean Coal/Dirty Air is one oft-cited work (Ackerman and Hassler,
1981), which focuses on the new source performance standards provisions of
the 1977 CAA amendments. Robert Crandall, in Controlling Industrial Pol-
lution (1983) provided more analysis, however, arguing that the new source
standards "are so stringent that the incremental costs of control seem to be
higher than for retrofitted existing sources. This situation can only retard
the development of new sources, increase the cost of pollution control, and
slow the cleanup of the environment." Convinced that the new source bias
was politically motivated to keep industry from relocating to the south and
west, and not to protect air quality, or manage the increase in pollution
attending economic development (or even both), Crandall recommended:
"All new source performance standards should be abolished. New sources
should be required to buy pollution rights (offsets or transferable emission
credits) for any emissions that they generate, but their emissions should not
be prescribed by government" (Crandall, 1983, p. 169). He also argued that
"the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) policy should be altered
to allow industry to migrate to the growing sections of the country, partic-
ularly if these areas have cleaner and more healthful air than the declining
northern and northeastern states" (Crandall, 1983, pp. 169-170, emphasis
added).
It is true that the 1977 new source performance standards (NSPS) re-
quired all new combustion sources to install pollution control equipment and
to achieve a given percentage reduction in emissions, regardless of the sulfur
content of the coal. It is widely recognized that this served to promote the
relative attractiveness of eastern high-sulfur coal over western low-sulfur
coal. The 1970 CAA amendments had done just the opposite: western
and eastern low-sulfur coals had gained some competitive advantage at the
expense of eastern high-sulfur coal. The third round of this interregional
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competition was concluded during the Congressional debate over the acid
rain control amendments.
But what is not widely acknowledged in the new source bias discussions
are the beneficial environmental consequences of the percentage reduction
requirements. For example, there are 10,203 MW of scrubbed NSPS capac-
ity in the 11 western states, out of a total capacity of 56,570 MW. Assume
that on average these scrubbed NSPS units emit at an annual average rate
of 0.31Ib/MBtu (lb/MBtu: pounds per million British thermal units); with
an average heat rate of 10,000 Btu/kWh (Btu/kWh: British thermal units
per kilowatt-hour), and a 70% plant capacity factor, these units emit just
under 100,000 tons of S02 per year. But had these units not been scrubbed,
they would have emitted over 300,000 tons of S02 per year - over three times
as much on an annual basis. Also, the 0.31Ib/MBtu emission rate assumed
in this example is conservative, Le., it overestimates actual emission rates
at many NSPS units in the west. Several western states require their new
sources to emit at much lower rates (0.08-0.20 Ib/MBtu are more common)
either through state-specified NSPS limits or case-by-case determinations
of BACTs under the PSD program. Thus the increase in annual emissions
that we might have seen without the new source standards would have been
even greater than estimated here.
The new source bias arguments focus on the fact that the marginal
cost of control of scrubbing western rather than eastern coal is three to
four times higher on a cost per ton basis, leading authors such as Crandall
to conclude that the investment in scrubbers for western power plants is
inefficient. By assumption, they concluded no marginal benefits. But the
marginal environmental benefits per ton of sulfur avoided are much higher
in the west because of the very low levels of background pollution. Had
the 1970 NSPS stood for the past 12 years, roughly 300,000 more tons
per year of sulfur would have been emitted into some of the most pristine
air, over some of the most esteemed natural resources (the national parks,
wilderness areas) in the world. Consider, for example, the recent agreement
reached by the owners and operators of one power plant in Arizona, the
Navajo Generating Station, located within the golden circle of class I areas
in the southwest, and several environmentalist groups concerned about the
plant's impact on the Grand Canyon and other national parks. This one
plant, constructed before the 1977 new source standards were promulgated,
is now finally going to clean up to new source levels. By the late 1990s,
the Navajo plant will reduce its sulfur dioxide emissions by roughly 90,000
tons per year at an estimated annualized cost of $90 million, with estimated
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net present value of benefits in the range of $1.7-$2.6 billion ($250 million
annualized benefits).
Should we accept Crandall's claims that the 1977 NSPS must have
induced utilities companies to "postpone the replacement of older, obsolete
units, thereby saddling consumers with higher generation costs?"( Crandall,
1983, p. 40) Especially in the west, which has seen such an increase in
population, electricity demand growth and power generation, and given all
the other relevant factors involved in power plant siting and construction, it
is not likely that the marginal costs of new source requirements have in fact
delayed the timely retirement and replacement of older sources. In fact, the
relative likelihood of power plant retirement is continually falling. EPRI and
the power generation industry see no real reason ever to retire power plants.
In the absence of pollution controls, a new unit would cost on the order
of $1000-2000 per kW, while to extend the life of an existing unit would
cost $200 per kW at most. While different pollution control requirements
increase that differential, there is already such a considerable spread that
the incremental impact on the "build-new-or-life-extend" questions facing
all utility managers is speculative.
Furthermore, in the ten years since the publication of Crandall's book,
there is little to suggest that his concern over delayed economic growth in
the Sunbelt due to new source standards, particularly for power plants, was
warranted. Florida and California were among the fastest growing states;
even with the new source standards in place, the EPA's 1989 base case
projected that Florida's S02 emissions would increase from 501,000 tons
per year in 1985 to 933,000 tons per year in 2000. And today the state of
Virginia has PSD permits pending for roughly two dozen new power plants.
Without the strict new source requirements under NSPS and PSD, these
new faciHties, located near the Shenandoah National Park and the James
River Face Wilderness Area, would rapidly degrade air quality in these class
I areas. Considerable controversy exists over these proposed plants, even
with the strict controls proposed for them given their location near these
class I areas and the cumulative impact of the new and existing facilities on
areas that have already been considerably impaired.
Anyone with an elementary knowledge of economics feels the intuitive
appeal of the new source bias arguments: unless the price elasticity of de-
mand for new cars or new product factors (like capital investment in new
steel or power plants) is zero, an increase in the cost of new goods must
have some effect on the demand. But the empirical evidence for the mag-
nitude of this effect, given all other political and economic influences on
new build, new buy, and location decisions is much too weak to support the
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most popular reform recommendation: to weaken the new source standards.
The economic efficiency arguments against the Clean Air Act's BAT-type
requirements (NSPS and BACT) would have been more compelling had the
critics also worked to tighten the requirements for existing sources. As it
was, the new source bias arguments mostly surfaced in support for regu-
latory relief - weakening of the new source requirements as a goal in and
of itself, without a corresponding effort to tighten the requirements on the
sources of most of the pollution.
6.9 Acid Rain Control as Regulatory Reform
In contrast, the acid rain control program established under the 1990 amend-
ments is a policy of regulatory reform: it reforms regulation by correcting
the serious mistake in the underlying Act (where existing sources are left
relatively uncontrolled and stringent new source standards are relied upon
to gradually improve and maintain air quality).
The acid rain policy deals with the new source bias problem, not by
relaxing standards for new units, but by strengthening the requirements on
existing ones. The new source standards (as well as the NAAQS-related
provisions) are retained under the mixed portfolio approach to air quality
management. In this sense it is clearly regulatory reform but not regulatory
relief. It is also regulatory reform in that it includes an allowance trading
system; this is a specific example of an emissions trading scheme that has
often been advocated by proponents of economic reform of environmental
regulation in order to reduce the cost of environmental protection.
In brief, the acid rain control program requires a 10 million ton reduc-
tion in sulfur dioxide emissions relative to 1980 levels. The acid rain title
of the 1990 CAA amendments concentrates its regulatory requirements on
the electric utility industry, although roughly 1.5 of the 10 million tons of
reduction are expected to come from non-utility sources of S02. The basic
structure of the program is simple. Reductions in S02 emissions will be
achieved in two phases. Phase I begins on 1 January 1995, and is designed
to achieve a 5 million ton reduction in S02 emissions relative to 1980 lev-
els. Phase II begins on 1 January 2000, and will complete the title's 10
million ton reduction goal. The remaining allowable annual emissions for
electric utilities is 8.9 million tons. The amendments then impose a cap on
total allowable S02 emissions from this sector at 8.9 million tons per year,
beginning in the year 2000.
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Each electric utility unit in the country above 25 MWe in size, is allo-
cated a portion of the 8.9 million tons of allowable S02 emissions through
a new regulatory instrument called an emissions allowance. Each allowance
is an authorization to emit one ton of S02. Thus, when fully implemented,
the acid rain program will issue 8.9 million allowances per year. The statu-
tory formulas that allocate allowances serve as default limits on allowable
annual emissions of S02 for each unit. That is, beginning the moment the
amendments were signed into law by the US President, each electric utility
unit was under the affirmative obligation to emit no more S02 than the
amount specified for it in the statute (to become operable on the deadlines
described above). Had there been delay or stalemate over the implement-
ing regulations, the industry would have faced a much more rigid program
than the one made operable by the promulgation of the emissions allowance
trading system regulations.
Under this set of regulations, the EPA will operate an emissions tracking
system, to keep track of actual performance on a unit-by-unit basis and an
allowance tracking system, to keep track of where allowances have been
transferred. The operative provision is the prohibition against emitting
S02 (on an annual basis) in excess of the number of allowances held by the
unit. The number of allowances held by any unit would equal the number
initially allocated by statutory formula plus any procured, minus any sold or
otherwise disposed of. The acid rain title does not call for any review of or
restriction on proposed allowance trades. Essentially, the acid rain program
itself is spatially indifferent; it is based on emissions only. However, all the
other regulatory requirements continue to apply. Thus, regardless of how
many allowances a unit may hold, it cannot emit S02 at a rate greater than
its SIP limit, or its limit under the NSPS and PSD provisions.
Now that the CAA includes provisions covering local and regional air
quality (at least near class I areas), and acid rain provisions aimed at long-
range transported and transformed air pollution, some still question whether
the public should be concerned about where exactly the acid rain control
reductions are achieved and where a plant might be allowed to increase its
emissions. Others formulate the questions differently: given the full set
of air quality control requirements that constrain a utility's emissions, will
any allowances ever be traded? The answer to the second question is yes,
empirically yes. The industry, aided by third parties serving as brokers,
gives every indication of having figured out how to use the flexibility of the
acid rain program to save compliance costs and to optimize their system
compliance strategy.
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As for the first question, on whether or when the public should be
concerned about the environmental consequences of an allowance trade,
consider the following three scenarios. First, if the underlying SIP governing
a plant's emissions is suspect or is known to be flawed, then the state or
others may apply pressure to at least examine the relevant parts or the SIP,
if not amend a faulty permit, before final acid rain compliance plans are
made to ensure that the plant really is not causing or contributing to a
violation of the S02 or PM-10 (particulate matter 10 J.lm or less in size)
NAAQS or PSD increment. A utility can readily check for itself whether
its emissions may be suspected of causing or contributing to a NAAQS
violation or increment consumption using the EPA's air quality modeling
guidelines.
Second, although the EPA has not revised the S02 NAAQS to include
a very short term averaging time (to prevent brief, but exceedingly high
concentrations of S02 in the ambient air near a source), the environmental
community is pressuring them to do so, and it is possible that a state could
adopt a short-term standard on its own. Even without a change of standard,
a screening model (of the ambient air quality impact) can be used to predict
whether any particular plant might cause such exceedances; if so, local
interest groups might profitably emphasize this fact rather than dwell on
changes in annual emissions allowed under the acid rain program which may
not cause or contribute to any residual air quality problem, particularly
not a short-term, local one. Again, utilities can arm themselves with this
information rather than wait and be surprised.
Finally, if a plant's emissions will cause or contribute to visibility im-
pairment or other air quality-related impacts in a class I area, regional
environmentalist groups may profitably take legal action to force a utility
or state to take such concerns into account. They may also continue to pres-
sure the EPA to put into effect the long-awaited regional haze regulations
and to support the federal land managers' attempts to protect their class
I areas from air pollution. Utilities can take into account the demand for
less S02 and NO x exposure in the class I areas and make excess emission
reductions at nearby plants, and then use the allowance market to offset
whatever incremental costs they might incur.
No one has argued that the acid rain policy is capable of protecting
the most sensitive resources from sulfates and nitrogen species. The al-
lowance market cannot substitute for local and regional air quality pro-
tection measures. Nor, however, without any specific air quality-related
concerns, should resistance to allowance trading - whether buying or selling
- be allowed to interfere with allowance transactions. Such interference can
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only lead to considerably higher acid rain compliance costs, which ultimately
will be paid for by electric utility ratepayers.
6.10 Discussion: Between Promise and
Practicality
For over two decades the environmental economics literature has presented
marketable permits and emissions taxes as superior alternatives to conven-
tional regulation based on the results of their optimization modeling. But
how good is the link between policy models and real policy problems? What
about the institutional environment - how, exactly, will trades be negoti-
ated and made? The gap between model processes and real procedures
distorts the expectations of policy analysts and decision makers. Some of
the mathematical models used in air pollution policy analysis essentially
solve for a static, partial equilibrium under conditions that in the real world
would reflect simultaneous trading transactions among fully informed indi-
viduals at no cost. In reality, traders have very limited information, incur
real transaction costs, and make bilateral, sequential trades. The "expecta-
tions gap", that is, the disappointing cost savings realized under the bubble
policy and other aspects of emissions trading compared to the theoretical
savings predicted by trading advocates, has as much to do with unrealistic
expectations as with policy-important constraints like nondegradation or
anti-backsliding requirements which prohibit a participant in a trade from
actually increasing emissions above existing levels (Atkinson and Tieten-
berg, 1991).
The US acid rain program is fundamentally different from the emissions
trading program and, while it is just getting under way, the expectation
is that the careful attention to institutional structure in the authorizing
statute will motivate and support a fairly fluid allowance market and stilJ
ensure that the program's goals are met and that local and regional envi-
ronmental protection is not jeopardized. While the acid rain program is
premised on a positive answer to the question posed above about whether
a more flexible regulatory structure could lead to more efficient and cost-
effective controls, that answer is in turn based on the retention of the lo-
cal and regional air quality protection provisions of the underlying Clean
Air Act, and upon the continued authority of the technology-based stan-
dards. In addition, the acid rain program has very clear goals and a struc-
ture comprising rigorous administrative control mechanisms - from the per-
manent cap on allowable S02 emissions and an unassailable baseline, to
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the allowance allocation rules, to the emissions monitoring, recording and
reporting requirements, and to the excess emission penalties set far above
the marginal cost of control. In considering the qualities of the acid rain
program, or any other regulatory regime, the administrative structure can-
not be separated from the primary objectives: you have to be able to "get
there from here".
The qualities that support a functional institutional structure, such as
those just described, do not inhere in using incentive-based strategies; they
result from self-conscious visible decision to build such qualities into what-
ever program is chosen. The emissions trading provisions may have lowered
the cost to firms of compliance with the Clean Air Act (a not unimportant
factor), but there is very little hard evidence to support that conclusion.
There is even less evidence they have provided any increase in environmen-
tal benefits, or encouraged innovation and technical change, or increased
economic efficiency beyond what would have occurred under a comparable
"command-and-control" program with appropriately designed institutional
structures. On technological change, proponents of emissions trading tend
to make claims such as the following: "incentive mechanisms provide a
greater stimulus for innovation and technical change in pollution control
than does a direct regulatory approach" (US EPA, 1992, p. 2-1) The prob-
lem with such categorical statements is that technological change depends
on a large number of factors, and it is far from clear that anyone knows
what affects the rate of technological change and what the rate of change
means for the economy as a whole (Kemp and Soete, 1992). An important
related factor not usually evident in the literature is what might be termed
the "effective demand" for cleaner technology. For example, trading S02
emissions at or near the pre-acid rain control level of roughly 18 million tons
of S02 per year for the utiJjty sector, would not have promoted technologi-
cal change in the electric utiJjty industry. At that overall level of emissions
(the 1985 level) it simply would be too easy to limit emissions with existing
technologies for emissions trading to have had much effect on technological
change. But the effective demand for cleaner power plant technologies, fuels
and management strategies might increase significantly when the allowable
limit is halved to approximately 9 million tons per year. This stringent goal,
coupled with the combination of flexibility and accountability embedded in
the acid rain legislation and implementing regulations, represent the state
of the art in incentive-based regulation. Now we just have to be patient to
see whether it works.
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The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author. They do not necessarily
represent the views of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of
State, or any other agency of the US government.
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Chapter 7
Economic Instruments for
Air Pollution Control
in Estonia
Tiit Kallaste
Stockholm Environmental Institute
Tallinn, Estonia
Abstract
This chapter describes the experience of Estonia in the implementation of economic
instruments for air pollution control. Market economy principles in environmental
policy in Estonia have not been in operation for very long; the systematically
organized taxation of environmental pollution actually started only in 1991. The
most important market forces applied in Estonia today are the so-called economic
instruments and resource pricing. Several economic instruments for the control
of air pollution have been introduced to complement other means, such as direct
regulation, particularly emission charges, subsidies and noncompliance fees, and are
characterized in detail. Also the Estonian Environmental Fund has been the basis
for the implementation of economic instruments to control environmental pollution
and for resource pricing. The Fund serves as an institution for collecting revenues
for environmental protection purposes. On the basis of Estonia's experiences in
the last three years with economic instruments under the very difficult conditions
of the transition to a market-oriented economy, one can conclude that the revenue-
raising character of economic instruments is dominant since emission charge rates
have been set relatively too low to provide effective economic incentives to polluters
to reduce their emissions.
Key words: economic instruments, emission charges, toxicity of pollutants, maxi-
mum permissible concentrations, revenue raising, enforcement incentives, subsidies,
noncompliance fees, environmental protection fund.
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7.1 Introduction
The intensive and large-scale use of natural resources, particularly oil shale
and phosphates, caused significant damage to the natural environment in
Estonia during the period of the centrally planned economy, particularly in
the north and northeast of the country. All components of the environment
have been seriously damaged by pollution in this area. Air pollution has
been particularly acute, and has had negative effects on human health in the
most polluted areas in the northeast (Estonian Nature Management Scien-
tific Information Centre, 1990; Ministry of the Environment, 1991; National
Board of Waters and the Environment, 1992; Kallaste, 1991), although the
air pollution situation is somewhat better in other parts of Estonia (Kallaste
et at., 1992).
During the postwar socialist period, the possibilities for economic con-
trol over polluting sectors of the economy in Estonia were very restricted,
since they were centralized by All- Union ministries. More than 90% of all
Estonian industries were controlled by the central government in Moscow;
Republican (i.e., Estonian) authorities had very little influence on the plan-
ning of the structure of local production. As a result, there was a lack of
environment-oriented investments, particularly for air pollution abatement,
so that air pollution reached critical levels in many places.
Many international environmental agreements on S02 and NO x emis-
sions are in force nowadays. For that reason investments are needed to
buy or build modern purification equipment or low-waste technologies -
the faster, the better. Until recently polluting enterprises were not con-
cerned about the high levels of air pollution, as there were no real economic
incentives for them to reduce it. Now changes are needed to update clean-
ing facilities and technologies. Environment-oriented investments not made
during the last decades need to be made in the near future. The major re-
stricting factor is the shortage of hard currency for the purchase of modern
production and purification technology. Experts estimate that to clean up
the sulfur emissions from oil shale power plants in the northeast of Estonia,
for example, will cost at least $1 billion.
To control the pollution, several market-oriented environmental policy
instruments for economic management have been introduced in Estonia step
by step since the early 1970s. Enforcement incentives such as noncompli-
ance fees or fines have been imposed for air and water pollution. How-
ever, the principles of taxation of the environment were not based on clas-
sical economic theory, but on socialist political economy. Taxes were intro-
duced on the basis of expert assessments, in view of the need for immediate
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restrictions on pollution. Tax rates were calculated on the basis of finances
available (or necessary) for pollution abatement activi ties during each year,
or on health criteria. Estonia was one of the first republics of the former
Soviet Union to implement economic instruments to control environmental
pollution.
7.2 Economic Instruments in Estonian
Environmental Policy
7.2.1 Introduction
Economic instruments are environmental policy tools that take advantage
of market principles to achieve the goals of environmental improvement.
They are often used as substitutes for or as complements to other policy
instruments such as regulations and cooperative agreements with industry
(OECD, 1991, 1992). Policy instruments in general can be classified into
three main categories (Bye et al., 1990): economic instruments, regulatory
instruments, and information or moral suasion.
Economic instruments offer a number of inherent advantages over reg-
ulations and moral suasion, including greater cost-effectiveness, permanent
incentives to reduce pollution, greater flexibility in application, and the pro-
vision of a continuous source of revenue. One basic objective of economic
instruments is to ensure appropriate pricing of environmental resources in
order to promote their efficient use and allocation. The cost-saving poten-
tial is one of the major characteristics of economic instruments. According
to an OECD definition,
... economic instruments affect the costs and benefits of alternative ac-
tions open to economic agents, with the effect of influencing behavior in a
way that is favorable to the environment. Economic instruments typically
involve either a financial transfer between polluters and the community
(e.g., various taxes and charges, financial assistance, emission reduction
credits, user charges for services, product charges), or the actual creation
of new market systems e.g., tradable emission permits. [GEeD, 1991,
p. lO-ll]
According to the OECD (Opschoor and Vos, 1989; Nicolaisen and
Hoeller, 1990), economic instruments can be classified as follows:
1. Charge systems: effluent charges, user charges, product charges, admin-
istrative charges and tax differentiation.
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2. Subsidies: financial aid for installing new technologies, and subsidies for
environmental R&D expenditure; grants, soft loans, and tax allowances
can be differentiated here.
3. Deposit-refund systems: combine charges and subsidies so as to provide
incentives to return pollutants for recycling.
4. Market creation or redefining property rights: tradable emission per-
mits, market intervention, and liability insurance legislation.
5. Enforcement incentives: noncompliance fees, performance bonds; these
are inseparable from regulatory measures.
Two of these five economic instruments are not currently in use in Es-
tonia; deposit-refund systems and market creation, although initial steps
toward introducing liability insurance were made in 1992. Subsidies and
enforcement incentives have been practiced for some time, combined with
various regulatory instruments. In the following, some characteristic exam-
ples of the implementation over the last few years are presented (Kallaste,
1993).
7.2.2 Charges
Charges are new instruments for pollution control in Estonia. Three types
exist: emission charges, administrative charges, and tax differentiation.
Emission charges are, in principle, fixed taxes (so-called regular con-
firmed emission charges) on direct releases into the air. Ambient concen-
trations must not violate health standards, or daily maximum permissible
concentrations (MPCs; see Table 7.1). Charges have been set for S02, NOx ,
CO, nontoxic dust, oil-shale fly ash, soot, etc. In practice they are levied
on up to about 50 pollutants contained in stack emissions. In general, the
charges are calculated on the basis of two extreme standards: the working
area and MPCs within a 24-hour period. Sulfur dioxide is used as the basis.
Emission charges for air pollution control were first implemented in
January 1991. Regular emission charges are imposed by executive bodies of
local governments on the basis of the entrepreneurship contracts (Govern-
ment of Estonia, 1990). All polluters are supposed to pay these so-called
confirmed regular emission charges. According to government regulations,
however, not all polluters are obliged to pay the charges; nonpoint pol-
luters (motor transport, sea and river transport), as well as households and
institutions financed from the state budget, are exempted.
Local authorities have the right to propose regular emission charge rates,
and to use the revenues themselves, for investment, environmental research,
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development, etc. They have the right to increase or to decrease the charge
rates established by the government by 20%, according to local conditions
and the economic situation of an enterprise (Government of Estonia, 1992).
In special cases the emission charges may be applied gradually, starting from
relatively low rates. In this way it works as a kind of subsidy in the form
of tax allowances.
Administrative charges are not widely used, although there are many
areas where control and authorization fees are to be paid to the regula-
tory authority. For example, the annual technical inspections of all vehicle
exhaust gases with respect to CO content could be classified as an admin-
istrative charge; this has been practiced in Estonia for more than 10 years.
Administrative charges are also used in the case of emission permits for
polluting enterprises.
A differentiation of the tax on gasoline was introduced several years
ago to encourage the use of lead-free fuel, but failed due to problems with
obtaining regular supplies from the former Soviet Union. At present, the
fuel supply is stable and various types of fuel are continuously available.
The system of tax differentiation should be reintroduced now. There are as
yet no examples of implementation of tax differentiation in other fields.
7.2.3 Subsidies
Subsidies have been used in combination with regulatory instruments for
a long time. Most subsidies are in the form of grants or tax allowances,
particularly for environmental investments. Grants from the state budget
for air pollution abatement were the main form of subsidy during the pe-
riod when Estonia had a centrally planned economy. In fact, most of the
environment-oriented investments were financed from the state budget. The
distribution of investments in different spheres was traditionally made on
the basis of expert assessments, but the shares of investments in water, air,
waste management, etc, have been uneven. The share of investments in air
pollution abatement has always been less than 10% of total investments in
environmental protection.
The criteria for allocating grants were quite different from those used in
OECD countries. Environmental investments were financed from central-
ized funds of the ministries or from the state budget. The centralization and
redistribution of profits to enterprises of the ministries was common, so that
the subjective investment decisions of the central government in Moscow or
in Estonia prevailed. These decisions were not always based on compara-
tive analyses of the cost-effectiveness of alternative investment projects. On
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the whole, the centralized environmental investment policy was not very
efficient.
Today, tax allowances in the form of emission charge exemptions are
also granted if a polluter has voluntarily installed gas cleaning equipment
or has purchased environmentally friendly technology. In fact, it depends
on the willingness of an enterprise to introduce less polluting technology,
or purification equipment or waste treatment systems. The borderline for
obtaining a tax allowance is set so that the enterprise itself has to achieve a
reduction of at least 25% of emissions into the air. The polluter is exempted
from the emission charge by 150% of the investment cost for environmental
improvement achieved during the fiscal year.
7.2.4 Enforcement incentives
The noncompliance fee is a kind of enforcement incentive, which was intro-
duced in connection with emission charges in 1991. If a polluter exceeds the
confirmed regular emission limits, a much higher tax is levied according to
the toxicity of the pollutant. Four toxicity classes are used, based on the
health hazards of the pollutants. The tax rate is determined on the basis of
expert estimates and considers the toxicity class of the pollutant. The tax
levied may be 5, 50, and 500 times higher than the regular tax for classes 3
or 4, 2, and 1, respectively. The multipliers are arbitrarily chosen to stress
the potential hazardousness of different pollutants.
The instruments used in Estonia are not analogous to those used in
OEeD countries, where noncompliance fees are fixed according to the profit
the polluter receives if he does not comply with the ambient standards and
exceeds the set emission limit.
In the case of disasters, explosions, or accidents, when hazardous emis-
sions exceed the confirmed limits considerably, a noncompliance fee is levied
on the polluter according to the toxicity class.
7.3 Practical Application of Emission
Charges for Air Pollution Control
Regular confirmed emission charge levels are calculated on the basis of input
resource characteristics, e.g., sulfur content of fuels, stack gas volume, the
nature of the polluted area, and the content of up to 50 pollutants (Kallaste
and Saare, 1991). Due to the lack of appropriate measuring equipment,
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emissions are calculated from the resource input data only; actual emissions
are not measured. The emission charge is based on the following indicators:
• The volumes of the pollutants emitted.
• The size of the polluted area, which is assumed to be a circle with radius
80 times the stack height.
• The type of land use within the polluted area.
• The nature (hazardousness) of the pollutants emitted, compared with
sulfur dioxide as a standard.
According to these indicators, the emission charges should perhaps be
called ambient taxes.
Regular emission charges are imposed by municipal or county environ-
mental protection boards on the basis of appropriate contracts. Polluters
are supposed to pay the regular confirmed emission charges not later than
the middle of every quarter. Payments in advance are possible. The polluter
is informed beforehand of the amount of regular tax for the year.
Emission charges are applied for emissions into the air by stationary
sources (stacks, municipal boilers, etc.) of pollution only. More than 300
polluters all over Estonia were obliged to pay emission taxes in 1991, more
than 80 of which were in Tallinn. In fact, emission charges are levied on
polluters whose emissions are higher than 200 tons per year or include very
hazardous pollutants belonging to toxicity classes 1 or 2.
Due to the lack of an accounting system for the transport sector, emis-
sion charges for this sector have not yet been implemented, but some pro-
posals to start earmarked fuel pricing are being discussed.
The present approach to the use of different charge rates is based on
health risk, declaring that different pollutants present different risks to hu-
mans. All pollutants are classified into four toxicity classes. The first class
includes pollutants that are most hazardous to humans; the fourth class
includes modestly hazardous pollutants. This allows comparisons of the
hazardousness of pollutants whose toxicities are quite different in the case
of equal violations of the respective health standards (for more details, see
Kallaste, 1989). The toxicity of one ton of 802 emitted is used as the basis
for comparison; accordingly, emission charges per unit weight of emissions
have been fixed (see Table 7.1).
The emission tax rate is calculated for each individual pollutant emitted.
The total emission tax to be paid per year is the sum of individual taxes
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Table 7.1. Information on the most relevant pollutants required for the
taxation of emissions, January 1993.
Maximum permissible
concentration Emission tax rate
MPC (mg/m3) Toxic- Pi Pi for
Working ity (EEK/ Tallinn
Pollutant 24 hrs area class ton)a ($/ton)
Sulfur dioxide (S02) 0.05 10.0 3 1.00 2.3
Nitrogen dioxide (N02) 0.04 2.0 2 2.50 5.8
Sulfuric acid (H2SO4 ) 0.1 1.0 2 2.24 5.2
Hydrogen sulfide (H2S) 0.0008 10.0 2 7.91 18.3
Ammonia (NH3) 0.04 20.0 4 0.79 1.8
Hydrogen fluoride (HF) 0.005 0.05 2 44.72 103.2
Formaldehyde (HCHO) 0.003 0.5 2 18.26 42.1
Oil-shale phenol 0.0007 0.5 3 37.80 87.2
Soot (C) 0.05 4.0 3 1.58 3.6
Cement dust 0.1 6.0 4 0.91 2.1
Particulates 0.15 6.0 3 0.75 1.7
Oil-shale flue ash 0.1 4.0 3 1.12 2.6
Petrol 1.5 100.0 4 0.06 0.1
Carbon monoxide (CO) 3.0 20.0 4 0.09 0.2
Phenol (C6 H5 OH) 0.003 0.3 2 23.57 54.4
Lead (Pb) 0.0003 0.01 1 408.25 942.7
Benzopyrene 0.000001 0.00015 1 57,735.03 1,332,347.0
aEEK = Estonian currency unit, the crown. 1 US$ = 13 EEK.
for each pollutant. The total tax for each pollution source IS calculated
according to the formula:
z
T = L Pi X Mi X K a,
i==1
(7.1 )
where T are annual tax payments for a single polluting enterprise, in crowns
(the Estonian currency since June 1992); Pi is the emission tax rate for
emitting one ton of a particular pollutant i into the ambient air, in crowns;
Mi are actual emissions of pollutant i, in tons per year; z is the number of
pollutants under study; K a is a coefficient calculated on the basis of a spatial
analysis of the areas of various land uses affected by the stack emissions.
The tax rate Pi is calculated as a root-mean value of two extreme stan-
dards - the working area and 24-hour standards for each pollutant (see
formula 7.3) - based on the 802 tax rate (see Table 7.1). In the case of
accidents, disasters, etc. the pollutant's toxicity class is taken into account.
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The emission tax increases as multiples 5, 50, or 500, respectively, for pol-
lutants belonging to toxicity classes 4/3, 2, and l.
To calculate the coefficient ](a, different land uses are weighted accord-
ing to the potential impacts of the pollutants. For example, open land in
rural areas carries a weight of 1, industrial areas carry a weight of 20, and
recreational areas, which are the most sensitive to pollution, carry a weight
of 50. In the case of towns and other urban areas, the weight depends on
the size of the affected area. This coefficient, reflecting the different areas
affected by pollution, can be expressed by the formula:
](a = Srural + 20 X Sind. + 50 x Srec. + ](urban X Surban, (7.2)
where Srural denotes the share of the area of water bodies, agricultural or
forested land affected by air pollution; Sind. is the share of the industrial
area; Srec. is the share of recreational areas; and Surban is the share of
territory of urban areas (towns, settlements, etc.) affected by air pollution.
The coefficient ](urban, in turn, depends on the population of a district
as follows:
](urban = 20, for less than 50,000 inhabitants;
](urban = 25, for 50,000-200,000 inhabitants; and
](urban = 30, for more than 200,000 inhabitants.
The area affected by the pollution source under study is calculated as
a circle with radius r = 80 xH, where H denotes the stack height.
The value of the coefficient ](a is fixed in the license granted to an
enterprise on the basis of an agreed annual amount of emissions. The regular
emission tax calculations are carried out each year and the changes in any
parameters are recorded in a computer database.
To estimate the numerical value of the emission tax rate Pi for different
pollutants the following approach is used. The coefficient Pi takes into con-
sideration the differences in pollutants' daily and working area standards,
and is calculated on the basis of the formula:
Pi = A/jMPCi,24hrS X MPCi,w.a., (7.3)
where MPCi,24hrs is the maximum permissible concentration of the pollutant
i over a 24-hour period in the ambient air over settlements, in mg/m3 ; and
MPCi,w.a. is the maximum permissible concentration of the pollutant i in
working areas, in mg/m3 . Its value is significantly higher than MPC24hrs '
The numerical value of the coefficient A (we may call it simply a scaling
factor) is chosen so as to make the 802 emission tax rate equal 1. Thus
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the S02 tax rate is used as the basis for comparison with the rest of the
pollutants under study. For S02 MPC24hrs = 0.05 mg/m3 and MPCw .a.
= 10.0 mg/m3 . The value of the scaling coefficient A is set equal to
VO.05 X 10 = 0.707. The values of the emission tax rates of the most
common pollutants in Estonia calculated in this way are given in Table 7.1.
For example, for HCHO (formaldehyde) the emission tax rate is:
p = 0.707/VO.003 x 0.5 = 18.26.HCHO
This means that the tax levied on emissions of HCHO (which is signifi-
cantly more toxic than S02; see Table 7.1) is 18 times higher than the S02
tax rate. In the case of Pb (lead):
p = 0.707/VO.0003 X 0.01 = 408.25.
Pb
In the case of pollutants with lower toxicity the appropriate emission
tax rate is also lower. For example, for CO (carbon monoxide):
p = 0.707/V3.0 X 20 = 0.09.
co
For these emission charge calculations, appropriate computer software
has been developed and is used by every local county or municipal environ-
mental protection board. At present, inventory data on emissions for the
whole of Estonia by polluting enterprises are available in the computerized
database of the Estonian Nature Management Information Center (1990).
Pollution taxes have been calculated for emissions of about 50 pollutants in
up to 500 enterprises throughout Estonia. More than 300 enterprises were
actually charged in 1991.
7.4 First Results of the Emission Charges
System in Tallinn
The total revenues from air pollution control for Tallinn city were about
970,000 roubles in 1991 (Tallinn Board of Environmental Protection, 1992).
The expected revenues from regular emission charges were 950,000 roubles.
The emission charge rate calculations were made for all major enterprises in
Tallinn, but the obligations to pay were included in entrepreneurship con-
tracts only in the case of 83 enterprises. The majority of revenues came from
emission charges; only a small amount was obtained from other economic
instruments applied, such as administrative charges, tax differentiation or
noncompliance fees.
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Table 7.2. Regular confirmed air pollution emission charges for Tallinn,
1991.
Thermal power plant "Iru"
Heavy machinery plant
Municipal heating enterprise A
Enterprise "Estonian Phosphorite"
Baltic shipyard
Enterprise "Silikaat"
Tallinn metal works
Estonian fish treatment enterprise
Municipal heating enterprise B
Pharmaceutical plant
Total
Total emissions of
pollutants (tons/yr)
12,609.0
494.4
5,478.5
3,161.0
525.5
1,806.2
429.9
148.8
148.8
75.4
25,651.9
Annual revenues
(roubles)
313,533.8
155,261.7
126,103.7
95,342.2
34,024.1
28,174.6
26,118.9
20,700.8
15,063.0
11,217.4
825,540.2
Source: Tallinn Board of Environmental Protection, 1992.
The contribution of enforcement incentives to total revenues was also
very small. This instrument obviously did not have the impact expected
beforehand, for two obvious reasons. The polluting enterprises were very
careful not to exceed the set limits, because they were aware of the new,
very strict restrictions. Second, the output of many branches of industry has
been permanently scaled down in recent years, so that far fewer people were
working under the extreme conditions where peak emissions or accidents
usually occur.
The majority of revenues consisted of contributions of the five to ten
most polluting enterprises' emission charges only (see Table 7.2). The rev-
enues for 1992 were very similar to those of 1991. In Table 7.2, three heat-
generating enterprises appear in the list of ten major polluters. Their share
in the total emission charge revenues to the Tallinn Fund is relatively large
- about half of the total (Tallinn Board of Environmental Protection, 1992).
The reason is that they use heavy fuel oil, which is rich in sulfur and no
purification technology is used for desulfurization of stack gases, or for the
removal of other pollutants. For further development of air pollution con-
trol, attention should therefore focus on the relatively small number of large
or significant polluters.
The present approach takes into consideration the risk to human health,
so that most attention is paid to highly toxic pollutants, whose effects are
significantly more serious than those of other pollutants. Some polluters
listed in Table 7.2 discharge relatively small amounts, but probably of
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significantly more dangerous substances (e.g., pharmaceutical plants, heavy
machinery plants), although their tax payments are still comparable with
the rest (see Table 7.2). Highly toxic pollutants are liable to much higher
charge rates (see Table 7.1). These are mostly emitted from outdated fac-
tories still using obsolete technologies. More technical innovation is needed
to replace such manufacturing equipment.
Compared with water pollution emission charges, rates for air pollution
control were greatly underestimated, and so they did not have the effect
initially intended; this was also experienced in OECD countries in the past
(OECD, 1991). Although regular emission charges are the most commonly
used economic instrument, their application is greatly suboptimal, probably
because they have not been fixed at a level high enough to achieve environ-
mental goals. Hence, they provide significantly low level incentive effects
and thus serve revenue-raising purposes only.
The high rate of inflation in the Estonian economy, which began in
the early 1990s, has negatively affected the full-scale implementation of the
new system of economic control for a wide area of environmental protection,
including air pollution abatement. The inflation has created a critical situ-
ation where the incentive impact of economic control instruments, proposed
at the rouble value of 1989/1990, turned out to be extremely low when ap-
plied in 1991/1992. It is important to note that the emission charges have
not been raised in line with inflation, and the tax rates on pollutants have
been set too low to be effective. The low tax level was a political decision
made by the government to contribute to the survival of many enterprises,
whose output was important for the republic.
Due to the high rate of inflation, the currency of that time (the rouble)
rapidly lost its value and the biggest polluting enterprises were worried
about the inflation rate and monetary reform. They were afraid that they
would not be able to pay the regular confirmed emission charges during the
coming year, so they paid them in full at the beginning of the fiscal year.
Assessed from the point of view of the effectiveness of emission charges
applied, this means, in fact, that the economic incentives in the form of
emission charges did not work at all.
In January 1993, the Estonian government set new tax rates on the use
of natural resources, water, and air pollution, as well as solid waste dis-
posal (Government of Estonia, 1993). Following the monetary reforms of
June 1992 when a new national currency unit, the Estonian crown (EEK),
was introduced, the respective tax rates were revised (see Table 7.1). The
exchange rate of 1 EEK = 10 roubles was fixed, but started to grow im-
mediately. The numerical values of most of the new tax rates on resources
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and for pollution were fixed similar to those of rouble values. Comparing
the 1992 and 1993 tax rates, one may interpret it as a tenfold increase in
tax rates on most resources. At the same time, however, all prices, ser-
vices, salaries, etc., also increased. As a practical result, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to assess the effective increase in tax rates in general. During
1991/1992, the very high rate of inflation in the economy created a great
deal of confusion in the accounting system.
7.5 The Estonian Environmental Fund
The Estonian Environmental Fund is currently dealing with the revenues
from the application of economic instruments for pollution control. The
Fund started in 1983, when the first step was made to introduce a strict
and systematic taxation of environmental pollution. Estonia was the first
among the 14 republics of the former Soviet Union to implement fines or
noncompliance fees for polluting natural water bodies and air in settlements
and cities, and to implement payments for the use offresh water. The system
was introduced in the 1960s and 1970s and enabled local environmental
protection agencies to gain some experience in the field of environmental
taxation.
The foundation of the Estonian Environmental Fund was accepted by
the central government in Moscow as an All-Union economic experiment
in the field of environmental protection and the rational use of natural
resources. It was a real innovation in the environmental protection system
of the former Soviet Union and was authorized to deal with environmental
protection activities at the local level.
Before the Fund was established, noncompliance fees and fines were col-
lected by local nature protection officers and channeled to the Ministry of
Forest Management and Nature Conservation. About 90% of the revenues
were centralized to the All- Union budget and only a minor share remained
at the disposal of the local government. Administrative fines for the vi-
olation of nature protection regulations and nonrational use of resources
were designed to generate revenues. In fact, fines for the pollution of water
resources paid by polluting enterprises, agricultural farms, the army, etc.,
were the major sources of the Fund revenues. In recent years, before the re-
organization of the Fund in 1990, the revenues totaled more than one million
roubles per year; this was a quite remarkable sum for that time, although
it represented only about 1% of the total expenditure on environmental
protection in Estonia.
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An unusual feature of this Fund was that more than 90% of the rev-
enues remained in Estonia and were not taken away (were not centralized)
by All- Union financial authorities in Moscow. It gave the Estonian environ-
mental authorities for the first time a chance to use the money themselves.
The Fund could be used to compensate for damage caused by pollution at
the regional level, for investments in environmental technology, know-how
transfer projects, scientific research, training, grants, international cooper-
ation, etc.
In 1990 the Fund was reorganized into a nonbudgetary republican in-
stitution with the rights of a legal person. It was reoriented to handle the
implementation of economic instruments for pollution control, and to collect
revenues and use them as supplementary finance for environmental improve-
ment. The Fund is attached to the Estonian Ministry of the Environment.
Local funds are attached to county or municipal environmental protection
boards. The activities of the Fund are run by a council, whose composition
is fixed by the Estonian government, following proposals by the Ministry of
the Environment.
The Fund is divided into: (1) the republican centralized fund, (2) 20 lo-
cal (county or municipal) funds, and (3) special, so-called earmarked funds.
At present, most of the Fund's revenues for air pollution control come from
emission charges. The rest of the revenues, which consist mostly of fines and
noncompliance fees, is to some extent unpredictable, since they depend on
the polluters' own environmental strategies chosen each year under different
economic conditions. The revenues from noncompliance fees and fines result
from the sanctions applied in case of unplanned emissions into the air from
leakages, accidents or disasters. "Chronic" or planned noncompliance is not
common, because polluters often try to negotiate on the basis of regular
confirmed emissions permits.
Revenues from emission charges and noncompliance fees are paid to the
respective local county or municipal fund. The share of emission charges to
the Fund is about 90%, and another six sources of revenue contribute about
10%. About half of the local fund revenues are given to the republican
Fund and are used by both local and republican authorities to improve
the air pollution situation at the national level. Every local environmental
protection board, in cooperation with local authorities, has the right to draw
up a specified list ofthe most hazardous air pollutants that present the most
characteristic danger to local habitants or environment. The shares of water
pollution, air pollution, and solid waste disposal tax revenues to the Fund
have varied considerably during the first two years of implementation (see
Table 7.3), resulting from fluctuations in the national economy. The share
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Table 7.3. Revenues of the Estonian Environmental Fund, 1991 and 1992.
Source of revenue
Water pollution emission charge
Air pollution emission charge
Waste disposal charge
Other sources
Total
1991
Roubles (1,000)
34,291
8,432
13,491
1,651
57,865
%
59.2
14.6
23.3
2.9
100.0
1992
EEK (1,000)
3,756
589
1,135
2,003
7,483
%
50.2
7.9
15.2
26.8
100.0
Source: National Board of Waters and the Environment, Environmental Data Centre,
1992, 1993.
of air pollution emission charges has decreased significantly, mostly due to
the rapid decrease in oil shale-based energy production, which is based on
outdated technology without sulfur purification.
As for the centralized republican Fund, its revenues are generally based
on a redistribution of local fund revenues. The use of the republican Fund's
means is fixed by the board of the Fund. In principle, local funds have the
right to make their own decisions on the uses of the revenues, which remain
at their disposal after distribution for environmental improvement.
7.6 Comments on the Implementation of
Economic Instruments
A number of aspects should be mentioned in connection with the estab-
lishment of an empirical framework for economic instruments in air pol-
lution control in Estonia. For a long time there has been no significant
economic incentive for pollution abatement measures, nor investment in en-
vironmentally benign technologies or flue gas cleaning equipment. Direct
administrative regulations, in combination with some first elements of eco-
nomic instruments for more efficient pollution control, have been relatively
ineffective until recently.
In general, estimates of environmental improvement costs have been
made neither on the basis of the value estimates of damage caused byemis-
sions of pollutants, nor on the full cost of compensation for damage to
particular components of the environment. They are not based on market
economy principles nor deduced from analyses of their cost-effectiveness.
The total desired annual revenue of the Fund that could ideally be used
for pollution control, i.e., guaranteeing investments and labor for pollution
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abatement activities (according to the logic of the centrally planned econ-
omy) has simply been fixed. For example, experts estimated that the total
revenues needed were more than 6 million roubles at 1989/1990 prices. This
estimate was used to calculate the charge rates per unit of emissions. Since
enormous changes have taken place in all sectors of the national economy in
recent years, it is obvious that a new, revised method of calculating the tax
rate basis needs to be developed as soon as possible. Since the taxes were
introduced, only a few revisions of tax rates have been made, most recently
in January 1994. This means that the principles of the planned economy
are still being used.
The revenues available to the local funds vary significantly by county or
municipality, i.e., regionally. The funds of four counties and municipalities,
out of 20, contributed about 82% of total revenues from air, water, and
solid waste taxes. These four regions are Tallinn city and three counties or
towns in the northeast of Estonia where air pollution charges are also high.
It is quite normal that these local funds are not able to use all the revenues
they receive in the most efficient way, which is one reason why they are
redistributed among local funds.
7.7 Conclusions
Many changes have been made in the economic structure of Estonia in order
to achieve the more efficient use of natural resources and make considerable
reductions in pollution loads. Recently a new system of policy instruments
for more efficient environmental control was introduced. The implementa-
tion of new economic instruments for air pollution control, such as emission
charges since January 1991, has been a major step forward. The newly
established tax system has various aims, the most important of which are:
• To reduce heavy pollution loads in the most critical areas, and to reduce
specific forms of environmental damage using different types of market
forces.
• By implementing the "polluter-pays" principle, to select the most effi-
cient and low-waste production technologies, thus stimulating polluting
enterprises to reduce their emissions and at the same time to conserve
raw materials.
• On the basis of resource pricing, to change the free-input approach that
has provided the preconditions for the inefficient use of resources and
has given rise to unacceptable levels of air pollution.
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• To accumulate earmarked money for environmental improvement
activities.
In contrast with the practices in neighboring Nordic countries, such as
Finland, Sweden, and Norway, in Estonia the revenues from pollution taxes
are used exclusively to improve the state of the environment.
The introduction of a system of market instruments has been a kind of
economic experiment, since until recently, Estonia was ruled by command
economy principles, where resources had no price before they were produced.
The free use of natural resources caused inefficient production levels with
overuse of resources, and resulted in a high output of wastes. Flue gas
cleaning technologies have not been widely used until now, since there have
been no real economic incentives to do so.
There is no time left to postpone the introduction of the economic
instruments and resource pricing. Further deterioration of the environment
should be prevented using every possible means. However, since the whole
economic system itself is in transition, the use of economic instruments
cannot produce significant effects. Estonia has started to take measures to
reduce the further deterioration of the environment, and this should serve
as the basis for sustainable development. For quick results in environmental
improvement, it is obvious that Estonia needs subsidies and long-term loans
from World and European institutions. A carefully designed master plan
for environmental policy should be developed for Estonia in the near future.
The new system of economic control of environmental protection is a
"mixed approach", combining elements of economic instruments, resource
pricing and direct regulations. It is also mixed in the sense that "old"
approaches and regulations are still in force. The levels of charge rates are
based mostly on the empirical knowledge of experts and principles from the
Socialist period. Classical economic theory and fundamental calculations
have not been used to set the charge levels. This, in turn, may be one reason
for the relatively large differences (up to tenfold) in the revenues of various
spheres of implementation of economic instruments - in air pollution, water
management, and waste disposal control.
The main conclusion of this chapter is that the pollution charges in Es-
tonia have been set too low to act as a real economic incentive for polluters.
In air pollution, charging polluters has had little impact on their economic
behavior. The revenue-raising character of the charges is still dominant.
For instance, the largest contributions to the Estonian Environmental Fund
were made by the two oil shale-based power plants in northeastern Estonia;
in 1992 they paid up to 18% of total pollution charges. However, the air
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pollution tax formed only a small part (0.08%) of the price of electricity
(National Board of Waters and the Environment, 1993).
The extremely complex transition from a centrally planned economy to a
market-oriented system in Estonia has reduced the expected environmental
effectiveness of the market instruments implemented. The very high infla-
tion rate and restructuring of most sectors of the economy have significantly
reduced the expected revenues from the new system of economic control of
pollution. The cost-efficiency of economic incentives is improving, but has
not yet reached its optimal level. Still, the pollution charges stimulate the
cost-efficient allocation of pollution abatement even at their present subop-
timallevels. When the national economy and accounting system broke down
in the early 1990s and rapid inflation started, the traditional principles of
assessing the efficiency of economic instruments were no longer applicable.
An emotional style is used at present when assessing the effectiveness of
pollution charges applied. The data on environmental expenditures are still
incomplete and often incompatible. The first attempts to build up a new
national accounting system were made only recently.
The very low pollution tax levels resulted from political decisions made
by the government to assist many enterprises to adapt to the changed eco-
nomic situation. This has created a situation where the revenues from
economic instruments and resource pricing (designed at the rouble value
level of 1989/1990) were relatively low from the start. The government is
increasing the tax rates stepwise; the most recent revision was in early 1994.
As the level of inflation remains high and pollution taxes have still not been
adjusted, optimal marginal costs are lower, and less pollution is controlled.
An important result expected from the implementation of economic in-
struments for air pollution control is a gradual shift in production and con-
sumption into a more efficient and environmentally friendly direction, which
will form the basis for sustainable development in Estonia. The transition
to a market economy is still in progress. Some elements of the centrally
planned economy continue to exist, preventing the cost-effective operation
of economic incentives. For example, soft budget constraints, fixed prices,
centrally granted investments, etc., are used in some important sectors of
the national economy. Administrative regulations and economic incentives
have a long way to go before they achieve cost-effectiveness criteria. It is
obvious that to establish the principles of resource pricing and economic
control of pollution similar to those used in other European countries, con-
siderable effort is still needed.
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Abstract
This chapter analyzes the development of a new management system for environ-
mental protection in Russia during the period of transition to a market economy.
Under the former command-and-control (CAC) system the share of abatement in-
vestments increased, and emissions actually declined, but environmental problems
were not resolved, and environmental quality standards were not achieved. The
CAC system collapsed, together with the centralized system of national economic
management, because it was based on budgetary resources. It was replaced by
economic mechanisms, including a system of pollution fees. This chapter traces
the development of the pollution fee system, and explains the reasons for its inef-
ficiency. Although actual emissions have declined, the level of pollution per unit
GNP has increased, and the share of environmental investments in GNP has fallen.
The major reasons for the weaknesses of the system have been severe cuts in state
funds, the low level of the fees charged, the inadequate fee collection system, and
the overall lack of markets in Russia. However, the institutional foundations for
an environmental management system have been laid, and the system is likely to
become more effective as the market economy develops.
Key words: pollution fees, damage estimation, command-and-control system,
environmental fund, environmental protection investments.
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8.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the system of environmental management in Rus-
sia, particularly economic instruments. The way the pollution fee system
was formed and is operated is analyzed. The analysis covers 2-4 years
starting from an experiment conducted in 1989-1990 in a limited number
of regions, up to the current results of the operation of the new pollution
fee system throughout the country. Focusing on an analysis of air pollution
management, we examine the ways in which enterprises are being encour-
aged to accept responsibility for environmental protection, and the incen-
tives provided by economic instruments for the reduction of environmental
pollution.
The administrative system of environmental management that existed
until 1990 reflected the overall system of Soviet economic regulation. How-
ever, the recent economic reforms put an end to the administrative mech-
anism of regulation in its old form, and a new regulation system corre-
sponding to general market relations was introduced, based on economic
instruments. The main issues we address here are whether the new system
has created incentives for polluting enterprises, what have been the positive
results of the introduction of the system; and what needs to be done to
increase its efficiency. Of course, the short period of operation of this new
system is insufficient to allow a deep and full analysis. We therefore analyze
indirect factors, compensating for the lack of empirical material and data
by expert estimates.
Such an investigation is relevant for the creation of market systems in
Russia. Economic mechanisms with an appropriate system of environmental
standards will soon be the only tools for ensuring the environmental respon-
sibility of enterprises. The privatization of public enterprises has given many
rights to the new owners, but the weaknesses of existing economic and legal
systems could create a disproportion between the rights and liabilities of the
owners, and could have negative consequences for the environment. In this
chapter we examine whether the new system of pollution fees provides suffi-
cient incentives for firms to invest in environmental protection. What could
make them comply with emission standards other than a system of pollution
fees? In answering these questions we take into account the current market
situation in Russia.
The command-and-control system did have some positive results for
environmental protection, however. It is therefore interesting to compare
the effectiveness of the old and new systems, although under the current
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deep economic crisis it is very difficult to judge the merits of the new system.
We first need to distinguish different tendencies.
8.2 The Command-and-Control System of
Environmental Management
The command-and-control (CAC) system involves a number of elements,
including environmental quality standards; planning and financing of envi-
ronmental activities; and monitoring and controlling environmental quality.
The main features of this system were determined in a set of legislative acts
adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet: the Basic Land Management Act
(1968), the Water Management Act (1970), the Mining Management Act
(1975), and the Forests Management Act (1977). In 1980 acts about the
Protection of the Atmosphere and the Protection and Utilization of Wildlife
were also adopted. These acts formulated general rules for the exploitation
of the environment and natural resources. Environmental protection goals
were set in the Public Health Act (1969), and the necessity for environmen-
tal protection was first mentioned in the constitution ofthe USSR (the Main
Law, 1977). In all of these acts the responsibilities of the various ministries
and organizations in the field of environmental protection were specified.
8.2.1 The system of environmental quality standards
In accordance with the Public Health Act (1969) the Ministry of Public
Health was obliged to work out and adopt environmental quality standards.
Current ambient standards (USSR Council of Ministers, 1980) played a key
role in the system of standards in the USSR, which was based on max-
imum permissible concentrations (MPCs) of hazardous substances in the
environment (atmosphere, reservoirs, soils).
It was considered that the MPCs, if adhered to, would preserve and
maintain the properties of the environment, Le., that the levels set in the
MPCs were sufficient to protect human health, plants, and animal life. An-
nounced in 1969 and introduced in 1978 (USSR Council of Ministers, 1978),
the MPC standards corresponded to medical requirements and were very
severe (often more stringent than in the EC or the USA). For S02, for ex-
ample, the MPC was 0.05 mgjm3 in the USSR, 0.3 mgjm 3 in SWitzerland,
and 0.26 mgjm3 in the USA. Examples of MPCs for towns are shown in
Table 8.1. Such standards were set for more than 200 substances on the
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Table 8.1. Examples of maximum permissible concentration (MPC) stan-
dards for urban areas (mg/m3 ).
Annual Daily
maxImum average
502 0.50 0.05
Cl 0.10 0.03
Hydrogen sulfide 0.008 0.003
CO 6.01 2.01
NOx 0.3 0.1
Phenol 0.30 0.01
Ph 0.0007
Hg 0.0003
Arsenic 0.30 0.01
Dust (nontoxic) 0.50 0.15
basis of medical criteria only, without regard to economic and other factors,
which explains their severity.
Such rigid standards were practically unattainable, however. According
to data for the early 1980s, average MPC standards were exceeded by fac-
tors of 2.4-2.5, particularly in urban areas.[l] On the basis of compliance
with the MPC standards maximum permissible levels of emissions (MPLs)
for enterprises (stationary sources of pollution) were fixed. (For mobile
sources, concentrations of exhaust gas emissions were also fixed, although
in practice, only the CO emissions of vehicles were controlled). These stan-
dards were to be followed by both new and existing enterprises. They were
calculated by the State Hydro-Meteorological Committee and the Ministry
of Public Health and introduced from 1 January 1980, in accordance with
the Atmospheric Protection Act. In practice, enterprises' actual emissions
were often substantially higher than the MPLs.
For economic and technical reasons, and because specific local condi-
tions were not taken into account, it was unrealistic to hope for compliance
with these standards; indeed, the majority of industrial enterprises would
have had to close down if the MPL requirements had been accurately ob-
served. Thus temporary coordinated standards (TCS) were introduced;
these were higher than the MPLs but lower than actual emissions. They
were set for existing enterprises according to individual circumstances (new
enterprises were required to comply with the MPLs). The possibilities for
enterprises to reduce their emissions step-by-step to comply with the MPLs
were taken into account in these standards. Special emission reduction pro-
grams were elaborated for large enterprises, taking into account the costs of
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all abatement measures. The temporary standards were thus a compromise
between the environmental and economic goals of Soviet society.
MPLs and TCS were fixed only for the largest enterprises at first. Sev-
eral years after their introduction (before the pollution fee system experi-
ment) only 14%-18% of all enterprises had complied with the standards.
8.2.2 The system of planning and financing of
environmental activities
From 1982 environmental planning became part of production plans of en-
terprises, general plans for urban development, and regional schemes for
the location and development of industrial complexes. On the basis of the
plans, enterprises were to achieve, step-by-step, compliance with the MPLs.
First, enterprises had to attain the TCS and then the MPLs. This process
had to be completed by the year 2005, when the goals of the Long-Term
Environment Program (LTEP) were to be realized (USSR State Committee
on Scientific and Technological Development, 1980); Le., compliance with
MPC standards throughout the USSR on the basis of the MPLs for emis-
sions by all enterprises. Thus for all such enterprises special investment
plans were drawn up; the investments had to be sufficient first to reach
TCS and then MPL standards. These investment plans formed the main
basis for abatement activities of enterprises. They were worked out by the
responsible ministries of the USSR and Soviet Republics on the basis of
the tasks of regional authorities (executive authorities of regional and local
Soviets), as well as the USSR and Republican plans for the protection of wa-
ter, air, land, and forests, as well as national parks, wildlife, fish stocks, the
rational use of resources, and for the introduction of pollution abatement
equipment.
Between 1981 and 1990 abatement activities were outlined in five- and
one-year plans for the socioeconomic development of enterprises. State
investments for environmental protection were fixed by the USSR State
Planning Committee. The Long-Term Environment Program (LTEP) was
to provide the general framework document, and at the regional level Re-
gional Complex Schemes for Environmental Protection were drawn up for
the most polluted and unique regions (e.g., Lakes Ladozhskoe and Baikal).
From 1984 onward the required investments were also financed from the
state budget after a special decision of the government. At the level of the
enterprise, abatement expenditures also were stipulated in the plans. This
money was given to enterprises from the budgets of the corresponding in-
dustry ministries, in consultation with the state organizations responsible
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for environmental protection. For infrastructural projects (such as sewer-
age) funds were provided from local budgets. Thus, at the highest level the
total abatement expenditures were determined by the USSR State Planning
Committee. Part of this money was then distributed among ministries and
later among enterprises according to their plans, and another portion of the
money was distributed among regions. The flows of funds could intersect;
for example, enterprises could obtain funds for abatement from both the
regional environmental programs and from ministries.
The final result of this resource allocation should have been the achieve-
ment of ecological standards. Every year enterprises received, from the
upper level, emissions reduction plans with corresponding investments and
limits on investment resource utilization (capacities of building firms, mate-
rials, etc.), which were the most important. Thus the financial and physical
aspects of environmental activity were well planned.
8.2.3 The environmental quality monitoring and
control system
Monitoring and control functions were performed by a number of state or-
ganizations. The State Hydro-Meteorological Committee was responsible
for the atmosphere and a special Air Protection Inspectorate was created.
Within the Ministry of Public Health there were special hygienic services
which, before the emergence of the State Environmental Committee in 1989,
were responsible for maintaining air quality. In particular, they had to stip-
ulate MPLs and TCS for enterprises and to supervise compliance with them;
grant emission permits; and organize environmental monitoring systems for
the collection of data on emissions. These organizations included inspection
departments, but they were unable to influence the polluters. Their main
tools were to impose penalties (up to a maximum of 100 roubles), to insti-
tute criminal proceedings (very rare), or to close down enterprises (almost
never).
8.2.4 Reasons for the collapse of the CAC system
Many Russian specialists have commented (Gofman, 1977; Gofman and
Gusev, 1977) that the CAC system did not create enough incentives for
the improvement of abatement activity, but nevertheless there was a steady
reduction in harmful emissions per unit of production in the former USSR
after 1980. This is apparent from Figure 8.1. If the CAC system had contin-
ued its operation, then with regard to the Long-Term Environment Program
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Figure 8.1. Dynamics of air pollution from stationary sources. Source:
Calculated according to USSR Statistical Committee, 1985, 1988, 1989,
1990.
Table 8.2. Air emissions planned by LTP (million tonnes).
1980 1985 1990 1995
Total 110.8 105 94 85.4
of which stationary sources 72.8 68.3 57.3 50.8
Source: Russian Council of Ministers, 1991.
2000
70.7
42.1
2005
53.2
32.6
(USSR State Committee on Scientific and Technological Development, 1980)
MPC standards would have been achieved by 2005, although much higher
investments would have been needed. According to the estimates of the
experts who designed the program, real abatement investments would have
needed to be two or three times higher. Although the CAC system did
achieve some positive results, it was rather expensive. The environmen-
tal planning and management systems were not oriented toward achieving
the MPC standards at minimum cost. Table 8.2 illustrates the probable
decrease in emissions over Soviet territory if the Long-Term Environment
Program had been realized.
The CAC system required environmental quality standards to be
reached with the help of state abatement investments. But with the ex-
haustion of the state budget resources the main means for meeting the
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standards were no longer available. The CAC system created no incentives
for purification or abatement activity. It was unable to survive without
state financial resources, leading to the waste of budget resources.
The CAC system collapsed in 1991-1992, together with the general sys-
tem of planned economic management. The CAC in environmental man-
agement had been created in 1980-1985 and it disintegrated together with
the rest of the planned economy.
The CAC did not solve any environmental problems ofthe former USSR,
but nevertheless prevented, to some extent, further deterioration in environ-
mental quality. Although its influence on enterprises was not significant, it
was tangible. In the following, we examine the consequences of the disin-
tegration demise of the CAC system, and whether the new system will be
more effective in improving the pollution dynamics after the economic crisis
in Russia.
8.3 The Pollution Fee System
In 1988, All-Union and Russian Ecological Committees were set up with
responsibility for the management of pollution control. In 1989 the All-
Union Committee organized an experiment to introduce pollution charges,
and in 1991 the system was extended throughout the territory of the former
USSR. In 1993 the Russian Ecological Committee was transformed into the
Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, with a wider range offunetions.
In 1992, the Russian parliament passed an Environmental Protection Act
and the Ministry continued its efforts to create an adequate environmental
management system for the new socioeconomic and political conditions.
At the end of 1980s it became clear that the command-and-control sys-
tem could not survive the transition to a market economy. The need for
a new system of environmental protection and management also became
obvious. A pollution fee system was therefore introduced, with two levels
of fees: a basic rate applied when enterprises operated within their permit-
ted emission limits, and an increased rate (five times higher) applied for
emissions above these limits. Regional authorities can adjust the rate with
correcting coefficients to take into account specific local circumstances.
For each enterprise, the environmental authorities define permitted vol-
umes of emissions, usually temporary standards, that were fixed in the
license. Then a legally binding agreement for natural resource utilization is
drawn up reflecting the order of pollution fees to be paid. Enterprises are
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committed to pay the basic rate for emissions within the permitted level,
and the increased rate for emissions above it.
Together with the introduction of the pollution fee system, environmen-
tal funds were also established at three levels: local, republic (regional), and
federal. Pollution fees contribute to these funds. According to data from
the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, in 1991 a
total of almost 1 billion roubles was collected in the form of pollution fees,
penalties, and fines (imposed together with fees). The main source were
fees for pollution within the permitted emission limits (65%). Fees for pol-
lution above the permitted levels contributed 14.8%, fines 9.3%, penalties
2.6%, and other sources 8.3%. Penalties and fines constituted only 12%
of the total. These data demonstrate that fees for pollution are the main
contributors to the environmental funds.
8.3.1 The experiment to introduce pollution fees
in 1989-1990
The CAC systems in the US market economy and in the USSR operated
in very different ways. The main efforts of the US government have been
to specify and control compliance with ambient and technology-based stan-
dards together with the necessary legal enforcement. The main task of the
Soviet government, on the other hand, was to ensure the proper distribution
of abatement investments. Standards were fixed but almost never met in
the USSR. The basis of the Soviet CAC system was the centralized provi-
sion of materials and financial means for environmental investments, and
this system collapsed together with the rest of the system of centralized
planning and finance.
The administrative mechanisms of pollution control were inefficient, but
scientists and managers understood that it was likely to become much more
inefficient in future during the transition to a market economy. New meth-
ods of environmental management were badly needed. The USSR State
Ecological Committee decided to put into operation a pollution fee system
and in 1989-1990 they conducted a corresponding experiment, involving
about 50 regions, including urban areas such as Moscow, Dnepropetrovsk,
Zaporozhje, Nizhniy Tagil, and other towns and regions with poor environ-
mental records.
To give an idea of the scale of the experiment, it was conducted in
towns such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, where the main part of indus-
trial production is concentrated, and where 10% of the population lives.
The annual levels of emissions into the air were 1.15 million and 608,300
174 Alexander Golub and Elena Strukova
tonnes, respectively. Other regions involved in the experiment included
Tver, Vologda, Cherepovets, Kostroma, and Jaroslavl in the European part
of Russia. These are industrial regions with serious levels of air pollution:
Cherepovets in the Vologda region (741,700 tonnes per year) and Jaroslavl
(309,700 tonnes per year). The biggest metallurgical plant in Russia is
located in Cherepovets.
The geographical diversity of the regions involved in the experiment was
reinforced by the inclusion of Siberian regions such as Kemerovo (202,000
tonnes of emissions into the air) and the Ural town of Nizhniy TagH (668,500
tonnes of emissions into the air). Regions with unique natural features were
also included; e.g., Lake Baikal in the Irkutsk region (156,600 tonnes of
emissions into the air). The wide diversity of participating regions with
different geographical, climatic, natural, economic conditions, and industries
ensured that the experimental results would be truly representative.
In the experiment two methods for calculating and collecting pollution
fees were tested. The first was based on measuring economic damage, and
the second on calculations of the regional expenditure required for pollution
control.
This first attempt to introduce pollution fees (for air and water pol-
lution, and solid waste discharges) was based on a decision of the USSR
Council of Ministers. The question of which regions would participate in
the experiment was resolved by local authorities, who had to request to
take part in the experiment. However, the imposition of effluent fees had
no legal basis; every enterprise could therefore refuse to pay, and they very
frequently did so. The environmental authorities then had to find indirect
ways to persuade them to participate; for instance, if the enterprise had to
submit a project for the authority's approval, it would not receive an answer
until all pollution fees were paid.
We now examine how the fees were calculated. The first method was
based on damage estimation. To calculate damage a simplified reduced
method to standardize the procedure was used. The most common approach
was to calculate the damage on the basis of a single formula:
(8.1 )
where u is the estimate of damage; v is the monetary assessment of the
damage caused by 1 tonne of conventional aggregated emissions; G is a
special coefficient, to take into account particular features of the region;
and M is the total volume of aggregated emissions:
M = Al * mi + A 2 * m2 +... + Ai * mi, (8.2)
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where mi is the total volume of emissions of substance i; Ai is the coefficient
of the relative danger of substance i.
By means of the coefficient A it was possible to aggregate various harm-
ful substances and discount them to conventional types of emissions. Special
rules were elaborated to help regional authorities calculate rates of fees (see
Gofman et al., 1986).
The collection of fees calculated on the basis of this method presented
a number of problems. In none of the cities in which this method of fee
calculation was implemented, was the actual charge correlated with the
calculated value of damage. Enterprises were simply unable to pay the es-
timated sums. Thus a second variant for calculating the fees was proposed.
The expenditures necessary for the realization of the regional pollution con-
trol program (K) were defined by the regional Environmental Protection
Committees. Then the payment for each polluter was calculated as a share
of the total abatement costs using the formula
(8.3)
where P is the emission fee; Mj are the emissions of polluter j; M is total
volume of emissions; and Mj / M is the share of enterprise j in the total
volume of emissions.
The payments calculated by formula (8.3) were 10-15 times lower than
the level of incurred damage, calculated by formula (8.1).
To create the necessary incentives for enterprises to curtail emissions
a special system of limits was proposed. For emissions within the MPL
standards, payments would be calculated using formula (8.3): the common
tariff. For emissions above the standards, the penalty tariff applied.
The main idea behind calculating the fees on the basis of formula (8.3)
was that for each territory the expenditures needed to realize the environ-
mental programs were known, and were different for each region. To cal-
culate penalty fees one needs to know the level of abatement expenditures
of each enterprise. Unfortunately, in most cases it was impossible to obtain
such data, so that in 1991 the method was simplified. By a decision of the
Russian Council of Ministers (1991), single rates of payment were adopted
for the whole of Russia (Tables 8.3 and 8.4). This decision was extended
for 1992, but according to local policy the rates could be changed. Local
authorities could use different approaches for different polluters, especially
taking into account regional conditions.
The experiment demonstrated the possibility of collecting pollution fees,
but also revealed many problems. The main problem was the absence of a
legal basis for collecting fees, since the decision of executive authorities was
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Fees for emissions of some air pollutants (roubles/tonne).
Pollutant
NOx
802
Pb
Dust from timber, lime, and coal
CO
Benzopyrene
Source: Russian Council of Ministers, 1991.
Within per-
missible limits
55.01
66.00
10,999.89
22.01
1.09
3,300,000.00
Above limits
263.39
316.00
52,666.14
105.39
5.21
15,800,000.00
Table 8.4. Fees for discharges of some water pollutants (roubles/tonne).
Pollutant
Aluminium hydrate
Aniline
Vanadium
Oil
Arsenic
Phosphates
Source: Russian Council of Ministers, 1991.
Within per-
missible limits
8,870.00
4,435,000.00
443,500.00
44,350.00
8,870.00
17,740.00
Above limits
46,934.00
23,467,000.00
2,346,700.00
234,670.00
46,934.00
93,868.00
only an indirect base. A polluter who refused to pay could not be forced to
do so. This problem was resolved in 1991, however, when the pollution fee
system was introduced throughout Russia.
8.3.2 Russian system of pollution fees in 1991
According to the results of the experiment it was decided that pollution
fees would be imposed throughout Russia from 1 January 1991 onward.
The fees would apply to air pollution from stationary sources; air pollution
from mobile sources (vehicles); pollution of water; and the disposal of solid
wastes.
The legal basis for the pollution fee system was established by a decision
of the Russian Council of Ministers: "The polluting emission fee system and
its implementation" (Russian Council of Ministers, 1991). In this decision,
specific fees for 1991 were adopted, and it was stressed that they would
apply to all polluters, regardless of their institutional positions. It was
shown that fees could be reduced at the regional level in light of specific
environmental and economic conditions. A special provision was created to
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include expenditures for environmental protection for the amount of fees
necessary.
Supplements to this decision fixed two types of fee rates for water and
air pollution (Tables 8.3 and 8.4): for technologically approved discharges
(emissions within the standards); and for emissions above the standards,
which were five times higher than those for emissions within the standards.
Pollution fees were fixed for emissions of 211 substances into the atmo-
sphere, and for discharges of 92 pollutants into water bodies. Moreover, fees
for exceeding the standard emissions were fixed for 33 pesticides, although
fees were not levied on discharges of pesticides within the standards because
of the unstable economic situation in the agricultural sector.
An essential feature of the pollution fee system was its uniform charac-
ter, independent of the region or the location of the source of the pollution.
Obviously, the regions had different abilities to absorb and compensate for
pollution, so that special correction factors were introduced to take into
account specific regional conditions. Different levels of regional aggregation
for air and water pollution were chosen: only 11 regions were distinguished
for air pollution (the Far East region had a correction factor of 1; the Ural
region had a correction factor of 2), whereas for water pollution the division
was more detailed, with 99 water regions.
The correction factors resolved the problem only partially, however. As
mentioned above, one of the main ideas behind the pollution fee system
was to create independent sources of finance for regional environmental
programs. Thus the fee rates should have been linked to the regional demand
for financial resources for such programs.
8.3.3 The current pollution fee system in Russia
The current system of pollution fees was formulated after the adoption of
the 1992 Environmental Protection Act (Russian Supreme Soviet, 1992).
Chapter III of article 20 of the Act provided the legal basis for the imposition
of fees for pollution. As before, rates of payment were set by the government,
but could be changed by the executive authorities. In August 1992 the
government adopted a decision (Russian Council of Ministers, 1992) on a
procedure for calculating fees for pollution and other harmful influences,
and the fee levels.
The possibilities for regional differentiation of fees were increased. Re-
gional environmental authorities, in consultation with the federal govern-
ment, could define their own pollution fees. A new system of payments
with regional differentiations was put into operation in 1993. At the same
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time, fees were introduced for other types of harmful influences, such as
noise, vibration, electromagnetic fields, radiation, etc.
Indexation of pollution fees was undertaken five times in 1992, and
twice in 1993 (in 1993 above-standard emission fees were increased 25 times
whereas within-standard fees were increased less often). In 1993, the total
fee payments of both above- and within-standard emission fees were ten
times higher than in 1992. In 1994 it is planned to increase pollution fees by
a factor of 15. Thus total pollution fees will have been increased by 150 times
over three years, even though the rate of inflation is about 300% per year
(the real dollar:rouble exchange rate was 50:1 in 1992, approximately 500:1
in early 1993, and 1300:1 at the end of 1993, in early 1994 it was 1600:1).
Thus the total impact of the pollution fees has decreased dramatically.
Of course, the growth of payments has not been equal to the rate of
inflation, and this has been the main reason for the sharp reduction in the
share of environmental protection expenditures in the Russian GNP.
Another type of economic instrument is taxation policy. The Taxation
Act (Russian Supreme Soviet, 1991) stipulated that 30% of profits allocated
for environmental improvement purposes would be exempt from profit tax.
In the Environmental Protection Act even wider exemptions were also out-
lined. Experience has shown, however, that these exemptions could be
used only together with corresponding changes in other laws. The Russian
Finance Ministry opposes these exemptions, because they will reduce tax
revenues; the budget is currently showing a deficit.
It would be interesting to examine the incentives arising from existing
tax exemptions, but unfortunately little information is available. However,
experts' estimates show that under the present system of taxation and fees,
these exemptions do not create enough incentives for the allocation of re-
sources to the environment sector. Even if the tax exemptions were to cover
100% of environmental investments, and if enterprises were also exempt
from value added tax, then the fees would cover only 48% of the necessary
abatement expenditures.
8.4 Estimation of the Efficiency of the Pollution
Fee System
Since the pollution fees were introduced:
(a) There has been a strong incentive to monitor the development of both
the system and emissions.
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(b) The number of enterprises with agreed maximum permissible levels and
temporary coordinated standards of emissions has risen sharply. The
fee system stimulated enterprises increasingly to sign such agreements.
The results of the two-rate system of pollution fees were significant since
emissions of all enterprises who had not signed agreements, and had no
fixed TCS, were regarded as being emissions above the standards and
hence subject to payment of the highest fee level. Thus enterprises had
a strong incentive to collect documents to determine their permitted
levels of emissions.
(c) The increased accumulation of environmental funds promoted the de-
velopment of markets for ecological services, although it was hard to
spend money because of the narrow market for abatement equipment;
procedures for decision making on resource allocations were not suffi-
ciently advanced; and conflicts arose between executive and legislative
authorities as to the directions of resource allocations.
Our analysis has shown that the majority of environmental expenditures
have been made in the regions of the experiment participants (three-quarters
of them spent no less than 80% of their own resources in 1991). This in
itself is testimony to the high capacity of the environmental authorities to
learn and to adapt the environmental management system very quickly to
the new conditions of the forming market.
To make some quantitative estimates, let us consider the dynamics of
air pollution from stationary sources in Russia (Figure 8.1). One can see
that there was a constant decrease in harmful emissions until 1989. In
1990 there was some increase in emissions, probably due to improvements
in monitoring systems and to more accurate reporting as a result of the
experiment with the introduction of pollution fees in some regions. The
necessity to calculate fees stimulated more detailed emissions accounting.
From 1991 to 1993 there was a sharp decline in emissions, at the high-
est rates for the last ten years. This could be evidence for the efficiency
of the pollution fee system, but we must also take into account the overall
economic situation in Russia in this period. There were sharp reductions in
all production indices. Figure 8.2 presents the dynamics of emissions per
unit of GNP in Russia. Although there has been a reduction in total emis-
sions, the amount per unit of GNP has actually increased. Thus production
processes appear to have become more environmentally intensive, and the
pollution fee system is now less effective than the CAC policy.
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Figure 8.2. Dynamics of air pollution from stationary sources per unit of
GNP. Source: Calculated according to USSR Statistical Committee, 1985,
1988, 1989,1990.
8.4.1 Development of pollution investments
It is very useful to analyze the dynamics of investments in pollution abate-
ment technologies. We consider the share of abatement investments in GNP,
since the high rates of inflation make it impossible to analyze absolute val-
ues (Figure 8.3). The share of abatement investments in GNP has fallen
sharply since 1980 and they now constitute just 0.12% of GNP, compared
with 0.35% in 1989. This is new evidence of the rather low effectiveness of
the pollution fee system in maintaining the necessary quality of the envi-
ronment. We also show in Figure 8.3 the share of abatement investments in
GNP needed to reach the environmental standards of the State Long-Term
Environment Program by the year 2005.
A number of factors can explain the poor performance of the new envi-
ronmental management system:
• During the economic crisis the allocation of financial resources from the
state budget for environmental protection almost stopped.
• Environmental funds and the enterprises' own resources (considered as
part of pollution fees) became the only sources of finance for investments
in pollution abatement.
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Figure 8.3. Dynamics of the share of abatement expenditures in GNP.
Full curve, actual dynamics, 1980-1993; dotted curve, share of abatement
investments in GNP required to meet environmental goals by the year 2005
according to the LTEP (USSR State Committee on Scientific and Technolog-
ical Development, 1980). Source: Calculated according to USSR Statistical
Committee, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990.
• The only opportunity to increase the share of abatement expenditure
in GNP to 0.35% or to the more desirable level of 0.8% is to increase
the rates of payments by 3 or 7 times, respectively. Then appropriate
resources would accumulate in environmental funds, to be spent for
abatement purposes.
Environmental funds are now the main source of abatement investments,
but because of the low fee rates these funds lack sufficient resources. More-
over, the funds are unable to collect all the necessary payments. Today,
another reason is dominant: whereas in 1991 the funds lacked the legal au-
thority to collect payments from enterprises, the main reason now is that
most enterprises are either insolvent or on the verge of bankruptcy. In the
first quarter of 1993 only 30% of the necessary fees were paid. Enterprises
managed to cancel their debts only after obtaining large-scale credit from
the Russian Central Bank. In 1994 the situation is continuing as high rates
of inflation devalue the accumulated resources even further.
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We have not mentioned the abatement investments made by enterprises
from their own resources. If the nominal interest rate is more than 200%
(the real interest rate is negative), only very profitable investments are jus-
tified. Enterprises would use their resources for abatement investments if it
would be more profitable than to pay pollution fees. On the basis of case
studies and analyses of branches of industry, we conclude that in the current
situation fees are not providing sufficient motivation for enterprises to use
their own resources for environmental protection.
The same results were obtained from a survey of 65 large enterprises in
24 regions (Dumnov, 1992). Dumnov calculated that the average enterprise
spent 0.2% of total annual receipts on pollution fees. In general, pollu-
tion payments had little influence, but 80% of the managers of enterprises
surveyed reported that they had increased the prices of their products to
compensate for the fees. If all the levied pollution fees had actually been
collected, the amount received would have been 70% higher than that ac-
tually realized. No one spoke about the necessity for new environmental
investments. If in 1991 only 8% of local enterprises were stimulated by
the pollution fees, now it is less than 1%. Pollution fees will create more
incentives for abatement investments when the Russian economy perceives
market signals.
To observe one more reason for environmental degradation, we compare
the dynamics of abatement investments with all investments in Russia. The
former have been decreasing at a higher rate than the latter. Of course,
the economic crisis has influenced the pattern of expenditures, but even in
comparison with the dynamics of all investments (which fell by a factor of 2-
2.5; Shatalin, 1994), environmental protection investments fell even further
(by a factor of 4-5). The indexation of pollution fees at the beginning of
1993 improved the situation, but only temporarily.
8.5 Conclusion
The main conclusion from this chapter is that the environmental sector in
Russia has been more sensitive to the general deterioration of the economic
situation than other sectors. The creation in recent years of the pollution
fee system was unable to prevent a decrease in environmental protection
activity that has been sharper than in other sectors.
The transition from the command-and-control system to the pollution
fee system seems to be a natural process for Russia as the country moves
toward a more market-oriented economy. Our results, however, suggest that
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the introduction of pollution fees in a period of transition has to be accom-
panied by appropriate measures that mitigate the negative consequences
of the current economic crisis on the development of the environmental
sector. The introduction of the system of pollution fees did create the in-
stitutional foundations for a new environmental management system, and
we expect this system to become more efficient as the market economy in
Russia develops.
Note
[1] For example, the MPC for dust emissions was exceeded more than 3 times in
16 towns (by factors of 6 in Donetsk and Osh; 5.3 in Frunze and Rustavi; 4 in
Fergana; 3.4 in Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, and Makeevka). For S02, emissions
standards were exceeded by factors of more than 3 in 14 cities (Astrakhan
6.2; Kirovakan 4.8; Krivoy Rog 4.4; Norilsk and Novotroitsk 4; Grozny 3.8;
Cheljabinsk, Saratov, Jaroslavl, and Donetsk 3).
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Making Carbon Emission Quota
Agreements More Efficient:
Joint Implementation versus
Quota Tradability
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Abstract
Given that a set of countries agree to keep their carbon emissions within certain
national quota limits, the outcome would be a treaty in the tradition of the Rio
Convention, only one step more demanding. This chapter discusses two additional
measures to improve the efficiency properties of such a nontradable quota treaty.
Both measures would allow committed countries to buy emission reductions from
other countries as a way of partially fulfilling their commitments. One is ''joint
implementation", which was supported by the Convention as an instrument ca-
pable of increasing the efficiency of commitments to limit carbon emissions. It is
questioned here whether joint implementation between developed and developing
countries would imply a considerable increase in efficiency. The other measure is
to make national emission quotas tradable, which, in contrast, could significantly
improve efficiency (to the extent that trade does), especially if developing countries
with low abatement costs could be induced to participate. Here, we identify the
circumstances under which quota tradability would allow developing countries to
participate without subjecting them to risks of economic losses.
Key words: carbon abatement policy, carbon abatement costs, joint implemen-
tation; tradable permits.
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9.1 Introduction
If a significant number of governments continue their efforts to reach an
agreement on carbon emission reductions, their policy considerations for
the short run are likely to differ from those for the long run. The short-run
objectives will probably center on getting started on a noticeable scale with
respect to the number of signatories, but with modestly ambitious reduction
goals. The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) of 1992 may
be interpreted as such an attempt. The long-run objective will probably be
somewhat different and focus on attaining significant reductions in global
emissions among those countries that agree to cooperate. This means that
the long-run objectives would center on attaining an efficient international
abatement policy, i.e., resulting in a maximum carbon emission reduction
for a given set of national sacrifices. In this chapter, we assume that, in the
near future, the aggregate international benefits of greenhouse gas or carbon
emission reductions cannot be determined with any great degree of precision.
As a result, an optimal level of emissions could not be estimated. Instead,
it is postulated that the target for an agreement among a set of countries
will be cast in terms of staying within a certain, more or less arbitrarily
chosen, level of aggregate emissions. (Efficiency under these circumstances
means cost effectiveness; these two terms are used interchangeably here.)
The FCCC does not formally require an individual signatory country to
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to any specific level. However, the Con-
vention requires that Annex I signatories (essentially developed countries)
"communicate . .. detailed information on their policies and measures ...
with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels", by the
year 2000, of emissions of CO 2 and other GHGs (not controlled by the Mon-
treal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer). If, as a result
of the FCCC, these countries do return individually to their 1990 emission
levels by the year 2000, this would represent an internationally inefficient
carbon abatement solution, similar to that of the Montreal Protocol, where
the signatories' emission quotas were not set so as to minimize abatement
costs for the set of signatory countries. [On the efficiency implications of the
Montreal Protocol, in general, and its set of nontradable chlorofluorocarbons
(CFC) emission quotas, in particular; see Bohm, 1990.] However, the FCCC
allows parties to engage in joint implementation as a means of meeting the
commitments of individual signatories by financing emission reductions in
other countries. Joint implementation has been hailed as an important step
toward efficiency; see, for example, Barrett (1993a, 1993b) and Jones (1993),
and possibly as a first practical step toward an international tradable quota
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treaty, which under conditions of a perfect quota trade market would rep-
resent an efficient long-term carbon policy. A tradable quota treaty is one
where signatories have fixed initial carbon emission quotas and can trade
parts of these quotas. Joint implementation among countries with commit-
ments to Limit their carbon emissions could develop into a full-scale tradable
quota system. In fact, this type of joint implementation could hardly be
anything less than a version of such a system, since the countries involved
would have to prove that they have reached a level of joint emissions not
exceeding the sum of their emission commitments (see Bohm, 1994).
In this chapter, joint implementation (JI) refers only to cases where a
country with a fixed emission quota, e.g., an industrial country that (even-
tually) aims to keep its emissions in the year 2000 below its 1990 level, is
credited for financing emission reductions in a country without any emis-
sion reduction commitment, here taken to be a developing country. More
specifically, we assume that there is a set of developed country FCCC sig-
natories who (at some future date) have made commitments in terms of
(binding) national emission quotas and who may buy emission reductions
from poorer countries, (either nonsignatories or signatories who have not
made any emission commitments) as a means of staying within their na-
tional quotas. Obviously, this case is where JI introduces something new.
This is also the case that has been in focus in the rapidly growing (but so
far mainly unpublished) literature on JI and that will be dealt with here.
Two issues are discussed in this chapter. First, it is questioned whether
JI with developing countries in practice can significantly improve efficiency
in a nontradable quota treaty among industrial countries, and whether JI
would help materialize a future tradable quota (TQ) treaty in which devel-
oping countries would also participate. Second, we investigate the distribu-
tional implications of making national emission quotas tradable, particularly
the effects on developing countries whose participation is so vital for making
a carbon treaty efficient. This shift from inefficiency to efficiency is essen-
tially a consequence of significant differences in marginal abatement costs
across countries, which a TQ treaty would tend to equalize.
Of course, efficiency could also be accomplished through a "global" car-
bon tax or a system of internationally harmonized domestic carbon taxes.
Before proceeding to a discussion of these issues, it is explained (in Sec-
tion 9.2) why neither an international tax, i.e., where tax revenues are
collected by an international organization, nor a system of harmonized do-
mestic taxes is likely to be a successful candidate for an optimal long-term
policy. [1] In Section 9.3, we briefly discuss the extent to which a system of
bilateral JI between industrial countries and developing countries is capable
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of significantly improving efficiency and of developing into a tradable quota
system including also developing countries. In Section 9.4, the main part of
the chapter, we investigate the effects of making national quotas tradable on
different types of countries, assuming that developing countries would also
participate. We assume that, domestically, all countries use some efficient
policy instrument to stay within their quotas, be it a domestic tradable per-
mit system, a domestic carbon tax, or some other approach. These effects
essentially turn on two factors: initial quota allocations to countries, and
the levels of their abatement costs. In both these respects, developed and
developing country parties to an international carbon reduction treaty are
likely to differ in a systematic fashion.
9.2 Instruments for an International Carbon
Emission Reduction Policy
A major reason why an international carbon tax can hardly be regarded
as a feasible approach to a stringent carbon emission reductions policy is
that many countries - especially those that use relatively large quantities
of fossil fuel and would hence pay large amounts of carbon taxes - are
unlikely to accept that "others" (the international organization) would be
given full control over their tax revenues. In a more promising version
of an international carbon tax, suggested by Hoel (1993), the percentages
according to which the total tax revenues to the international organization
would be shared among the signatories are taken to be determined at the
outset. A problem with this version, however, is that even if the set of
cosignatories and the tax level could be assumed to be given, the effect of
the tax on the volume of total taxes from the cosignatories, and hence the
effect on the amount of tax redistributions to the individual party, would
not be known beforehand. This is likely to make many countries hesitate
to join such a treaty.
A system of harmonized carbon taxes (and tax transfers required in
order for poor countries to cooperate) is hardly likely to be sustainable,
particularly if a number of smaller or poorer parties to such an agreement
felt more or less forced to join the agreement. A reason for this feeling is
the potential threat embodied in the arsenal of "carrots" and "sticks" (aid
and trade policy instruments) that a strong subset of committed countries,
such as the OEeD, has at its disposal. If so, individual countries may
(be expected to) do what they can to circumvent the effect of the carbon
tax on their fossil fuel consumption. Obviously, a practicable agreement
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cannot be one that stops signatories from using all policy instruments with
potential direct or indirect effects on fossil fuel consumption. Thus, a tax
harmonization agreement may be impracticable either because it turns out
to be impossible to control all instruments, other than the carbon tax, which
influence fossil fuel consumption, or because attempts to implement such
control would be so unpalatable to individual countries that they decide
not to join or later defect from the agreement (see also Hoel, 1993).
If these contingencies mean that carbon tax harmonization runs the
substantial risk of being ineffective or unstable in the long run, it becomes
particularly important to analyze the properties of the alternative system
of carbon emission quotas. Regardless of whether the quotas are tradable
or nontradable, a reluctance to cooperate may threaten the effectiveness
and stability of such a system as well, although perhaps not to the same
extent. Here, the problem is not that it would be difficult to determine how
much carbon the treaty actually allows the signatories to emit, which, in
effect, is the problem of a tax agreement just hinted at. The problem would
now be that signatories may try to conceal their actual levels of fossil fuel
consumption. This monitoring problem may be severe for consumption of
fossil fuels produced domestically or imported from nonsignatory countries,
but hardly for fossil fuels traded between parties to the agreement where it
is in the interest of the exporting party that the quantities not consumed
in the country are registered.
If a quota system were found to be practicable from the point of view
of monitoring, there are other issues, particularly those concerning the im-
plications of incomplete quota agreements, that need to be analyzed. A
nontradable quota (NTQ) system is the precedent of the Montreal Protocol
(with respect to CFC consumption).[2] Such a system is inefficient and is
likely to be very costly to the world economy when the issue is shifted from
reducing the use of ozone-depleting substances such as CFCs and halons,
to that of reducing the use of fossil fuel. Hence, a carbon emission quota
system would probably have to be made tradable. Since governments may
hesitate to accept a policy mechanism that has not yet been used interna-
tionally and may even be poorly understood, it seems imperative that more
is made known about the characteristics of a TQ system and how individual
parties would be affected by the choice of a TQ instead of an NTQ system.
To the extent that JI represents the generic element of a TQ system or even
the beginning of such a system, it is important to gain further insight into
what JI could offer in terms of efficiency improvements on a NTQ treaty.
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9.3 Efficiency Implications of Bilateral Joint
Implementation
9.3.1 Introduction
The discussion here concerns JI between an industrialized and a developing
country. In fact, it has been argued that JI may be limited to such pairs
of countries (for an interpretation of JI in the FCCC, see Barrett (1993b).
Since the exact definition and criteria for JI still remain to be seen, it is
meaningful at this point to observe only certain general characteristics of
JI. We briefly discuss the following three issues:
1. Can bilateral JI be efficient, e.g., in the sense that buyers pay only the
net marginal costs of emission reductions in other countries?
2. Can contracted net emission reductions in another country (one without
a commitment to limit carbon emissions) be reliably monitored?
3. Can a bilateral JI system, even if quite extensive, evolve into a TQ
system?
Purchases of emission reductions in another country can be made by
the government of the buyer country, either directly from the government
of the country where the abatement activity is undertaken, or indirectly via
an international organization such as the Global Environmental Facility, or
directly by private firms, although monitored by governments. Norway and
a few other countries have already made pioneering steps to undertake what
may represent officially recognized JI projects in the future.
JI activities are typically considered to be undertaken on a fairly large-
scale project level, e.g., buying carbon offsets by (co)financing (in the NOf-
wegian case) high-efficiency lighting, coal-to-gas conversion, and energy-
efficient housing projects (Barrett, 1993b). For reasons of imperfect moni-
toring Of control similar to those mentioned in the discussion of tax harmo-
nization above, JI does not seem to be suitable in the form of "purchasing"
the effects of the introduction of a carbon tax in another country. Nor
would JI, for reasons of transactions costs, involve (co )financing truly small
projects. Therefore, JI is also interpreted here as concerning large specific
investment projects in the seller country.
The principal advantages of JI, most often highlighted, are (a) promot-
ing global cost efficiency by replacing high abatement cost projects in one
country by low abatement cost projects in another; hence, (b) allowing na-
tional abatement goals to be more ambitious; and (c) improving the chances
of achieving a more comprehensive international abatement agreement (see,
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in particular, Hanisch, 1991; Hanisch et al., 1992; Barrett, 1993a, 1993b;
Jones, 1993). Moreover, especially if JI activities were worldwide and quite
extensive, JI could significantly reduce the carbon leakage problem which is
a major complication for incomplete tax or quota treaties. Finally, given its
project-by-project approach, JI would be relatively easy to start up; hence,
it could at least be a short-term second-best solution or the only politically
feasible solution in the short term.
However, as will be shown here, some aspects of this list may present
too rosy a picture of the implications of allowing JI. In particular, it needs
to be ascertained that JI does not lead up a blind alley, making it even more
difficult to reach a significant international agreement to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. But, first, in what sense does JI actually promote efficiency
and to what extent is it practicable? Before setting out, it should be noted
that most of the quoted writers on JI acknowledge some, or perhaps most,
of the problems to be mentioned here. A possible point of disagreement,
however, concerns the severity of these problems.
9.3.2 Efficiency aspects
The potential efficiency implications are impressive, especially if JI can ef-
fectively survive the first small-scale phase. If only a few JI projects are
attempted, it is widely recognized that the transactions costs per project
are likely to be large. Furthermore, overvalued currencies in seller countries
may constitute a threat to the efficiency of JI. More important, to the ex-
tent that a thin (initial) JI market means insufficient competition among
sellers, there is a substantial risk that sellers will get significantly more than
their net marginal costs covered. Another important efficiency aspect re-
lates to the next problem: will there be a systematic tendency to register
an overestimate of the effect on net carbon emissions in the seller country?
9.3.3 Monitoring aspects
A first problem here concerns the project's direct effects on carbon emis-
sions. This problem may be illustrated by a case that has been mentioned
as a potential officially recognizable JI project. Although this case does not
represent a carbon emission reduction project that could easily be incor-
porated in a quota or a tax harmonization solution, it nevertheless reveals
problems that could arise in other JI projects as well.
The case involves a private US firm, AES Corporation, which paid $2
million of a project cost of $14.5 million for planting more than 50 million
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trees in Guatemala over a ten-year period, to reforest an area of 385 square
miles (see Barrett, 1993a). Assuming this JI project were to be credited
to the USA, it would be in the interest of the firm that wants to achieve
something by increasing sequestration through this project, to have more
sequestration per dollar of investment officially registered rather than less.
The US government, if party to an agreement to limit net carbon emis-
sions, would prefer that one of its firms contributed to more sequestration
rather than less; the more sequestration that could be registered, the less
costly the buyer country's own domestic carbon reductions would be. Fi-
nally, the party - government and/or firm - implementing the tree-planting
operations in the seller country would probably be able to get paid more
for (appearing to be) doing more. This would be so even if the payment
equaled "incremental costs" only, since in any cost concept relevant here
some minimum profit would have to be included; otherwise neither the re-
cipient firm nor its government would be interested in cooperating, and
most likely the more profits that could be included, the bigger the project's
registered sequestration effect would be.
Now, since all parties are interested in having a given project look as
productive as possible, they may do whatever they can to provide documen-
tation that supports their interests and to avoid providing information to
the contrary. First, the tree-growing capacity of the area to be reforested
could be exaggerated. Second, the quality of the seedlings and planting work
could be exaggerated. These problems could be at least partly avoided by
measuring, not "intended" reforestation, but actual reforestation at some
(much) later stage. For this monitoring to be satisfactory, it would probably
be quite expensive. Furthermore, knowing the actual effects only at some
time in the future may not prove satisfactory.
The most difficult monitoring problem, of course, is to estimate the
sequestration level in the case that no project is undertaken. First, would
there be no naturally growing vegetation if the project were not carried out?
Or is there any other use of the land, labor and possibly domestic capital
tied up in the present project that would be worthwhile from a sequestration
point of view in the absence of the project and, if so, how would that affect
net carbon emissions? Moreover - moving from direct project effects to
indirect effects - if the project had not been carried out, would, as a result,
some similar reforestation project be set up elsewhere in the country? If so,
how accurately could the net effects then be estimated?
Although it is an obvious problem that the incremental abatement of a
project cannot be measured with accuracy, the problem is compounded by
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the fact highlighted above that all parties directly involved in the project
have a common interest in making the estimates look "good".
If all these estimation problems would disqualify projects of the type
now discussed, practicable JI schemes may be quite limited and concern only
a part of all those projects that would be undertaken if a tradable quota
agreement existed, which directly or indirectly introduced a permit price
or (domestic) tax on carbon emissions. This would, of course, constitute
another efficiency problem.
9.3.4 The long-term implications of joint implementation
It has been suggested that JI as between developed and developing coun-
tries is quite similar to a TQ approach. First, however, it should be noted
that TQ systems could realistically also cover measures to increase carbon
sequestration only if total national carbon sequestration levels could be mon-
itored sufficiently accurately, most likely by satellite inspection (see Dudek
and LeBlanc, 1992). To simplify a comparison of JI and TQs here, let us
assume that such monitoring will in fact turn out to be possible. Then, the
question can be raised as to whether a comprehensive carbon emission TQ
system, including developing countries that have committed themselves to
certain net emission limits, can be expected to grow out of a system of JI
conducted on a project-by-project basis.
Although there are obvious similarities, JI and TQs differ in several
important respects. As mentioned earlier, some abatement activities, "small
projects" and (other) effects of levying a tax or (permit) price on fossil fuel
in the countries involved cannot be included in a JI scheme, but could be, if
a TQ system existed. In addition, although negotiations over initial quotas
in a TQ treaty can certainly be expected to be complicated by conflicting
estimates of future baseline emissions in the various countries, quota trade
- once such a treaty is attained - would be relieved of any consideration of
baseline scenarios, which was shown above to jeopardize the practicability
of a JI system.
Given this fundamental difference between a JI system and a TQ system
in operation (the former is based on the estimated emission reduction from
an unobservable baseline scenario for each project, and the latter is based
on reductions of a national emission quota in one country being purchased
by another country), there does not seem to be any natural path along
that a JI system could develop into a TQ system. In fact, it seems easier
to find circumstances that would present obstacles for such a development.
Specifically, if a developing country already benefits from a number of JI
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activities, it may not find the remaining additional benefits from joining a
TQ treaty convincing enough, whereas without a past history of benefiting
from JI operations, it would have found the benefits large enough to have
joined the treaty (see Bohm, 1994).
To sum up, it is obviously an easy task to find faults in a JI system,
but there remains one advantage that the more ambitious alternatives, at
the present time, do not seem capable of matching: the principle of JI has
been shown to be politically acceptable. On the other hand, there is still the
question of whether these alternatives and their implications are correctly
understood. In the next section, we address a crucial distributional aspect
of changing a nontradable quota system into a tradable one.
9.4 Distributional Effects of Quota Tradability
9.4.1 Introduction
Just as JI is interesting as a means of increasing efficiency by engaging
low-cost developing countries (DCs) in global emission abatement, it is in-
teresting to investigate whether in general the introduction of quota trad-
ability would attract DCs to cooperate with those richer countries which
have committed themselves to reducing their emissions below baseline. In
this section, we analyze in particular the effects of quota tradability on the
benefits to DCs under various international differences in abatement costs
and initial quota allocations. The following specific issues are discussed:
• What are the implications of abatement cost differences for DC trad-
ability gains?
• Would industrialized countries (ICs) take more advantage of DCs in any
relevant sense, the relatively higher the abatement costs are in the ICs?
(This question relates in particular to a point often made by politicians
that TQ systems would be unfair to DCs.)
• If a DC turns out to value its fossil fuel use more than was initially
estimated to be the case, will it lose from having signed a TQ treaty,
whereby it will be an exporter of carbon abatement?
In Section 9.4.2, an attempt is made to identify a shortlist of quota
allocation principles that are likely to be relevant for ICs versus DCs in
an international TQ treaty. These allocation principles, which amount to
assigning all costs to ICs while allowing DC emissions or DC GDP to be
fully protected, are used in Section 9.4.3 to analyze how the tradability
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gains for ICs and, in particular, DCs are affected by systematic differences
in abatement cost functions and by changes in these functions.
9.4.2 Basic assumptions concerning cost functions and
initial quota allocations
There has been a long discussion in the literature about potentially fair
principles for initial quota allocations (see Grubb, 1989; Barrett, 1992). The
discussion has suggested principles such as (current or past) population size
and GDP, with or without special considerations of the individual country's
share of fossil fuel exports in GDP, basic heating/cooling "needs", or the
energy demand structure of existing industry, etc. Although it has been
difficult to identify criteria that are likely to be widely accepted, it seems
possible to suggest a shortlist of more generic allocation principles that will
allow a theoretical analysis of the issues spelled out above.
To begin with, there seem to be two types of potential carbon emission
treaty signatories: (a) those who require (at least) full compensation for
all foreseeable implications of the treaty they are asked to join, and (b)
those who accept to make sacrifices. The latter group can be divided into
two subgroups: (b.l) those countries that agree to make sacrifices, while
allowing certain other countries to be fully compensated, and (b.2) those
that require all parties to make (some) sacrifices. This provides a set of
two versions of an initial incomplete treaty, (I) to include only countries of
type b.2 (which all agree to make sacrifices), and (II) to include countries of
type a and b.I. These two versions can be interpreted as (I) a treaty among
some or all ICs only, and (II) a treaty among some DCs and some, or most,
of the ICs. Here, we focus on allocation principles for the perhaps more
interesting case of a type II treaty, since it involves a broader spectrum of
countries, including also DCs.
Then, a treaty of type II would be one in which DCs are (at least) fully
compensated (as in the initial phase ofthe Montreal Protocol). In Bohm and
Larsen (1993), two versions of this principle are used and will be used here
as well: (1) where DCs are allowed to remain on their estimated baseline (or
"business-as-usual") emissions path, which would benefit them if a quota
trade were to open up, and (2) where the allocations are estimated to keep
DCs fully compensated (plus some minimal incentive to make them prefer
to join the treaty). Obviously, for reasons mentioned in connection with
our discussion of JI, these estimates will not be easily agreed upon. Still, it
is assumed here that, given negotiations setting out from any of these two
principles, some decision on emission levels for a set of DCs would event ually
198 Peter Bohm
1
/Gross MAC
'I
----------- ...
•Net ICMAC:
I
I
1
1
1
1
I~
.... 1
....
~
Emission reduction % (El'-E1)/E?
Figure 9.1. Schematic marginal abatement costs for an industrial country
and a developing country.
be arrived at, and henceforth their emissions would have to stay within the
(post-quota trade) levels.
As already mentioned, all costs associated with treaties to be discussed
here will be borne by the rcs. Although our subsequent analysis does not
require any specific burden-sharing principle among the rcs, we may assume,
to fix ideas, that a fair allocation among the countries which share the costs
is one where costs amount to the same percentage of GDP (Bohm and
Larsen, 1994).
The incomplete treaties to be discussed are all such that carbon tariffs
or similar actions are taken by the signatories to prevent any significant
carbon leakage through trade with nonsignatories.
Gross abatement cost functions may generally be seen as setting out
from zero and having marginal abatement costs (MAC) grow at an increas-
ing rate (see Nordhaus, 1991; Bohm and Larsen, 1994). This means that
we disregard the existence of significant "no-regret" (Le., costless ) options
(see the "gross MAC" curve in Figure 9.1).
We assume that rcs have moved farther up along this gross MA C curve
than DCs, typically because fossil fuel use has been reduced more in res,
mainly due to their more stringent actions to reduce domestic pollution
from SOx and NOx emissions from fossil fuel combustion. Then, the net
MAC curve (deducting the national valuations of domestic pollution) will
be steeper for rcs than for DCs. Since the main cost differences between
Efficient Carbon Emission Quota Agreements 199
DCs and ICs can be found in the relative slopes of the MAC functions, we
use linear (net) MAC functions with the slope being steeper for ICs than for
DCs; see the net MAC curve for a typical DC (MACD) and the net MAC
curve for a typical IC (MACI) in Figure 9.1.
9.4.3 Implications of differences in MACs and initial
quota allocations
We set out from a nontradable quota treaty where each IC is constrained
by an emission quota (which, for simplicity, is assumed to be constant over
time), while DCs, being nonsignatories, can emit carbon as they please. We
compare this treaty with two extreme cases of a tradable quota treaty in
which also DCs participate and where, in case 1, their initial quota alloca-
tions equal what they are expected to emit as a maximum under "business-
as-usual" and, in case 2, their initial allocations are such that they would
be fully compensated for their emission commitments.
Without any loss of generality, we limit the discussion to a treaty be-
tween two signatory countries, an IC (indexed I) and a DC (indexed D).
They are assumed to behave as if there were many signatories, where no
country has any significant effect on quota or permit prices p. Country I has
agreed to stay within its quota allocation Et < EP, its (estimated) baseline
emISSIOns.
Case 1
Country D emits carbon equal to its projected maximum baseline emissions;
thus, as an allocation in a TQ treaty, we would have Ets = Eg. Then, total
emissions, ET , from the two countries are here taken to be:
To simplify the arithmetic and diagrammatic presentation, we assume
that Ep = Eg. Then, the net abatement cost function and the net MAC
function for country i can be written, in absolute terms, as
Ci = 1/2 ci(E? - Ei)2; M ACi = ci(E? - EJ,
where E i denotes actual emissions (see Figure 9.1). The total costs of a
nontradable quota (NTQ) and a tradable quota (TQ) treaty are
CNTQ = 1/2 q(EP - Et)2,
CTQ = 1/2 q(EP - E1)2 + 1/2 cD(Eg - EO)2,
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where Ei denotes equilibrium emissions after quota-unit trade. Thus, Ei
and quota-unit price p are determined by the following set of equations,
where equation (9.1) shows the equality in equilibrium between the MAC's
and p, using the fact that quota exports (Eg - ED) = (Ej - Et), quota
imports.
q(EP - Ei) = co(Eg - ED) = co(Ej - Et) = p,
Ej +ED = ET .
This yields
E* _ qEf +coEtI -
q +Co
Aggregate tradability gain G is defined as
G = CNTQ _ CTQ ,
which can be written
(9.1 )
(9.2)
G = ~ [q(EP - Et)2 - co(Eg - EO)2 - q(EP - Ei)2] . (9.3)
Replacing co(Eg - ED) by q(EP - Ei), (see equation (9.1), and (Eg - ED)
by (Ej - Et), the second term becomes -q(EP - Ei)(Ej - Et). Hence,
we obtain
G = l q(EP - Et)(Ej - Et) > 0,
since, by definition,
EP> Ej > Et
(9.4 )
for an Ie signatory. That G > 0 is, of course, the obvious effect of opening
up a new kind of trade. The gain is shown by the shaded triangle in the box
diagram of Figure 9.2, where emissions from country I are read from left
to right and emissions from country D are read in the opposite direction;
the reduction in total emissions is shown by shrinking the box by EP - Et,
making the MACI and MACo curves between Ep and Et reflect quota
demand and supply, respectively, on the international quota trade market.
The effect on G of increased marginal abatement costs for country I,
given by an increase in q, equals
aG lOA [* A aEj]
-a = -(EI - EI ) (EI - EI ) +q-a > 0,q 2 q (9.5)
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Figure 9.2. Tradable quotas for an industrial country and a developing
country.
sInce
oE*
__r
ocr
co(Ef - Et) 0
(cr +CO)2 > .
This means that increased MAGs for an Ie must increase the gains from
making quotas tradable. Diagrammatically, this can be seen from Figure
9.3a, where a higher cr means that both the base and the height of the G
triangle increase when cr increases. Setting out from a case where cr = Co,
equation (9.5) also shows (a) the effect of making cr larger than cd and (b)
the effect of further increases in cr (e.g., when country I takes actions for
domestic reasons that indirectly reduce carbon emissions).
Obviously, both I and D gain from opening up the quota trade, i.e.,
Gi > O(i = I, D). Net gains for D equals D's quota sales p(Ei - Et) minus
abatement costs; i.e., using (9.1), we have
Go (Ei - Et)co(Ei - Et) - ~co(Ei - Et)2
quota sales quota price abatement costs
1 (* A)22 CD Er - Er > O.
Using equation (9.1), we may rewrite equation (9.6) as
(9.6)
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Figure 9.3. Effects of increased marginal abatement costs on tradability
gains.
Go = cr(Ej - Et)(EP - En > O. (9.6')
(9.7)
(9.8)
Similarly, using equations (9.4) and (9.6'), we have country I's gain as
G-Go
~ cr(EP - Et)(Ej - Et) - ~ cr(Ej - Et)(EP - En2 2
1 (* A)22 cr E I - E I > O.
Thus, GI 2: Go for cr 2: cd. Since
oEj co(EP - Et)
-- = > 0,
ocr (q + cO)2
we also have that Go grows with cr, as illustrated in Figure 9.3b.
The effects of increases in cd are less obvious for the case where cd
remains lower than cr. Deriving equation (9.2) with respect to cd, we get
oEj cr(Et - EP)
---- = < o.
oco (cr +coP
Thus, it follows from (9.4) and (9.7) that both
oG < 0 and oGI < O.
oco oco
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Table 9.1. Effects of increases in MAGs where Et = E T - EB and CI > CD.
Case 1: EB = Eg (ET constant) .
Effect of increase
in cost ...
aSince CI > CD.
. .. on tradability gains
G G1
>0 >0
<0 <0
+ Go
>0
> oa
Given equations (9.6') and (9.8), it looks as if CD could either grow or
fall with CD. To follow what happens in terms of Figures 9.2 or 9.3, we can
note that CD would obviously be at a maximum (for a given CJ) if
Ei - Et = EP - Ej.
This equality holds, as can be seen from equation (9.2), rewritten as
cD(Ei - EP) = CJ(EP - En, only if CD = CJ. However, since we now have
that CD < CJ, equation (9.2) implies that
Ej - Et > EP - Ej.
Hence, given equation (9.8), the effect of CD on CD has a unique and
positive sign (which, of course, is what we would find from the first derivative
of equation (9.6') with respect to CD, although this is less transparent in
terms of Figures 9.2 and 9.3). Thus,
{)CD
-() > O.
CD
To sum up, we have for case 1 that, given CD, the higher the costs in
the ICs, the larger will be the gain for DCs (and ICs) from making quotas
tradable; thus, DCs gain from the fact that abatement costs are higher in
ICs. In addition, an increased value of fossil fuel use in a DC and, hence, an
increase in MAGs in such a country, given its estimated maximum baseline
emissions, will further increase the DC's tradability gain, given that MAGs
are higher in ICs (see Table 9.1).
Gase 2
In this case, we have a different allocation principle for a TQ treaty from
that in case 1. Here, the initial allocation to country D is smaller than
its estimated maximum baseline emissions, Eg; it is small enough to be
(approximately) equal to
EB = ~ (Eg - ED).
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Figure 9.4. Tradability gain for an industrial country in case 2.
This means that, given (approximate) estimates of the equilibrium
quota unit price and MA Co, an initial allocation is sought where coun-
try D would be kept fully compensated, i.e., remaining on the same GDP
level as in the case of a NTQ treaty (where ED = Eg). (This can be seen in
Figure 9.4, where the initial allocation EB implies that country D (a) has
costs equal to area EgEB F for reducing its emissions to its initial allocation,
and (b) receives compensating profits by selling emission reductions down
to ED.) Assuming that country D can be persuaded to join a treaty only if
kept at least fully compensated, this case represents the opposite extreme to
case 1. Here, all tradability gains would go to country I (which is the only
party making a net payment), except perhaps for some (constant) minimum
incentive premium to country D to make this county prefer to participate,
as was suggested above.
CNTQ is the same as before, since Et remains as in the previous case,
and country D, by assumption, makes no emission reduction in a NTQ
treaty. CTQ and the size of the tradability gain going to country I depend
on how the quota allocation to I is determined. Here, total emissions (ET )
remain the same as in case 1 and hence, Et = E T - EB. If so, country I
would benefit from both an increased initial allocation and the tradability
gain under the TQ system; see the shaded area in Figure 9.4. Since E T is
unchanged, the only difference from case 1 is that initial allocations between
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I and D are shifted from Eg to E~ in Figure 9.4. Obviously, the higher q
is, the larger this gain will be. Hence,
oG = oGl > O.
oq oq
Similarly, it is obvious that
oG = oGl < O.
oco oco
In contrast with case 1, a distinction must now be made between ex
ante and ex post changes in q and Co for the case of country D. Obviously,
by the construction of the allocation principle for this country, it will be
kept fully compensated for ex ante changes in the MAGs. For increases in
MAG ex post, it can be seen from Figure 9.4 that country D would gain
from a larger q but lose from a larger CD, This means that, for country 0
to be certain of being fully compensated, the allocation to D must be based
on an upper bound to the estimated cd.
More relevant, perhaps, is the case where country I's NTQ emission
target, Et, remains intact (case 2'). Since the effects on G l can now be
shown to be ambiguous (although always positive), let us concentrate on
the effect on Go, which is more important here. Since Et is kept intact,
the MA Go curve in Figure 9.4 must be shifted to the left by an amount
equal to Eg - E~ in equilibrium. For ex ante changes in q and CD, country
D will, by assumption, stilJ be fully compensated. However, for ex post
increases in MAGs, the effects on Go will be the same as in case 2; again,
the initial allocation to country D is given and an increase in q (co) means
an increase in quota demand (decrease in quota supply). Hence, as before,
since an ex post increase in cd would imply a loss for country D, the initial
allocation to this country would have to be based on the upper bound to the
estimates of cd. Obviously, for similar reasons, initial allocations to country
D - in case 2 as well as case 2' - cannot be based on what might turn out
to be an overestimate of q.
The conclusions for cases 2 and 2' to be highlighted here are that, by
construction of the allocation principles, DCs are kept fully compensated
and, hence, their GDPs are not affected by a TQ treaty regardless of the ex
ante estimates of MAGs. In addition, we have seen that DCs would gain
from ex post increases in q. However, since ex post increases in cd would
imply a loss for DCs, their initial allocations must be based on an upper
bound to their estimated MAGs. For similar reasons, the DC allocations
must be based on a lower bound to the estimated IC MAGs. It should
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be added that, in case 2', total emissions will decrease and thus provide a
net benefit to DCs to the extent that they value a decrease in total carbon
emissions.
As a final remark, it should be noted that if, from the outset and before
negotiations reached the point where initial allocations had been decided
upon, an NTQ treaty was considered along with a TQ alternative, the
latter would be to the advantage of DCs in still another respect. As shown
by Bohm (1992), the fact that tradability increases the value of quotas for
those signatories who would end up being exporters of carbon abatement,
typically DCs, and reduces the costs of commitments for those who would
make significant commitments, typically ICs, the former would now want
larger initial allocations and the latter would now more easily accept smaller
initial allocations.
9.5 Conclusions
Quota tradability and joint implementation have been discussed in their
potential roles of improving efficiency of a nontradable quota treaty. In
doing so, we have seen that these two institutions may in fact help DCs or,
more precisely, help IC signatories by helping DCs.
We saw in Section 9.3 that joint implementation (between an IC and
a DC) as an approach to improving the efficiency of a nontradable quota
treaty, has drawbacks, particularly in terms of serious problems of estimat-
ing net emission reductions from individual projects, and hence limiting the
use of low-cost emission abatement in DCs. However, joint implementation
was seen to have significant advantages in two respects: it is known to be
politically acceptable, as shown by the FCCC, and is easy to start up.
In Section 9.4, we set out from the situation where ICs have committed
themselves to emissions levels below their no control baseline, as is the case
for signatories to an NTQ treaty, e.g., a more demanding version of the
FCCC of 1992. Could DCs be attracted to a TQ arrangement with the
IC signatories, so that it would benefit not only the ICs and possibly the
emission reduction targets, but also DCs whose low-cost abatement options
are so important to use in order to attain efficiency in an international
carbon reduction treaty? DCs would, of course, not accept to join such a
treaty unless they are given initial emission allocations that more than fully
compensate them for doing so. If emission allocations are sought where DCs
are compensated, but barely so, we have seen that these allocations must be
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based on an upper bound to the estimated MAGs for DCs and a lower bound
to the estimated MAGs for rcs. More likely, at least for a hypothetical TQ
treaty in the near future, initial allocations to DCs would approach a level
represented by their estimated maximum baseline emissions. If so, we have
seen that DCs would benefit more, the higher the differences in marginal
abatement costs between rcs and DCs. Somewhat surprisingly, we also saw
that, for the case where initial DC allocations are close to the upper bound,
unexpected increases in the value of fossil fuel use in DCs would make their
gain from joining a TQ treaty even larger.
Thus, making nontradable quotas tradable, e.g., those quotas that may
eventually be the result of (more ambitious versions of) the FCCC, and
attracting DCs to participate would allow reductions of carbon emissions
to be conducted in an internationally efficient manner (barring incorrigi-
ble market imperfections in global quota trade). This efficiency gain could
also increase the speed at which an even more ambitious international car-
bon reduction treaty could be arrived at. By contrast, we have seen that
joint implementation may actually reduce the prospects for moving in that
direction.
Notes
[1] For simplicity, we assume here that quotas as well as carbon taxes refer to the
carbon content of fossil fuel and not to the emissions themselves. In a short-
run perspective, this is probably not a severe constraint on the analysis. In the
longer run, however, ways to remove carbon from emissions may become eco-
nomically worthwhile, which require policy instruments to be designed taking
this possibility into account. Then, to provide the appropriate incentives for
R&D of new technologies, a treaty would, in principle, have to be such that
proof of carbon recovery would be credited to firms and countries that employ
such techniques.
[2] The Montreal Protocol allows trade of CFC production quotas generally and
CFC use quotas among countries within the European Community, treated as
one party to the Protocol. (I do not know whether such trade has taken place
to any significant extent.) However, the most important kind of trade, that of
CFC use quotas among all the parties to the Protocol, is not allowed.
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Control of Reciprocal
Transboundary Pollution and
Joint Implementation
Andries Nentjes
Department of Economics and Public Finance
University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
Abstract
International conventions to protect the environment usually have the form of com-
mitments to reduce emission on a reciprocal basis. This chapter analyzes the con-
ditions under which a Pareto-efficient agreement to reduce emissions reciprocally
can be improved by joint implementation. Joint implementation is conceived as
a second phase in which obligations to reduce emissions, which were agreed upon
in the first phase, are exchanged for money. The scope for reciprocal reduction
of emissions and for joint implementation are discussed first for a case where each
government cares for its national environment only, and next for the case where a
government is also willing to pay for improvement of the environment abroad.
Key words: joint implementation, international environmental conventions, re-
ciprocal transboundary pollution.
10.1 Introduction
Despite the lip-service that is paid to the "polluter-pays" principle as a
guideline for settling international environmental relations, the standing
practice is that the state which is the victim of transboundary pollution has
to pay the polluting country to reduce its emissions. Where environmental
spillovers are unilateral the victim can pay a sum of money to compensate
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the polluter for the extra cost of pollution control. The solution could also
be applied when pollution is reciprocal: parties could compensate each other
reciprocally for their extra abatement efforts and the convention combines
obligations to reduce emissions with payments in money. In their analyzes
most economists have taken for granted that countries will proceed accord-
ing to this scheme. Maler (1989, 1990) and Welsch (1993), for example,
take a noncooperative Nash solution as a reference point and compare it
with a Pareto-optimal solution that is realized by allowing money payments
between parties. However, this approach is more normative than positive.
It does not reflect what really happens. International environmental con-
ventions usually take the form of reciprocal promises to restrict emissions.
In other words, countries pay each other with reductions of their national
emissions instead of paying in money. This observation raises the question
of whether a Pareto-optimal agreement in terms of reciprocal reductions of
emissions will result in the same rates of emission reductions and will raise
welfare in participating countries to the same degree as will a treaty that
combines emission reductions with money payments between parties.
In his analysis of international cooperation to reduce emissions of a
global pollutant, Hoel (1991) has shown that indeed there is a difference
between a Pareto optimum attained by reciprocal reductions of emissions
and the outcome of an effort to reduce emissions in such a way that joint
welfare of participating countries is maximized. He does not work out the
full implications of the distinction between the two arrangements. The main
purpose of this chapter is to analyze under which conditions, and to what
extent, the welfare gain from an international agreement to control emissions
reciprocally that has been concluded and ratified can be improved by adding
a second phase in which parties are allowed to recontract, by proposing an
increase or decrease in their obligations to control pollution in exchange for
money. The analysis concentrates on a nonglobal pollutant: the country
where the pollutant is emitted does affect environmental damage in the
countries that are involved in reciprocal pollution. The global pollutant can
be viewed as a special case of this.
The relevance of our model is that it gives the political concept of joint
implementation a proper place in economic theory. Although not explicitly
mentioned, the idea of joint implementation is implicitly part of the UN
Montreal Protocol of September 1987 on substances that deplete the ozone
layer.[l] The concept also pops up in the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (May 1992). In order to curb emissions of greenhouse
gases, parties to the Convention may implement their control policies and
measures jointly with other parties (Article 4.2a). The Convention also
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defines "a mechanism for the provision of financial resources on a grant or
concessional basis" for the implementation of the convention (Articles 11.1
and 5).
As will be shown, joint implementation, conceived as a financial mech-
anism that supplements agreements on reciprocal reductions of emissions,
improves both the cost-effectiveness and environmental effectiveness of the
conventions. Cost-effectiveness of joint implementation implies that a cho-
sen level of environmental quality in country A can be achieved at lower
cost by decreasing emissions in country B and increasing them in country
A. Cost savings in A enable the country to compensate country B for its
extra abatement effort. Environmental effectiveness of joint implementation
means that environmental quality in country A can be improved by addi-
tional reductions of emissions in country B. One can imagine a situation
where the marginal costs of improving environmental quality in A exceed
the perceived marginal benefits in A, whereas country B can do the job at
marginal costs which are below A's marginal benefits. A's environmental
benefits make it worthwhile to compensate B for its additional abatement
costs.
A second issue to be discussed is the way in which the terms of inter-
national contracts to reduce emissions as well as joint implementation are
affected if the government of one country cares for the quality of the envi-
ronment in another country. For example, governments of West European
countries might be willing to contribute to emission reductions in Eastern
Europe because environmental improvements in those countries give bene-
fits to the donor countries. We shall define this as a case of international
environmental care.
This chapter has been inspired by observations of existing practices
and recent innovations in international bargaining on environmental issues,
although the analysis is theoretical. Simplifying assumptions have had to
be made, and the model abstracts from a host of problems that have to
be taken into account in real negotiations and joint implementation. The
following offers an apparatus of thought; not a set of directly applicable
instructions.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.2 gives a survey of the
essential concepts and analyzes the properties of international agreements
based on reciprocal reductions of emissions. In Section 10.3 the scope for
joint implementation in the case of reciprocal transboundary pollution is
discussed. Section 10.4 focuses on how international care affects environ-
mental agreements. Conclusions are presented in Section 10.5.
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10.2 Reciprocal Reductions of Emissions
10.2.1 Introduction
The analysis takes as its starting point two countries. Environmental qual-
ity in each country is affected by its own emissions and (for at least one
of the countries) also by the emissions of the other country. Decisions on
environmental policy are made by the national government. Its perception
and valuation of the environmental problem are caught in a simple sepa-
rable utility function generally used (e.g., Maler, 1990; Hoel, 1991) of the
form Wi = Bi(ri) - Ci(Zi), with i = 1,2. For country 1, B 1 represents the
benefits from reducing the pollution load (rI) and C1 the costs of emission
reduction (zd. The concept of environmental benefits does not necessarily
imply that benefits can be measured accurately and "translated" into money
terms. What is meant here is benefits in a subjective sense; it is assumed
that the political body is willing to pay for environmental improvement.
Environmental benefit and cost functions are twice differentiable with de-
creasing marginal benefits and increasing marginal costs. Reductions of
emissions and pollution loads are connected through the transmission re-
lations rl = rl(zl,z2) and r2 = r2(zl,z2). The transmission functions are
specified in a linear form: rl = allZl + a12z2 and r2 = a21Z1 +a22Z2; where
all, a12, a21 and a22 are the transmission coefficients. This specification im-
plies that we consider nonuniformly dispersed (nonglobal) pollutants, such
as acidifying emissions.
10.2.2 Noncooperative Nash equilibrium
Each of the governments pursues the national interest as it sees it. In
the economic approach such behavior is styHzed by maximizing the gov-
ernment's utility function under the constraint of the relevant transmission
equation. When there is no cooperation between governments, and each
government considers the level of emissions and the emission reduction of
its neighbor as given, the condition for the noncooperative Nash equilibrium
is derived by maximizing the Lagrange functions:
L 1 = B1(rI) - C1(zI) + >'1(rl - allZl - a12 z2),
L2 = B 2(r2) - C2(Z2) + >'2(r2 - a21 z1 - a22 z2).
The first-order conditions are:
(10.1)
(10.2)
(10.3)
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Figure 10.1. Noncooperative Nash equilibrium.
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(10.4 )
Each government controls its emissions up to the point where marginal
costs are equal to the marginal internal, or national environmental benefits.
Equations (10.3) and (10.4) are both functions in Zl,Z2 the so-called reac-
tion functions. By substituting the transmission functions in the first-order
conditions, and taking the total differential, the sign and magnitude of the
reaction coefficients can be found. For country 1 the reaction coefficient is:
(10.5)
If country 2 intensifies its emission reduction effort, country 1 will react
by reducing its abatement effort (and by increasing its emissions). The
reaction curve of country 1 is represented by curve R 1 in Figure 10.1; R 2
is the reaction curve of country 2.[2] The noncooperative Nash equilibrium
is presented in Figure 10.1 by the point N, which is the intersection of the
two reaction curves (10.3) and (10.4).
10.2.3 Pareto efficiency
Both countries can improve their welfare by coordinating their pollution
control policies. Country 1 can offer to raise its emission reduction effort
on the condition that country 2 follows the same line of action. The effect
will be that country 1 gets a greater reduction of pollution load in return
for an extra unit of emission reduction than it would have had under the
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Figure 10.2. Cooperative Nash equilibrium.
noncooperative policy regime. The same holds true for country 2. There
is room to contract a reciprocal increase in emission reductions from which
both countries will derive net benefits. This is shown in Figure 10.2. WI
is the iso-welfare curve or iso-net benefit curve of country 1.[3J Any point
in the area above WI constitutes higher welfare for country 1 than points
on the iso-welfare curve and therefore is preferred to points on WI. Figure
10.2 also shows the iso-welfare curve for country 2, Vf!2' Points to the right
of W 2 are preferred to points on the curve. The contract area, enclosed by
curves WI and W 2 is the set of all possible combinations of zl, Z2 which are
Pareto-superior to N.
The first-order condition for a Pareto-optimum is derived by maximizing
the Lagrange function:
L = B1(rl) - C1(Zl) + Al(rl - allzl - a12 z2)
+JLd(W2 - B2(r2) + C2(Z2)J + A2(r2 - a21 z1 - a22z2).
The first-order conditions are:
C~ = allB~ - JLla2lB~,
C~ = a22B~ - 1/JLlaI2B~.
(10.6)
(10.7)
(10.8)
Equations (10.7) and (10.8) state that for a Pareto optimum the
transboundary benefits of pollution control have to be taken into account
alongside the national or internal benefits. The Lagrange multiplicator is
-JLl > 0; this implies that in the Pareto optimum CL C~ and consequently
ZI, Z2 will be larger than in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium.[4J
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q - al1B~
a12B~ C' B"2 - a22 2 (10.9)
which is one equation with two variables ZI, Z2. This reminds us that
the Pareto optimum consists of a range of combinations ZI, Z2. If nego-
tiations concentrate on reciprocal emission reductions and no money pay-
ments are involved, the range of Pareto-efficient solutions is represented
by the contract curve RS in Figure 10.2, bounded by the restrictions
WI 2: WI, W2 2: W 2; where W is the level of net benefits in the nonco-
operative Nash equilibrium.
From equation (10.9) it follows that
al2B~dz2 = -(C~ - anBDdzl,
a21B~dzl = -(C~ - a22B~)dz2,
(10.9a)
(10.9b)
The right-hand side of (10.9a) represents the marginal net cost of in-
creasing ZI for country 1; the left-hand side states the marginal benefits
country 1 gets in return through the increase in Z2 by country 2. In short,
(10.9a) and (10.9b) state that in the Pareto optimum of reciprocal reduc-
tions, the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits of the bargain for each
of the two countries.
However, from the first-order conditions (10.7) and (10.8) it also follows
that in the Pareto optimum of reciprocal emission reductions the following
set of equalities is possible:
a21B~ > C~ - anB~
C~ - a22B~ > a12B~
(10.7a)
(10.8a)
In words, it could be that the marginal transboundary benefits for coun-
try 2 arising from pollution control in country 1 exceed the marginal net
costs of emission reductions in country 1; simultaneously, the marginal ben-
efits in country 1 of Z2 are lower than the net marginal cost of Z2 for country
2. The situation is illustrated in Figure 10.3 by the pair M ZI ,M z2 and sug-
gests that further improvements in welfare in both countries are possible
by increasing ZI and decreasing Z2. However, once the Pareto optimum of
reciprocal emission reductions has been realized, such a reshuffling is not
possible since it would be in conflict with the conditions (10.9a) and (10.9b).
For example, increasing ZI would increase the net costs of country 1 and
reducing Z2 would decrease its benefits.
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Figure 10.3. From cooperative Nash equilibrium to joint maximum
benefit.
10.2.4 Market equilibrium
Where countries 1 and 2 negotiate on the size of their emission reductions
the ratio Zl / Zz defines the quantity of emission reductions country 1 can
get in return from country 2 when it reduces its emissions by 1 unit: the
ratio zz/Zl constitutes the rate of exchange or price of the "goods" (emission
reductions) that are traded.
A possible procedure for finding an equilibrium solution within the range
of Pareto-efficient solutions, that is, a point on the contract curve, would
be the introduction of a market for the two goods. A perfectly competitive
market could be simulated if the negotiating parties accept as a third party
an auctioneer who announces price ratios and if each negotiator would take
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the price ratio as given and reveal the true amount of emissions control it
is willing to offer at the price proposed by the auctioneer. Under these con-
ditions it is possible to derive an offer curve for each of the two negotiators
and a market-clearing equilibrium at the point where the two offer curves
intersect.
The behavior of each negotiator under the market regime is modeled
by maximization of its utility function under the constraint of a given price
ratio. The Lagrange functions are:
L1 = B1(rd - C1(zd + A1(rl - allz1 - a1271"1 z,),
L2 = B 2(r2) - C2(Z2) + A2(r2 - a2l7l"2 Z2 - a22 z2),
(10.10)
(10.11)
where 71"1 is the price ratio Z2/Z1 and 71"2(= 1/7I"d the price ratio ZI/Z2.
The constraint r1 - (all +a1271"dz1 implies that in deciding on its emission
reduction, country 1 accounts for the direct impact of that reduction on
the pollution load at home (that is, allz,) and also for the indirect impact,
since country 2 responds by offering Z2 at a given ratio 71"1, which reduces
the pollution load in country 1 by a1271"1Zl (= a12z2). The same type of
argument holds for country 2. The first-order conditions are:
C~ = (all + a1271"dB~,
C~ = (a22 + a2l7l"2)B~.
(10.12)
(10.13)
Equations (10.12) and (10.13) are functions in Zl, Z2. They can be
interpreted as offer curves. Figure 10.4 gives a graphical derivation of the
offer curve for country 1 as a series of points of tangency of successive price
lines and iso-welfare curves. In the same way, the offer curve for country
2 can be derived. The two offer curves and their point of intersection,
that is the market equilibrium M, are shown in Figure 10.5.[5] Within
the range of possible price ratios an equilibrium rate of exchange 71"]' exists.
Mathematically, the price ratio that follows from (10.12) and (10.13) is:
(10.14)
A comparison with (10.9) reveals that the market equilibrium satisfies
the conditions for Pareto efficiency in the case of reciprocal reduction of
emissions. Equation (10.14) also shows that a finite price> 0 is possible
only if transboundary pollution is reciprocal (a2l and a12 > 0), if there
are (politically perceived) positive marginal environmental benefits in both
countries, and abatement technologies are available at finite marginal costs.
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Figure 10.4. Offer curve of country 1.
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Figure 10.5. Market equilibrium of reciprocal reduction.
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Reciprocal transboundary pollution may be very asymmetric, but this does
not prevent a deal with a finite rate of exchange being struck.
It should be remembered that the market solution as a particular case
of the range of cooperative Nash solutions is possible only if the negotiating
parties accept the rules of the game by adjusting their emission reductions
offers to the prices mentioned by the auctioneer and do not behave strategi-
cally. There is strategic behavior if negotiators try to influence the market
price through their offers of emission reductions. For example, country 1
could understate its willingness to control emissions at given prices if it
expects that this will raise the market equilibrium price in its favor. The
result would be that the market equilibrium is not a point on the curve
of Pareto-efficient solutions. The assumption that parties do not behave
strategically limits the applicability of our "market model" to real-world
cases. The usefulness of the concept of market equilibrium is that it fixes a
point on the contract curve and provides a focus for the outcome of negoti-
ations on reciprocal reductions of emissions. In the next section the market
equilibrium concept will function as a point of reference that is needed for
an analysis of the scope for joint implementation.
10.3 Joint Implementation
10.3.1 Introduction
The Pareto efficiency condition (10.9) is derived for a situation where the
welfare of two countries can only be increased by exchanging reductions
of emissions. In this section it will be demonstrated that Pareto-efficient
outcomes with larger welfare gains for both countries become feasible by
introducing an extra means of exchange that has utility for both parties.
Let the means of exchange be international money. The variables Y1 , Y2 are
inserted in the welfare functions; where Y1 is the revenue received by coun-
try 1, and Y2 is the revenue of country 2. Joint revenue is constrained in
the sense that revenue for country 1 is expenditure for country 2, and vice
versa; i.e., +Y1 = - Y2 • A welfare function in the form Wi = Bi - Ci ± Yi im-
plies that all these components are expressed in international money units.
The use of international money makes it feasible to compensate a country
that increases its pollution control, which will decrease its net environmen-
tal benefits, by increasing its real income. In the other country real income
is reduced, but this can be compensated by higher transboundary environ-
mental benefits and lower net costs of pollution control, brought about by
lowering its abatement.
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10.3.2 Pareto efficiency
The first-order conditions for Pareto efficiency with payments are derived
by maximizing the Lagrange function:
L = BI(rt} - CI(ZI) + YI + III {W2 - B2(r2) + C2(Z2) - Y2}
+AI(rl - aUzI - a12Z2) + A2(r2 - a21 z1 - anZ2) +
8(YI +Y2 ). (10.15)
The first-order conditions are:
(10.16)
(10.17)
The two unknown variables Zl, Z2 can be solved from equations (10.16)
and (10.17); these equations are special cases of (10.7) and (10.8), with
-Ill = 1. In other words, a Pareto-efficient solution of emission reductions
with money transfers must be a point on the Pareto efficiency curve with
emission reductions as the only active variables. Therefore, finding Pareto-
efficient solutions with money payments can be interpreted as a movement
along the Zl, Z2 Pareto efficiency curve, which is the dotted curve through R
and S in Figures 10.2 and 10.5. The welfare of each country is interpreted
as the sum of its net willingness to pay for a clean environment plus real
income. Starting from a point on the curve RS, for example, M (Figure
10.5), it is possible to assess whether a movement along the curve, which
changes the combination (Zl' Z2), increases the net environmental benefits
of, say, government 1 by more or by less than it decreases welfare of country
2. If the country whose net environmental benefits increase can and does
compensate fully the country whose net environmental benefits decrease by
means of a side payment in money, both parties can agree on the move
along the contract curve. In this way the Pareto optimum with money
transfers can be found. It should be noted that since international money is
involved it cannot be excluded that the Pareto optimum is a point beyond
the disagreement point R or S on the curve through Rand S in Figure 10.5.
This is so since a country whose welfare is in danger of being reduced below
the welfare of the Nash noncooperative equilibrium because of its increased
costs of pollution control, can be compensated in money.
An alternative way to clarify the impact of money payments on emission
reduction is shown in Figure 10.3. As the market equilibrium of recipro-
cal emission reductions without money payments, we have M Zl, M Z2, with
Control of Reciprocal Transboundary Pollution 221
B~(MZI,MZ2) > q(MzI) - B~(MzI,Mz2). This implies that country 2 is
willing to pay country 1 in money for increasing its level of abatement. Si-
multaneously, country 2 could reduce its own level of emission control, save
abatement costs and set money free for compensating country 1 for both its
net marginal cost of increasing Zl and for its loss of transboundary marginal
benefits arising from country 2's decrease in pollution control. This is pos-
sible since C~(MZ2) - B~(MzI,Mz2) > BUMzI,Mz2). The Pareto optimum
with money payments is attained at zi, zi, where the two inequalities change
into equalities.[6]
In the real world agreements on reductions of transboundary pollution
usually fix the size of emission reductions for each party to the agreement.
The above analysis makes it clear that, even if a Pareto-optimal solution
were to be realized, such a best of all possible contracts in terms of recip-
rocal reductions leaves scope for additional gains in net benefits for both
parties by allowing recontracting, taking the commitments to control emis-
sions reciprocally as a starting point. In this second phase obligations to
reduce emissions are exchanged for money. Joint implementation clauses
in recent international conventions on climate change and reductions of
CFCs indicate that policy makers are beginning to discover the limitations
of reciprocal reductions and the possibility of welfare gains by reallocating
pollution control among countries in exchange for payment in money.
From (10.14) it follows that in a special case where pollution control cost
and benefit functions in the two countries are identical and their internal
pollution coefficients all, a22, as well as their pollution import coefficients
a12, a21, are equal then, the exchange ratio z21 Zl = 1 in the case of reciprocal
reductions of emissions. Both countries reduce their emissions by the same
amount. From (10.16) and (10.17) it appears that in this case of symmetrical
transboundary pollution between countries with identical welfare functions,
there is no scope for joint implementation since the joint maximum welfare
can be attained by reciprocal reductions of emissions. This result illustrates
that in the case of Pareto-optimal contracts of reciprocal emission reduc-
tions, joint implementation can be viewed as an instrument that corrects
for differences in cost and benefit functions together with asymmetries in
transboundary pollution.
10.3.3 Market equilibrium
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that there exists a Pareto op-
timum with money payments, although it does not say how it can be
found. One possible solution is to simulate a perfectly competitive market
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(10.18)
(10.19)
by introducing an auctioneer who announces prices. The difference from the
market solution discussed in Section 10.2.4 is that the use of money makes
it feasible to split up the negotiations on Zl, Z2 into separate decisions on
Zl and Z2' The auctioneer operates on and coordinates two "markets": for
Zt the price is tt, and for Z2 the price is t2. The rule of the game is that
at the announced price tt, country 1 reports how many units of Zt it is
willing to offer, or to withdraw from the market compared with the initial
situation; country 2 states how many units Zl it demands, because of the
transboundary environmental benefits they create. The demand of country
2 can be positive or negative. Mutatis mutandis, the supply of and demand
for Z2 are discovered in the same way.
Formally, the problem is solved as follows. Let Tt be the money payment
received by country 1 with Tt == ttZt, where tt is the compensation in
money received per unit of emissions reduced. T2 == t2z2 is the sum paid by
country 1 and received by country 2. Both countries maximize their welfare,
including net transfers. Maximization of the Lagrange equations
L t == Bt(rd - Ct(zd + ttZt - t2 z2 + At(rt - anZt - at2z2),
L2 == B2(r2) - C2(Z2) + ttZt - t2z2 + A2(rl - a2t Zt - a22 z2),
gives the first-order conditions:
anB~ - C~ == tt, (10.20)
a21B~ == tt, (10.21)
a22B~ - C~ == t2, (10.22)
at2B~ == t2. (10.23)
Equation (10.20) defines the supply of Zt by country 1, and (10.21)
the demand of country 2 for Zt; (10.22) and (10.23) are the supply of and
demand for Z2. From the four equations that define the market equilibrium,
the four unknown values tt, t2, Zt and Z2 can be solved. In other words, there
exists a price vector tt, t2 where the demand for Zt, Z2 equals the supply, The
conditions for a market equilibrium with money payments also satisfy the
condition for a Pareto optimum with money payments. This can be verified
by substituting (10.21) in (10.20) and (10.23) in (10.22).
The reader should keep in mind that the analysis rests on the same
behavioral assumptions as the analysis of Section 10.2.4: parties accept an
auctioneer and reveal their true preferences. An alternative adjustment
mechanism that claims not to be sensitive to strategic behavior is given by
Chander and Tulkens (1990, 1992).
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One can imagine that countries that consider joint implementation have
an objective in mind that is less ambitious than maximizing net benefits.
Instead it could be cost-effectiveness: negotiators set out to reallocate the
initial result from reciprocal reduction (M Zl, MZ2) in such a way that the
joint costs of pollution control are minimized under the constraint that
the pollution loads (M rl , M r2 ) that result from the agreement on reciprocal
reductions of emissions do not increase. Klaassen et at. (1994) and F0fsund
and Naevdal (Chapter 11) discuss procedures for finding the cost minimum
for n countries by way of successive bilateral negotiations. In this section
we only wish to assess whether a Pareto optimum that (by assumption)
has emerged from negotiations on reciprocal reductions of emissions leaves
scope for joint implementation geared to cost-effectiveness.
The cost minimum is found by maximizing the function
L
-CI(ZI) - C2(Z2) + AI(r1 - anZI - a12 z2)
+A2(f2 - a2lz1 - a22 z2), (10.24)
where rl, r2 are the concentrations of pollutants that follow from the emis-
sion reductions that have been agreed. It should be noted that the pollution
constraints have the form of inequalities. The first-order condition is:
C'I
C'2
-Alan - A2a21
-Ala21 - A2a22 '
(10.25)
where -AI, -A2 are the shadow prices of reducing the pollution loads in
countries 1 and 2, respectively.[7]
Neither the Pareto efficiency condition (10.9), nor the market solution
for reciprocal emission reductions (10.14), do meet the condition for cost-
efficiency. This implies that even if negotiations on reciprocal reductions
of emissions have led to a Pareto-efficient agreement there is still room left
for the reallocation of obligations to reduce emissions between countries in
order to realize the same environmental benefits against lower cost. Again
this would ask for joint implementation. The country with relatively low
marginal abatement costs (say country 1) can take over the obligation to
reduce emissions from country 2, which has relatively high marginal abate-
ment costs, and can receive compensation for its additional costs from the
country that can increase its emissions. This case is illustrated in Figure
10.6. The total costs of pollution control are lowered (represented by a
downward shift of the iso-cost curve) by substituting the initial uniform
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Figure 10.6. Cost-effective joint implementation.
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distribution .2'1,.2'2 by z;, z2' The binding receptor Tl defines the trade ratio;
dz2/dz1 = -all/al2. In the example, the pollution load in country 1 and
consequently its total environmental benefits remain constant. In country
2 the pollution load decreases and total environmental benefits increase. In
this specific case country 2 has a double motive to pay country 1: lower
costs as well as higher benefits.
10.4 International Environmental Care
10.4.1 Introduction
In this section we stick to the assumption that transboundary pollution is
reciprocal, but drop the assumption that all countries are interested only
in their own national environment and cost levels. It will be assumed that
some countries are concerned about environmental quality in other coun-
tries. A major reason why the inhabitants of one country might care about
environmental quality abroad could be their "selfish" interest in the conser-
vation of nature or landscapes in other countries, which they can enjoy as
tourists or by way of the media. A second reason could be genuine altruistic
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care for the quality of life abroad. The existence of such preferences could
mean that the government of country 2 cares about the pollution load (rd
in country 1.
10.4.2 Reciprocal reductions of emissions
If country 2 does care for the environment in country 1 then the environ-
mental extra-territorial benefits of pollution control have to be added to the
environmental benefits realized in country 2 itself. The welfare function of
country 2 then takes the form:
(10.26)
where IB2(rd represents the extra-territorial environmental benefits, or in-
ternational environmental care. The introduction of international environ-
mental care changes the noncooperative solution. If country 2 considers
pollution control by country 1 as given, then the maximization of
B 2(r2) + IB2(rl) - C2(Z2) + Al(rl - allzl - a12 z2)
+A2( r2 - a12 z1 - a22 z2)
gives as the first-order condition:
C~ = a22B~ + a121B~.
(10.27)
(10.28)
A comparison with (10.4) reveals that for any given level of Zl marginal
cost C~ and consequently Z2 will be higher than they would be without
environmental care. This implies that the inclusion of altruistic preferences
makes the reaction curve R2 shift upward. Since country 1 maximizes its
own welfare function with national benefits, only its reaction curve will not
change position. Consequently, the Nash noncooperative solution will shift
with Z2 higher and Zl lower than in the case without environmental care
(see also Hoel, 1991).
The existence of international environmental care also affects the co-
operative solution. If countries 1 and 2 were to negotiate on reciprocal
reductions of emissions and to behave as price takers, then the offer curve
for country 2 can be derived from maximizing
L2 B 2(r2) + IB2(rl) - C2(Z2) + Al(rl - all1l"2r2 - a12 z2)
+A2(r2 - a211l"2Z2 - anZ2), (10.29)
from which we have
( 10.30)
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Figure 10.7. Market equilibrium with environmental care.
From (10.30) it follows that
C' B' IB'11"2 = Zl = 2 - a22 2 - al2 2 (10.31)
Z2 a21B~ +alIIB~
The properties that -aI2IB~ < 0 and alllB~ > 0 imply that for a given
price 11"2 the term (C~ - a22B~) must be larger, and/or that A21B~ must be
smaller than they are in equation (10.14). Therefore, the supply of Z2 by
country 2 and its demand for Zl are higher than they would have been with-
out international environmental preferences. This implies a shift in country
2's offer curve from 02e to 02c, as indicated in Figure 10.7. International
environmental care means that at each given level of Zl, country 2 is will-
ing to offer a higher level of pollution control than it would have done if
extra-territorial environmental benefits did not exist.
For country 1 the offer curve is specified by the equation
From (10.30) and (10.12) it follows that
Z2 C~ - allB~ 1 a21B~ +alllB~
- = 11" I = ----0-_-'-----0-
Zl a12B~ 11"2 C~ - (a22B~ +aI2IB~)
(10.12)
(10.32)
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Country 2's greater willingness to control pollution (compared with
preferences for the national environment only) means that in the market
equilibrium the exchange ratio changes to the advantage of country 1, as
Figure 10.7 shows. It may be a surprise that the existence of environmental
care raises the abatement effort of the donor country. The background is
that to increase emission reductions at home is also a method to improve
environmental quality in the neighboring country.
The general conclusion is that preferences for the environment abroad
shift the burden of pollution control to the country with international envi-
ronmental care. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium its pollution con-
trol will be higher and, starting from that position, its willingness to offer
pollution control at given exchange rates is higher too. The other country
that is the object of environmental care will start from a lower noncooper-
ative level of pollution control but this is compensated partly or perhaps
even more than that by its higher level of abatement in the market solution
induced by the more favorable rate of exchange.
10.4.3 Joint implementation
We are particularly interested in the improvements that could be brought
about by joint implementation. Similar to the case with only preferences
for the environment at home, there is no guarantee that with international
environmental care the market solution of reciprocal reductions coincides
with the Pareto-efficient outcome if money payments are used. The first-
order conditions for a Pareto optimum with money payments are:
all(B~ + IB~) + a21 B~ = C;,
a12(B~ + IB~) + a22B~ = C~.
(10.33)
(10.34 )
Compared with the case of purely national preferences [equations
(10.16) and (10.17)], the term IB~ is added at the benefit side of the
first-order conditions. This implies that both Zl and Z2 are higher than
they would have been without international environmental care. Usually
all > a12; ceteris paribus the additional pollution control, compared with
(10.17) and (10.18), is mainly realized by a higher Zl and not so much by
higher Z2.
If country 2 is a rich country with high (subjective) national environ-
mental marginal benefits there is a fair chance that in the market equilibrium
of reciprocal emission reductions, its marginal costs of pollution control ex-
ceed the joint environmental benefits (represented by MZ2 in Figure 10.3).
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Care for the environment in the neighboring country raises Z2 even further.
Under these conditions it is to be expected that under the joint implementa-
tion scheme the caring country 2 will pay country 1 to increase its pollution
control and to accept a decrease in pollution control in country 2.
10.5 Conclusion
In the case of reciprocal transboundary pollution the possibilities to reduce
emissions on a reciprocal basis can be constrained by differences in the costs
and benefits of pollution control between countries, together with asymme-
tries in transboundary pollution. If the "purchase" of additional reductions
of emissions abroad, by offering extra pollution control at home, is too ex-
pensive, because of the high net costs of pollution control, a country may
still have the option to offer money in exchange for emission reductions to
countries with relatively low marginal costs of pollution control and low
internal environmental marginal benefits.
The ultimate cooperative equilibrium position can be realized by way of
a procedure that consists of two steps. In the first step the negotiations have
the form of reciprocal reductions of emissions, and the best possible (Pareto-
optimal) solution that is feasible within the constraints of this procedure can
be sought. The next step consists of reallocation of pollution control which
is such that some parties increase their abatement of emissions and are paid
for doing so by the countries which decrease their abatement effort.
This procedure allows us to give the political concept of joint imple-
mentation a place in economic theory. Negotiations usually concentrate on
reciprocal reductions of emissions. Only recently have countries discovered
the advantages of the second step, that is, revising the emission allocations
of the first step and allowing payment in money to bring about the realloca-
tion of obligations for control pollution. This is what joint implementation
is in essence. In the real world, joint implementation might be a device for
correcting inefficiencies in the initial allocation of reciprocal emission reduc-
tions, for example, when reduction is equiproportional. In this chapter it
was shown that even if the initial allocation was Pareto-optimal, there is
generally scope for further improvement in the joint implementation stage.
The conclusions do not change if there exists international environmen-
tal care. The caring country can encourage additional reductions of emis-
sions in the country for whose environment it cares, by offering that country
a more favorable rate of exchange in the negotiations on reciprocal reduc-
tions of emissions. As a complement, the country that cares can improve
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the efficiency of reciprocal reductions in the joint implementation stage by
proposing payments for additional reductions of emissions in the country it
cares for, and simultaneously increases emissions at home.
The analysis of international care leads to the conclusion that its exis-
tence does not necessarily demand a special kind of subsidy. The desired
outcomes can be realized in the process of negotiation on reciprocal reduc-
tions of emissions. Joint implementation is an instrument for making the
agreement more Pareto-efficient, just as it is when environmental care does
not exist. This implies that in the simple case discussed in this chapter
there is no need to take account of environmental care by way of special
financial arrangements different from the joint implementation mechanism
that functions between countries that care only for their own national en-
vironments.
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Notes
[1] According to Article 2.5 countries which are relatively small producers of CFCs
are allowed to transfer to or receive from any other party to the Protocol pro-
duction in excess of its limits, provided that the combined levels or production
of the parties concerned do not exceed the production limit. Article 2.8 allows
consumer countries which are members of a recognized regional economic in-
tegration unit to fulfill their obligations jointly with respect to consumption,
provided their total combined consumption remains below the required limits.
[2] The negative reaction will be stronger, the higher the pollution import coeffi-
cient (a12 for country 1) and the sharper the increase of marginal abatement
costs relative to the decline in marginal benefits.
[3] To the right of point N the WI curve is increasing: any increase in Zl increases
pollution control costs; in order to raise environmental benefits in such a way
that net benefits in country 1 remain constant, country 2 would have to increase
its level of pollution control as well. Increasing marginal costs in country 1
mean that country 2 would have to raise Z2 increasingly in order to provide
the necessary additional environmental benefits. To the left of point N, net
environmental benefits of country 1 are reduced by decreasing Zl because the
loss of environmental benefits exceeds the savings on pollution control costs.
In order to keep WI constant country 2 has to increase its level of pollution
control.
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[4] The concepts of Nash noncooperative equilibrium and Pareto equilibrium are by
now part of common wisdom in the analysis of international pollution problems;
see Pethig (1982); Nentjes and Wiersma (1984); Nentjes (1990); Hoel (1991).
[5] The model of a market equilibrium for n countries is given in Nentjes (1990).
[6] The aggregate marginal environmental benefits of Zl increase because z2 is
lower than M Z2 ; aggregate marginal benefits of Z2 decrease because zi is higher
than M Z1 .
[7] The constraint qualification asks that the number of binding constraints is less
than the number of variables, therefore only one constraint can be binding in
the cost minimum of our example.
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Abstract
A second protocol on the reduction of sulfurous emissions is currently being nego-
tiated by the European countries. Due to a number of factors the final protocol
may not be the best of all possible agreements. This chapter suggests that a given
protocol may be improved by allowing countries to trade the emissions they are
allowed under the protocol, and suggests various institutional arrangements under
which this may be done. The results of a computerized simulation of such trad-
ing are presented and used to evaluate the conditions under which such a trading
scheme may be beneficial.
Key words: emissions trading, cost efficiency, environmental agreements.
11.1 Background
The first generation of European transboundary pollution agreements were
based on uniform reductions of emissions as a basic principle of fairness.
Thus the first sulfur protocol between European countries called for all sig-
natories to cut back their sulfur emissions by 30% by 1993 compared with
emissions in 1980. However, it is well known that uniform reductions in gen-
eral imply higher total costs than necessary to reach the same environmental
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objectives, i.e., this principle of fairness is not cost-effective. The parties to
the negotiations on the second sulfur protocol (SSP) have recognized this
point, and the agreement will imply different emission reduction rates for
the participating countries. A consequence of this is that abatement costs
will probably vary more than they would have done if considerations of fair-
ness had played a dominant role in the negotiations. This implies that the
economic burdens of abatement, measured per capita or as a percentage of
GNP, will vary significantly. Against this background, the question arises as
to whether economic instruments have a role to play in the implementation
of the new protocol.
The protocol will be signed by the governments of the participating
countries. We will therefore regard countries as the basic units, although
individual firms may be considered in the future. We will not consider
emission charges, which in order to be effective would have to be differen-
tiated across nations, since such a system of charges is an untried form of
regulation, and is not a realistic instrument as far as the current protocol
negotiations are concerned. Emissions trading, however, has been discussed
by the parties to the negotiations, and it is likely that such a scheme will be
included in the SSP. It is from this perspective that this chapter has been
written.
11.2 What Theory Can Tell Us
Airborne sulfur belongs to a class of nonuniformly dispersing pollutants that
causes localized damage when it is deposited. The concept of an optimal
solution is obtained by integrated assessment modeling, with the calcula-
tion of abatement cost functions, atmospheric transport and deposition as
building blocks. The mathematical formulation of the optimization problem
was given by Tietenberg (1985):
n
min l: Ci( e? - ed,
i=l
given that
n
l:aijei:S nj + bj , j = 1, ... ,m,
i=l
(11.1)
where Ci is cost of emissions abatement from source i; e? are initial emjs-
sions from source i; ei are emissions after purification from source i; nj is
deposition target at receptor j; aij is the transportation coefficient; amount
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from source i deposited at receptor j per unit emitted from source i; and bj
is background deposition at receptor j.
A necessary condition for a solution with positive values of ei is:
m
c~ - LaijAj = 0, i = 1, . .. ,n,
j=1
(11.2)
where c: is marginal purification cost of source i; and Aj is the shadow price
on the deposition target Dj (positive for binding receptors, zero otherwise).
Due to the nonuniform dispersion of sulfur and the variation in the
ability of the receptors to neutralize depositions, marginal purification costs
in the optimal solution are generally different; marginal costs at anyone
source should equal the total marginal "damage" of emitting an additional
unit. The expression for "damage" is the shadow prices of the target load
constraints weighted by the transportation coefficients. "Damage" is in quo-
tation marks because shadow prices reflect abatement costs and not proper
environmental evaluation. The shadow price on a binding constraint show
the increase in the total costs of reducing the deposition target by one unit.
Receptors with nonbinding deposition constraints, i.e. where depositions
are less than target loads, have zero shadow prices. The evaluation of tar-
get loads by shadow prices is therefore not an evaluation of the cost of
damage in the true sense. Treating environmental objectives as constraints
introduces a kind of zero-one evaluation of these constraints. This kind of
model-related evaluation must not be confused with valuing environmental
variables as such.
The RAINS model (Alcamo et ai., 1990) developed at the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) provides an efficient tool
for solving problem (11.1). Policy efficiency and cost efficiency are taken
care of by the RAINS model in the following way: Policy objectives are
entered as constraints, and cost efficiency is achieved by optimization. The
policy objectives are ceilings on depositions, called target loads, in different
geographical areas. These geographical areas, called receptors, are 150 X
150 km rectangles into which Europe has been divided. The optimization
implies that those levels of emissions are found which minimize total abate-
ment costs summed over all countries, while the depositions at each receptor
are within the constraints. Thus, the model assumes policy efficiency with
regard to the constraints and solves for cost efficiency.
The type of model represented by RAINS has been used as a frame
of reference for the SSP negotiations. There is a general agreement that
uniform cutbacks, as under the current protocol, are not cost-efficient, and
234 Finn R. F¢rsund and Eric N<pvdal
that concern for the environment should be based, directly or indirectly in
some form, on critical loads of sulfur deposition in the grid-based receptors.
These critical loads are defined as the amount of deposition in a specified
geographical area that is consistent with no significant damage to a given
percentage of ecosystems in that area. For instance, the "5% critical load"
is defined as the amount of deposition that is consistent with no significant
damage to 95% of the ecosystems in a given area. Deposition may be
measured in a variety of units, but it is common to measure this in grams
of sulfur per km 2 per year. Interested readers are referred to Downing et at.
(1993) for a comprehensive definition and discussion of this concept.
The recent popularity of emissions trading within countries stems from
the certainty of effect, since the total emissions are fixed, and increased
cost efficiency results with a high degree of certainty from the economic
motivation to trade. The advantages of emissions trading will generally
contribute to cost effectiveness and burden sharing, and will also provide a
dynamic incentive for more efficient technology choices (see, for example,
F0rsund, 1992).
Emissions trading has been dealt with in the literature based on mod-
els similar to the one above (see Montgomery, 1972, 1974; Krupnick et al.,
1983; McGartland and Oates, 1985; Tietenberg, 1985). Looking for de-
centralized permit systems to mirror market solutions, Montgomery (1972)
demonstrated that by pricing permits at each receptor, and forcing a source
to acquire permits for all downwind depositions, a decentralized market so-
lution supporting the optimum may exist. Such an approach, however, is
probably impossible to enforce in practice. Investigating a system of emis-
sion permits for sources, Montgomery (1972,1974) found arrangements that
lead to optimal solutions only in the case where all constraints in (11.1) are
binding. Krupnick et at. (1983) relaxed this assumption by introducing ex-
change rates. These rates are defined as the amount of emission reduction
at one source required in order to compensate for one unit of increase at
another source. The exchange rates discussed by Krupnick et at. are en-
dogenous. We feel that a trading system, in order to be feasible, has to be
as simple as possible, and in our view this necessitates exogenous exchange
rates. At this point it is necessary to point out that we are not looking for
a second best system, but rather a third or even fourth best, and we will
pursue such a system without strict formal criteria.
Emissions trading with exchange rates is not in use even within countries
at present. We therefore underline the difficulties within a very simplified
system for trade between countries, and conditions on the trading system
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that we feel must be fulfilled for practical applications of sulfur emissions
trading.
11.3 Conditions for Emissions Trading
The SSP will in all likelihood be based on emission ceilings for each country
to be achieved by some future date. Since the main rationale for emissions
trading is improvement of cost efficiency, there is no reason for introducing
trade if emission ceilings are based on the cost-optimal solution with envi-
ronmental objectives as constraints, nor if the data on which the optimal
solution is based are accurate. If some countries are dissatisfied with their
emission ceilings, e.g., due to high abatement costs, this problem could be
resolved with some system of side payments rather by than moving away
from the optimum by allowing emissions trading. It is important to note
that given the environmental objectives, considerations of fairness should
not interfere with how emission ceilings are set. Such considerations are
however valid in the bargaining over how to finance the abatement process
(see Vislie and N<Evdal, 1993) for a game theoretic discussion of agreements
such as the SSP).
In the context of the SSP a number of additional conditions must be
fulfilled in order for a trading scheme based on exchange rates to be an
attractive policy instrument. At least the following features must be well
defined:
• Emission ceilings.
• Environmental policy objectives.
• Exchange rates.
The SSP will probably call for substantial reductions in emissions in
almost all countries over the next two decades. Trade implies that countries
buying emission quotas will reduce their emissions by amounts lower than
those specified in the SSP. One must therefore take special care to argue
that an increase in emissions, compared with the ceilings set in the protocol,
will constitute an improvement of the SSP agreement. However, even with
such a trade, most countries will have to reduce emissions substantially from
pre-protocol levels. When trade is allowed, some countries will reduce less
than the agreed emission ceilings if they can get other countries to carry
out larger reductions.
It is assumed that the new protocol will lay down a quantitative emis-
sion ceiling for each country. If this is the only expression of environmental
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objectives in the agreement, it follows that a one-to-one trading (offsetting
an increase in emissions by one country with an equal decrease in another
country) is the only possibility. This runs contrary to the recognized nonuni-
form dispersion of sulfur. Notice that it is not enough to state some general
desirability of obtaining critical loads at some future date. Environmental
objectives must be formally linked to the emission ceilings in order to de-
fine trade ratios other than one-to-one. The formal linkage of the emission
ceilings to environmental objectives is through rules for obtaining cost effi-
ciency and policy efficiency. A natural alternative to emission reductions as
environmental objectives per se is deposition load reductions. The case for
this approach, in the context of the SSP, is substantially strengthened by
the critical loads concept defined in Section 11.2. This is because the critical
loads concept provides a quantitative link between the amount of deposi-
tion in different geographical areas and the amount of ecological damage
done by the deposition. Although this link measures damage in a physical
rather than an economic sense, it could still provide a powerful tool in the
formulation of efficient environmental policies.
Assuming that there is agreement on environmental objectives reflect-
ing localized costs, a one-to-one trading scheme cannot be "correct". This
is because one-to-one trading would tend to equalize marginal abatement
costs, which in general will be inefficient due to the nonuniform dispersion
of sulfur emissions.
Since we have assumed that there is a formal link between emission
ceilings and environmental objectives, it follows that a change in the dis-
tribution of the emissions due to trade will influence the degree to which
environmental objectives are fulfilled. Agreement is therefore needed on
how to evaluate the impact of trade on the objective variables. We will
assume that target loads are the environmental objectives. If the SSP is
not perfect, the target loads can be in one of three possible states: (i) the
emission ceilings generate depositions that are greater than the target loads;
(ii) the emission ceilings imply that depositions are less than target loads;
and (iii) some depositions are below target loads, and some are above.
In the first two cases, emission ceilings are generally too high or too
low. It follows that in these cases emissions trading with exchange rates
is not a efficient instrument since emission ceilings are not consistent with
environmental objectives. The relevant strategy in this case is either to
renegotiate the emission ceilings, or to rethink the environmental objectives.
If this is not done, we as may well implement a one-to-one trading scheme
in order to achieve the total level of emissions at the lowest possible cost.
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If depositions are both below and above target loads, there is room for
improvement in the distribution of emissions, and emissions trading with
exchange rates may be a suitable instrument. It is important to note that
there is no guarantee that all deposition targets will be met after trading has
taken place. Ideally this would be the case, but if target loads are violated
before trading has taken place, we will not be able to achieve nonviolation
for all target loads with certainty unless the initial emission ceilings are
renegotiated. [Van Ierland et ai., (1993) achieve such a result through one-
to-one trading, using a procedure that assumes that the sum of the initial
emissions is equal to the optimal emission level. They also allow forced
trading in the sense that trading takes place which would not occur in the
real world without additional compensation to the traders.]
A necessary condition for establishing appropriate trade ratios is to cal-
culate a reference solution, covering the distribution of emissions and abate-
ment costs, that must be agreed upon. The logical choice for such a refer-
ence solution would be the optimal solution derived from model calculations
based on environmental objectives, and whatever imperfect information we
have at our disposal. In the absence of such a solution, one-to-one trading
seems the only logical trading scheme, since no reference solution implies
no consistent policy objectives that acknowledge the physical properties of
sulfur emissions.
We are now left with the difficult task of defining meaningful exchange
rates. One possible way of defining a set of exchange rates that is not based
on the cost minimization model, is to base them on ratios of "ecological
damage", derived from the matrix describing the dispersion of sulfur and
some kind of evaluation of the tolerance of the receptors to sulfur deposi-
tions. The difficulty with such an approach lies in the evaluation of damage
to the receptors. To establish universally acceptable criteria for such an
evaluation seems a difficult task as long as one is outside the realm of pure
economic theory, where it is at least assumed that it is possible to evaluate
the benefits. In our case, it would require the establishment of benefit func-
tions, one for each receptor, that would have to be established according to
criteria that will be acceptable to all signatories to the SSP. We feel that
the alternative presented below is better in the sense that it is simpler and
still maintains some beneficial properties.
In this chapter we base the exchange rates on the information contained
in the first-order conditions (see Klaassen et al., 1994). If we divide the first-
order conditions with one another we obtain the expression:
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(11.3 )lij = c~ = 2::k=1 aikAk
cj 2::k=1 ajkAk .
We define lij, evaluated in the optimum, as the exchange rate between
country i and country j; that is, one unit of emissions from source i is
equivalent to lij units of emissions from source j. The choice of this ex-
change rate may seem somewhat arbitrary, in the sense that its information
is of limited relevance outside the optimal solution. However the scanty
information that exists will give the countries an incentive to trade emis-
sions until they are on a point on a isocost curve where the curvature is
the same as in the optimal solution. This trading will take some account
of the environmental impact of the changed distribution of emissions. If
country i contributes relatively more to binding receptors, then country i
may increase its emissions by less than one unit for every unit of emissions
it buys from country j. If the opposite is the case and country j contributes
relatively more to binding receptors, then country i may increase its emis-
sions by more than one unit for every unit of emissions it buys from country
j. The result may be considerable cost savings without altering the dis-
tribution of emissions in a environmentally unfavorable manner. It should
be clear, however, that if emissions trading with exchange rates results in
exactly the optimal solution, then this is to a large extent due to plain luck.
The point is that trading with exchange rates has the potential to reduce
the gap between optimal emissions and actual emissions to a considerable
degree. The conditions under which this will be the case are examined in
Section 11.5.
11.4 Administrative Framework
There must be some administrative framework within which trades between
countries can be organized, in order to capture the advantages of emissions
trading.
The motivation for countries to trade emission permits is taken to be
the desire to save abatement costs. There is of course the possibility that
some countries with a high level of environmental consciousness would use
trading as a means of financing emissions abatement to a level below the
emission ceilings specified in the reference solution, but we will disregard
this possibility in the following. A number of issues have to be dealt with:
• How to introduce exchange rates for sulfur emissions.
• How to ensure that trades are in compliance with the protocol.
Trading Sulfur Emissions in Europe 239
• How to approve trades.
• The roles of third parties.
As a point of departure, we assume that the administration ofthe proto-
col, the UN ECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe), pro-
vides a service function with respect to the reference run and calculations
necessary to monitor the consequences of trades on the level of deposition.
We refer to this function as the Service Center.
The emission targets are to be met by a specified future date, say 10
years ahead. This means that the trades do not need to be carried out
immediately; rather, the point is to agree on future commitments. The
trade proposals must be accepted by some evaluation procedure to be a
valid part of the agreement, and given the time span of the SSP, there
should be ample time to evaluate proposed bilateral trades.
There are two opposite extremes for institutional setups: centralized
command, and decentralized consensus. These administrative schemes are
illustrated in Figure 11.1.
11.4.1 Centralized framework
The Service Center will be upgraded to a Command Center in the central-
ized solution. The trades are organized and evaluated by the Center, but
it is left to the countries to actually carry them out. The objective of the
Center is to find trades such that total costs are reduced.
A key feature in the centralized solution to trade is how to deal with the
environmental objectives. If the target loads are to be observed, all trades
will be interlinked, and all trades must be determined in a simultaneous
decision process. Thus, if applying a sequential trade procedure, the order
of trades will influence the total outcome. When a target load is reached
new trades will be decisively restricted.
Working with two periods may help to resolve this problem by register-
ing all feasible combinations of trade out of the set of trades cleared by the
countries involved, and then solving simultaneously toward the end of the
trial period.
One should note that the need to introduce the target load constraints
explicitly is not necessarily so strong. Recall that a subset of target loads is
more than fulfilled in the initial protocol agreement. There is therefore some
scope to increase emissions without violating the target load constraints. An
ad hoc procedure would be to check for violations and rule out trades that
lead to excessive depositions also in third countries, or to restrict the volume
of such trades.
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Service Center
Calculates:
Reference solution
Exchange rates
Changes in depositions
due to trade
Country 1 Infonnation flows
<
Countries calculate:
Demand for additional emissions
permits and possibly bilateral
bargaining solutions
Country 3
Centralized solution:
>
Country 2
Service Center as Command Center, calculates most profitable
trades. No information flows from countries to the Center.
Intermediate decentralized solution:
Countries give buying and selling prices to the Center, where exchange
rates are applied and profitable trades are calculated. Information is returned
to countries.
Decentralized solution:
Center provides countries with exchange rates, and countries have to take
bilateral action.
Figure 11.1. lUustration of information flows for different institutional
frameworks.
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11.4.2 Decentralized framework
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In a decentralized framework the countries must take some initiative by
proposing trades in the trial period. One question is how countries could
identify possible trades. It could be left up to every country to seek out all
other countries and exchange bids and offers, as indicated in the third setup
in Figure 11.1. This approach does not appear too promising. It would be
better to use the Service Center as a clearing house by receiving bids for
selling purification capacity and receiving offer prices for buying emission
quotas (intermediate decentralized solution). If some countries feel that
purification costs are excessive, they could quote what they are willing to
pay to other countries to assume responsibility for a certain level of abate-
ment. Similarly, if countries feel that they can purify even more without
burdening themselves with excessive costs, they could quote how much they
would accept as payment to undertake more purification. Countries could
quote on both types of bids simultaneously. The countries do not have to
consider the exchange rates or trade ratios when making bids and offers. By
applying exchange rates, the Service Center can delineate the set of possible
trades and provide countries with appropriate information upon which they
can act. For example, weights of sulfur emissions could be converted to a
common "damage" unit, i.e., by applying exchange rates; thus emissions
from Norway and Turkey can be compared on a bilateral basis.
Since no changes in deposition have yet to take place, there is time
both for countries to work out the most profitable trades, and for the Ser-
vice Center to check the target load constraints. When these calculations
are completed and possibly subjected to some kind of approval procedure,
trading may take place and emission permits may change hands.
11.4.3 Zoning
It is undoubtedly easier to decentralize emissions trading when exchange
rates are all equal to one. In order to benefit to some extent from this,
and to reduce the number of trade ratios, one could consider some sort of
zoning. One possibility with the greatest flexibility is to restrict trade to
neighbors. Countries could also be grouped according to the level of target
loads and downstream - upstream features of atmospheric transportation.
Trades within a zone would then be on a one-to-one basis, while exchange
rates apply to intergroup trades. The Service Center would function as
before.
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Application of the Trade Algorithm
SLEETS
To study the properties of exchange rate trading, we have developed the
computer model SLEETS. A main priority has been to simulate as closely
as possible how trading might take place in the real world. The program
takes as inputs two emission vectors: one initial solution which is the start-
ing point of the algorithm, and one optimal solution which is the one we
want to attain. The initial solution may be interpreted as an emission vec-
tor that has been accomplished through the UN ECE bargaining process.
The optimal solution is generated by the RAINS model version 6.0, using
the target loads currently recognized in the UN ECE negotiations. Associ-
ated with these vectors is a distribution of abatement costs, generated by
exponential abatement cost functions. We have based these functions on
the cost functions generated by the ENEM module in the RAINS program.
The model then proceeds to examine the possible cost savings of the pairs
of bilateral intercountry cooperation. The pair that may realize the largest
cost savings is chosen and emissions between these countries are reallocated
in a cost- minimizing manner. Thereafter, all possible cost savings through
bilateral cooperation are recalculated, and again the most profitable pair is
chosen. This continues until cost savings are smaller than a predetermined
level, after which the algorithm ends.
We concentrate on three scenarios: the near-optimal scenario; the sig-
nificant variations scenario; and the significant exceedances scenario.
11.5.1 The near-optimal scenario
This scenario is intended to simulate the event that the emISSIOn vector
resulting from the bargaining process is very close to the optimal solution.
This scenario has been generated by letting the initial emission vector vary
±20% around the optimal solution. The main purpose of this scenario
is to examine whether an exchange rate trading system will ruin a "rather
good" bargaining result. The aggregated results from this scenario are given
in Figure 11.2. It is evident from this figure that exchange rate trading
has next to no impact on the aggregate figures. Cost savings are in the
neighborhood ofDM 500 million per year, and total emissions are reduced by
109 kt S02. This is rather promising. The proximity of the initial solution
to the optimal would make large changes in the aggregate figures due to
undesirable trading. However, these figures are not the main point. The
basic test of exchange rate emissions trading is the effect on the distribution
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Figure 11.2. The near-optimal scenario.
of costs and emissions. For this purpose we have created a simple index.
For all countries we compute:
Xtrd - Xopt
0'=
xini - Xopt
(11.4 )
where Xini is the initial emissions before any trading has taken place, Xopt is
the country's optimal emissions and Xtrd is the country's emissions after all
trading has taken place. The properties of this index should be evident. If
Xtrd is closer to Xopt than Xini, then the value is less than 1. A negative sign
implies that trading has resulted in overshoot. The best possible result is
0' = O. If 0' = 1, the country's emissions are either unaltered by the sequence
of trades, or, most likely, the country has not engaged in trading at all. The
values of these indices are illustrated for the near-optimal scenario in Figure
11.3. Note that we have left out the countries that did not trade.
As should be evident from Figure 11.3, all countries that engage in
trading are closer to the optimal solution after trading than before. This
result might seem somewhat optimistic, but this property is pervasive in our
simulations, although a few exceptions have occurred. All in all, however,
it seems that exchange rate trading has the fortunate property that it does
not significantly worsen an initial solution that is close to the optimum.
11.5.2 The significant variations scenario
This scenario is generated by increasing the optimal emission vector so that
the resulting initial emissions are uniformly distributed ±60% around the
optimal solution. We consider this scenario an important test of exchange
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Costs
rate trading. The potential for cost savings is large, and if a considerable
amount of these savings are realized through exchange rate trading, then
this system deserves to be taken into consideration. The aggregate figures of
this scenario are presented in Figure 11.4. The cost savings are considerable
- almost DM 4 billion per year and have occurred without any significant
increases in aggregate emissions (+290 kt 802 ).
But the important thing is still the distribution of emissions. Using the
index defined in the previous section, these are shown in Figure 11.5. Again
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we have left out the countries that did not participate in any trading. As
one can see, the simulation is almost suspiciously successful. All countries
engaged in trading are considerably closer to optimum. Spain, for instance,
emitted 2,209 kt S02 before trading, compared with 1,487 kt after trading,
measured against an optimal level of 1,486 kt. Denmark is the country where
a is the largest. The optimal level of Danish emissions is 58 kt. Trading
increases the emission level from 27 to 51 kt, which from an efficiency point
of view must be considered an improvement.
11.5.3 The significant exceedances scenario
In this scenario all countries have been given emission increases that are
uniformly distributed from 0 to +30% above the optimal solution. This is
a somewhat different scenario from the preceding ones in that all emissions
are higher than optimal. Under these circumstances one cannot expect a
solution close to the optimal solution. This is confirmed by Figure 11.6.
There is a small decrease in aggregate emissions (approximately 300 kt)
and the cost savings are DM 247 million. As in the preceding scenarios, we
have constructed trade indices for the countries that participate in trading.
From Figure 11.7 we see that the effect on the distribution of emissions is
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Figure 11.6. The significant exceedances scenario.
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Figure 11.7. The significant exceedances scenario: trading indices.
not very good. Although some countries come closer to the optimum, others
move further away, particularly the Netherlands and Romania.
In this case, emissions trading with exchange rates has somewhat disap-
pointing results. This is not because something is wrong with the concept,
but rather because trading started from an initial emission vector that was
obviously built on a different evaluation of environmental objectives. That
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is, the reference scenario we tried to reach was not consistent with the emis-
sion ceilings required in the initial solution. This implies that we started
trading with the wrong set of exchange rates.
11.6 Conclusions
Emissions trading has the potential to combine both policy efficiency and
cost efficiency. To date, trading schemes with one-to-one trading ratios have
been set up. However, sulfur emissions disperse nonuniformly and therefore
bilateral, different exchange rates for emissions trading are required. A num-
ber of conditions must be agreed upon within the SSP if emissions trading
is to function. Most important, agreements are required on environmental
objectives, a reference solution, generation of exchange rates, or definitions
of how to evaluate changes in depositions following trade.
A general feature of airborne sulfur as a pollutant is that a unit emitted
from a source has different impacts depending on where it falls. This implies
that one unit of increase from one source cannot be offset by exactly one
unit decrease from another source, but has to be weighted by some kind of
exchange rate. The exchange rate may be greater or smaller than one. We
have suggested one way of defining such exchange rates, and pointed out
that these have some beneficial properties. Emissions trading with different
bilateral exchange rates is a demanding task for implementation, and such
systems are not yet in use, even within countries. We have underlined some
of the difficulties and conditions that must be met for practical applications
of sulfur emissions trading.
The simulations of three scenarios of sequential bilateral trade have been
done with SLEETS. The work so far has led to the following conclusions.
Trading with exchange rates seems beneficial if aggregate emissions at the
starting point are close to the aggregate emissions at the optimum. The
cost savings that may be achieved are significant. If aggregate emissions
initially are considerably higher or lower than in the optimum, the method
seems to be less appropriate.
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Chapter 12
Agency in International Pollution
Permit Trading
Dallas BUl'traw
Quality of the Environment Division
Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, USA
Abstract
This chapter investigates institutional issues affecting the potential design of an
international pollution permit trading program. Most previous studies, including
simulation models of 502 emissions trading in Europe, have assumed that national
governments would be the agents participating in trades. An alternative is that
emission permits be distributed to and traded by affected enterprises. This chap-
ter evaluates these two alternatives according to the two primary benefits usually
attributed to incentive-based environmental policies. The first is the attainment of
cost effectiveness, also referred to as technical or productive efficiency. The second
is the internalization of social costs, otherwise known as allocative efficiency. I con-
clude that an international system of emission permit trading such as 502 trading
in Europe, would perform better according to these economic criteria if permits
were distributed directly to affected enterprises. However, in this brief investiga-
tion, such a conclusion can not be definitive. Rather, the primary finding is that
further attention to the question of agency is warranted. Nevertheless, a strong
case can be made that international environmental agreements such as an accord
for 502 emissions trading in Europe should establish guidelines for national gov-
ernments regarding the domestic economic regulation of internationally tradable
permits.
Key words: sulfur dioxide, emissions trading, principal-agent, international en-
vironmental negotiation.
249
250
12.1 Introduction
Dallas Burtraw
Incentive- based approaches to environmental regulation are moving into
the spotlight in many industrialized nations. The movement is occurring
through a broad, albeit so far limited, array of applications addressing lo-
cal pollution issues and through increasingly sophisticated discussions con-
cerning transboundary pollutants (OECD, 1993). Incentive-based (IB) ap-
proaches are distinguished from the conventional approach to environmental
regulation, generally labeled command-and-control (CAC), which typically
involves the specification of design or performance standards for given tech-
nologies in given applications. The hallmark of IB approaches is that indi-
vidual firms are given latitude in design and performance, while they are
held accountable for their consumption of services provided by the envi-
ronment. Accountability is enforced either through quantity constraints on
total collective emissions or on ambient air quality, or through price con-
straints such as fees per unit of emission of various pollutants.
This chapter addresses the question of what level of organization - eco-
nomic enterprises or national governments - should be the institution desig-
nated as the decision making unit for environmental compliance strategies,
when IB instruments are adopted on an international level for the regulation
of transboundary pollutants. For instance, under an international system of
tradable emission permits negotiated on a multilateral basis, the question
at hand is to which type of institution should accrue the internationally
created intangible property rights associated with emission permits. Should
permits be distributed to and traded by economic enterprises or national
governments? I characterize this question as the designation of agency,
with the particular context for this discussion being negotiations for sulfur
dioxide (S02) reduction in Europe.
Most discussions of IB regulation at the international level have been
either silent or ambivalent on this question. The implicit assumption is most
often that national governments constitute the economic agents that would
engage in permit trading (OECD, 1992; UN, 1992). One justification for
this is that political acceptance of a tradable permit system may be most
forthcoming if it is perceived to be a relatively small departure from conven-
tional multiparty negotiations that assign targets among nations, such as
recent agreements on S02 reductions in Europe. Trading between nations
would be a mechanism allowing flexibility in the implementation of these
targets.
Furthermore, national governments are indisputably the sole sovereign
authority empowered to enter into international environmental agreements;
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and therefore, national governments are the principals ultimately account-
able for compliance with and enforcement of those agreements. This status
makes national governments the natural candidates to function also as the
participating agents in a permit trading system.
A further reason for national governments to be the agents in an inter-
national system of permit trading is that they are in a position to integrate
standards for compliance with domestic environmental regulation. This is
often referred to as harmonization of international environmental obliga-
tions with domestic regulation, and is especially relevant if nations already
use IB environmental regulation to protect the environment or to raise rev-
enues. Hoel (1993, 1991a) argues that to designate national governments
which are the principals to an agreement to serve also as the agents for its
implementation is the best design for the harmonization of policies and the
maximization of social welfare from an international perspective.
An explicit assumption in recent simulation modeling of potential agree-
ments for S02 emission reductions in Europe has been that national govern-
ments serve as the agents for trading. For instance, the RAINS model de-
veloped at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
is only designed to entertain policy options including emission constraints
targeted at national governments. RAINS uses cost functions for emission
reductions aggregated by industry and then aggregated by country to reach
a solution about the economic and environmental cost of potential policies.
Based on the summary reported in UN ECE (1992), this statement also
holds with respect to the Coordinated Abatement Strategy Model (CASM)
developed by the Stockholm Environment Institute at York, and the Abate-
ment Strategies Assessment Model (ASAM) currently being developed at
Imperial College, London.
However, several authors have suggested that trading between nations
may not be the only, or the best, design for an international permit trading
system. Swart (1992) points to lack of experience by national governments,
lack of knowledge about compliance options and operations at the facil-
ity level, and the inability of bureaucracies to act in a timely manner in a
market environment. He suggests that greater cost effectiveness might be
achieved by trading between firms, although he acknowledges this would
imply transfers of currency that may conflict with national trade policies
and therefore permit trades might have to be ratified by the national gov-
ernments involved. Grubb (1992) suggests that governments might pass
entitlements to permits obtained through international agreements on to
firms, which could engage in trading. Bertram (1992) considers an assort-
ment of decentralized approaches such as allocating permits on a per capita
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basis. Dudek and Tietenberg (1992) argue on practical grounds that the
issue would have to be addressed by each nation. In capitalist economies,
they suggest it is most plausible for firms to serve as agents for permit
trading, while in centrally planned economies central authorities would en-
gage in trading. They point out that the Montreal Protocol, as amended
in London, allows trading between enterprises subject to the concurrence of
national governments that are involved. And they point out that trading
of S02 allowances under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments in the USA
is between affected firms, although they do not draw attention to the piv-
otal role that economic regulators at the state level have in designing cost
recovery rules, approving trades, and ultimately affecting the shape of the
program (Bohi and Burtraw, 1992, 1991).
The choice between enterprises versus national governments as the au-
thorized trading agents in an international permit system represents con-
ceptually different regulatory frameworks. In any case, the choice is not
a clear-cut one, because if enterprises constitute the agents for trading,
national governments or the relevant economic regulators will retain over-
arching authority with regard to policies governing the economic behavior
of enterprises (much as state regulators retain such authority with regard
to permit trading by utilities in the USA). However, in principle, interna-
tional agreements could incorporate prescriptions or guidelines about the
proper role for national governments or economic regulators in regulating
firm behavior with regard to compliance under an international permit sys-
tem. These types of guidelines would seem more likely to be found in an
agreement in Europe for control of sulfur deposition than in broader inter-
national environmental agreements because of the pre-existing legal frame-
work within the EU and the apparent desire of many central and eastern
European countries to move toward greater economic integration with the
EU.
This chapter employs two economic criteria to address the question of
agency in a international permit system, particularly with regard to S02
emission reductions in Europe. These criteria are the two significant poten-
tial benefits that are generally ascribed to IE environmental regulation. The
first is the attainment of cost effectiveness, also referred to as technical or
productive efficiency. Section 12.2 evaluates the two alternative approaches
with regard to their ability to promote the cost-effective implementation of
a given environmental goal and to provide dynamic incentives for technolog-
ical advance. The second benefit ascribed to IB environmental regulation is
the internalization of social costs, otherwise known as allocative efficiency.
Although these two anticipated benefits of IE policies are often thought of
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as two sides of the same coin, in practice they have independent relevance.
Furthermore, most conventional approaches to regulation that have em-
phasized cost effectiveness have ignored the internalization of social costs.
Section 12.3 evaluates the alternative possibilities with regard to the inter-
nalization of social costs and transparent pricing of factors of production,
that is, prices that send accurate signals about the social cost of resource
use. Finally, Section 12.4 presents a summary and offers a perspective on
the role of government in administration and monitoring.
12.2 Comparing Performance in Promoting
Productive Efficiency
12.2.1 Introduction
The most commonly cited potential benefit of IE regulation is the attain-
ment of productive efficiency through the cost-effective implementation of
a given environmental goal, along with the dynamic incentive for techno-
logical advance in order to reduce the cost of compliance in the future.
Formally, within a theoretical model of a competitive market in which all
parties have full information, tradable permits or emission fees can achieve
a given environmental goal at lower cost than any other regulatory scheme
(Montgomery, 1972; Baumol and Oates, 1988). Alternatively stated, IE ap-
proaches can afford society a greater level of environmental quality at the
same cost as might be expended with CAC regulation. Furthermore, the
flexibility in the choice of abatement strategy imparts an incentive to im-
prove abatement technology because some portion of the savings will accrue
to the firm.
Several studies suggest that a system of tradable S02 emission per-
mits in Europe has the potential to achieve dramatic cost savings relative
to rigid and inflexible assignments of emission quotas on a national ba-
sis. Simulations based on the RAINS model indicate that a reallocation
of the current level of expenditures between nations in Europe, as might
be achieved through a cost-effective system of permit trading among na-
tional governments, could further improve the emission reductions that will
be achieved from 18%-30% of 1990 levels. However, reductions in sulfur
emissions and deposition levels by 50%-70% is required to reverse the trend
of soil acidification in Europe. However, if this effort was not uniform but
was targeted, this goal could be obtained with reductions in emissions of
20%-25% (Shaw et ai., 1990, p. 352).
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An international agreement for 802 emission permit trading that casts
national governments as the agents for trading may capture a significant
portion of potential cost savings compared to traditional approaches to en-
vironmental regulation. However, this chapter suggests that there is signif-
icant reason to suspect that such an approach would fall short of the total
potential for savings. In this light, the relevant question is whether a sys-
tem that casts national governments in the trading role would perform any
differently than if affected economic enterprises were cast in that role.
There are at least two reasons to think they would perform differently.
One reason is that national governments may fail to adopt domestic poli-
cies that would implement their international obligations in a cost-effective
manner. A second reason has to do with the mechanics of emissions trading
when spatial considerations are important. These issues are discussed in
turn.
12.2.2 The shape of domestic policies under an
international agreement
If national governments were designated the trading agents in an interna-
tional 802 permit trading program, each government would have to develop
a domestic compliance plan. The political process involved in the develop-
ment of a compliance plan would remain under the influence of competing
social priorities and private interests. As a consequence, it is not clear what
form domestic environmental regulation would take.
If an international environmental agreement took the form of an in-
ternational tax imposed on national governments, it seems reasonable to
expect that each national government would pass the revenue burden along
to polluters in the form of a domestic emission tax in order to raise rev-
enue to fulfill its international fiscal obligation (Hoel, 1993). However, for
a variety of reasons, it appears that tradable permits are the likely instru-
ment of choice at the international level, at least with respect to the control
of 802 emissions in Europe. Unlike a tax system, under a permit system
national governments would not be saddled with large requirements to gen-
erate revenues.
However, national governments would be saddled with an emission cap.
To comply with the cap these governments would have latitude to consider
passing on permits to affected enterprises directly. But they may as well
adopt domestic tax or permit programs, or extend and calibrate existing
CAC regulations in order to comply with their international obligations.
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The latter is the smallest departure from the status quo, and is perhaps the
most likely to occur.
The evolution of emission offset and netting programs in the USA pro-
vides an interesting example ofthe behavior of regulators when faced with an
emission constraint on an aggregate level, absent well defined institutions to
support an innovative approach such as emissions trading. With the devel-
opment of the US Clean Air Act, many metropolitan areas were designated
as being in noncompliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS). The responsibility for regulating emissions and ultimately im-
proving air quality is delegated primarily to the states, which are required
to develop and implement state implementation plans to bring metropolitan
areas into compliance with NAAQS. In many instances metropolitan areas
are subject to a virtual emission cap, which primarily affects point sources of
pollution, that is enforced by sanctions imposed by the federal government.
Meanwhile, the desire for economic growth brought with it the specter of
new point and mobile sources of pollution that further undermined local air
quality.
One result of this dilemma was the introduction of emission offset and
netting programs to accommodate new growth without worsening ambient
air quality. Static savings resulting from regulation of conventional air pol-
lutants in the USA have been estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars
(Hahn and Hester, 1989; Tietenberg, 1990). However, as has been discussed
thoroughly elsewhere, these programs were often flawed and trading was
occasional, partly due to the imprecise and uncertain allocation of property
rights (Tripp and Dudek, 1989; Tietenberg, 1985; Hahn, 1989; Dudek and
Palmisano, 1988). The perceived lack of commitment to incentive-based
approaches by federal regulators bred uncertainty regarding the longevity
of the program and of property rights or related entitlements to savings
generated through specific investments. In any case, institutions to pro-
mote emissions trading have been slow to evolve and thus have had limited
success, even in the face of quantity constraints on total emissions. The
significant inertia associated with the CAC approach has kept it the cen-
terpiece of State Implementation Plan (SIP) efforts in the USA, even in the
face of ostensible emission caps at the metropolitan or regional level.
An international permit trading system that identifies national govern-
ments as trading agents would be analogous in structure to the CAC because
it would impose an emission cap at the national level, even though trad-
ing would allow flexibility in setting the cap. As such, this approach may
have an analogous result. The practical appearance of domestic regulation
is likely to resemble the status quo, a cost-effective outcome would not be
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achieved at the domestic level, and the opportunity cost of emissions would
not be recognized by firms.
Whether an international permit system with enterprises acting as the
trading agents would succeed further in this dimension is an open question.
National governments would still have opportunities to influence compli-
ance activities by firms and to strategically subsidize domestic industries
if permits are allocated directly to and traded by individual enterprises.
Among the most significant of these opportunities applies to regulation of
the electricity sector in Europe, which accounts for approximately 65% of
total 80 2 emissions in Europe.
Within the electricity industry across Europe there exist a variety of
ownership and regulatory structures. Investor-owned utilities regulated at
the national or regional level, municipal and cooperative utilities, state-
owned enterprise, recent attempts at privatization in the UK and a number
of cases where these structures exist side by side in mixed ownership systems
with yardstick competition (Henney, 1992; Holmes, 1988).
IB approaches to environmental policy depend fundamentally on the
expectation that firms will respond to incentives by choosing a least-cost
strategy for compliance. Virtually all of the economic analyses of potential
savings from IB regulation have been limited to examinations of competitive
product markets, or occasionally, to the role of market power on behalf of
producers in an unregulated product market (Baumol and Oates, 1988;
Tietenberg, 1985; Bohm, 1981; Hahn, 1984; Malueg, 1990; and Misiolek
and Elder, 1989). However, regulated and state-owned enterprises that
characterize the European electricity sector may not have the incentive to
maximize profits or to minimize costs that competitive firms have (Henney,
1992, p. 76; Holmes, 1988). In addition, regulated firms typically do not
make decisions on the basis of market prices, but rather on the basis of
distorted opportunity costs that reflect regulatory practice. Rules governing
the recovery of costs for permit expenses and how these compare to rules
for alternative investment options would strongly influence the financial
incentives facing firms in compliance with a permit trading program (Bohi
and Burtraw, 1991, 1992).
Across Europe one currently observes the strong influence of regula-
tory policy in creating incentives for electric utilities, a common practice by
governments to pursue diverse social goals other than economic efficiency,
and tremendous dissimilarities in these social goals between countries and
in the economic and regulatory structure of electricity systems. These char-
acteristics of the electricity industry represent formidable obstacles to the
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attainment of cost effectiveness in a permit trading program, but some
remedies exist for these problems.
One remedy is to promote the symmetric treatment of compliance op-
tions with respect to cost recovery rules and associated regulatory incentives.
Another is to promote the EU goal of transparent pricing of electricity. The
USA has the Uniform System of Accounts that reconciles the policies of
different regulators in a consistent manner. As the EU moves toward an
open internal energy market and greater economic integration with the rest
of Europe a similar institution would be very helpful. Pertaining directly
to tradable emission permits, there will be a number of accounting and reg-
ulatory issues that will be new for the industry. A template for consistent
accounting should be developed as part of an international agreement for
emissions trading.
In summary, it is not obvious that the achievement of potential cost
savings would be any more certain if enterprises were to be directly endowed
with permits in an international permit system than if national governments
took that role. However, this approach would guarantee that a framework
for permit trading would be put in place at the domestic level, and it seems
likely that, at least at the margin, firms would recognize some portion of
the opportunity cost for marginal permit acquisitions. This would not occur
if they were regulated solely by CAC regulations under domestic statutes
sufficiently stringent to comply with international agreements. In either
case, national governments retain the authority and capability to influence
the compliance behavior of firms. The main point that emerges, however, is
that placing permits directly into the hands of affected enterprises removes
one obvious avenue of political influence, and allows the realization of cost
savings to remain a possibility.
12.2.3 The mechanics of emissions trading with
spatial constraints
An important feature of acidification in Europe is that damages are thought
to relate to S02 emissions in a nonlinear and nonuniform manner. The re-
lationship between S02 emissions and the quantity of sulfur deposition is
approximately linear. However, S02 emissions are not uniformly mixing in
the atmosphere, meaning that the location of sulfur deposition and associ-
ated damages depends on the location of the emissions.
The S02 emissions trading program adopted in the USA in 1990 ignores
entirely the spatial dimension of the acidification problem and trading of
S02 emission "allowances" may occur between affected facilities located
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anywhere in the country. Kete (1992) and Hausker (1992) offer compelling
defenses for why this was a reasonable policy decision. However, in Europe
the spatial dimension of the acidification problem is less likely to be ignored.
Current and emerging patterns of industrial activity, coupled with meteoro-
logical patterns and the location of sensitive ecological systems, suggest that
the migration of emissions through permit trading would not be expected to
lessen the problem in acutely affected areas. Moreover, the political context
is defined by strong national identities and by a decade of scientific investi-
gation that has heightened awareness of regional effects. Consequently, the
promise of IB regulation must be evaluated in the context of a spatially dif-
ferentiated program incorporating ambient constraints on deposition, with
its associated complexities.
A number of approaches to incorporate spatial constraints into a system
of emissions trading are possible, which are reviewed in Tietenberg (1985)
and Klaassen and Amann (1992). The approach that has received the most
attention is emissions trading subject to constraints on deposition of sul-
fur at various receptor sites, sometimes termed a "pollution offset program."
Mathematical programming can be employed to identify the cost-minimizing
outcome under such a trading system. The notion that this outcome could
be achieved through permit trading rests on the incentive compatibility of
the outcome, because it is, in effect, a competitive equilibrium. However,
the actual process through which participants move toward this outcome is
usually left unspecified. The implicit assumption is that trading between
firms follows a tatonnement process facilitated by a "Walrasian auction-
eer" in competitive price theory. Mathematically, this is equivalent to the
assumption that no trade takes place until an equilibrium is discovered,
at which time permits are reallocated on a simultaneous and multilateral
basis. Theory suggests the equilibrium will be the unique cost-minimizing
outcome.
Beginning with Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991), several recent studies
have introduced doubt about the ability of a system of tradable permits to
achieve the cost minimizing outcome in practice when permits are traded
under a system that accounts for spatially differentiated effects of pollution.
In place of mathematical programming, these studies have used simulations
of actual trading processes to illustrate trading not as simultaneous and
multilateral, but sequential and bilateral instead. In the presence of various
trading rules such as an offset program that requires that individual trades
not violate spatially differentiated deposition standards, the solution to the
joint cost minimization problem in general is not attainable through a series
of sequential and bilateral permit trades. The reason is that the solution
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to a sequential and bilateral trading process is path dependent; that is, the
sequence of bilateral trades determines the outcome. A particular sequence
of trades would lead deposition at a particular geographical location to
increase up to the maximum constrained level at that location, while a
different sequence of trades would lead a different deposition constraint to
bind first. Once a deposition constraint binds, it is not always possible for
further cost-saving bilateral trades to be individually consummated without
violating the deposition constraint, even though additional trades taken as
a set may lower costs while complying with all deposition constraints.
At least four studies have shown that in the context of S02 emissions
trading in Europe a sequential trading process will result in savings com-
pared to CAC, but fall far short of the potential savings at the cost mini-
mum, due to the problem of path dependence (Klaassen and Amann, 1992;
Kruitwagen, 1992; van Ierland et ai., 1993; Klaassen and Forsund, 1993). A
consistent assumption in these studies is that trading takes place between
nations rather than between individual enterprises. The assumption is ne-
cessitated by the use of the RAINS model as a platform for the simulations.
Cost functions in the RAINS model are aggregated at the national level.
The presumption in the model is that abatement efforts within a nation
will be pursued in a mostly cost-effective manner, although some explicit
prohibitions are built in.
In the program of research reported in this chapter, this assumption
is relaxed in order to explore the performance of bilateral and sequential
trading algorithms when trading occurs at the enterprise level rather than
at the level of national governments. A trading simulation is constructed
using piecewise linear cost functions drawn from RAINS for various small
sets of European countries presumed to enter an international system of
permit trading to reduce S02 emissions. Nations in each set are selected ar-
bitrarily, with some effort made to ensure geographic proximity. Transport
coefficients between countries are drawn from data for 1990 from EMEP
(Sandnes, 1993). This toy model is reconstructed repeatedly using different
sets of nations to test the robustness of the results. The performance of the
algorithm for one scenario is presented in Figure 12.1 and explained below.
Trading is modeled as a bilateral process with a stochastic element iden-
tifying the sequence in which potential trades are considered. Before each
trade, potential trading partners are chosen using a Monte Carlo sampling
procedure. Differences in marginal costs provide an incentive to engage
in trade, so intuition suggests that agents with the greatest difference in
marginal costs would be more likely to engage in trade than agents with
relatively similar marginal costs. However, there are a variety of factors
--6- One firm per country
-0- Two firms per country
-0- Three firms per country
10090
Dallas Burtraw
8070605040
260
1
0.9
c::: 0.80
·5 0.7
.0
.;::
1ii 0.6:c
OJ 0.5
>.~ 0.4
:;
E 0.3
::l
u 0.2
0.1
0
30
Fraction of potential savings achieved (%)
Figure 12.1. Savings from three levels of disaggregation.
that also seem important in identifying trading partners, including an ele-
ment of chance in what may be characterized as a matching and bargaining
process. These missing factors are represented by associating probabilis-
tic weights with each pair of potential trading partners. The weights may
be varied along a continuum, with differences in marginal costs playing a
deterministic role in identifying potential trading partners at one extreme,
and at the other extreme allowing the order of trades that are explored to
be entirely random. We represent this continuum for a pair of potential
traders i and j are by the weight
Wij = Imci - mCjlln(l/O) / L L Imci - mCjlln(l/O), 0 ~ () ~ 1,
i j>i
(12.1)
where () is a parameter that reflects the amount of randomness in the deter-
mination of trading partners. In the example represented in Figure 12.1, () is
assigned the value 1, implying that potential pairs are identified randomly.
That is, each pair i and j has an equal probability of being selected.
After a potential pair of trading partners is selected, the direction of
possible trade is determined by checking the relative magnitude in marginal
costs, and the ability to trade is determined by checking deposition con-
straints for all nations. If trade is possible, permits are exchanged until
marginal costs are equal or until a deposition constraint binds. Whether
trade is possible or not, the selected pair of potential traders remain eligi-
ble to be selected again in the next pairing. In the simulations presented
in Figure 12.1, there is a 1% possibility the process will conclude after
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each potential pairing is considered. (Other stopping rules are also consid-
ered, but are not discussed here.) After trading concludes, the outcome is
evaluated according to the percentage of potential gains from trade that
are achieved. Potential gains from trade are calibrated by the difference
between global compliance costs at the joint cost minimization solution
(equivalently, multilateral simultaneous trading) and the cost if no trading
occurs. Finally, the simulation is repeated, each time identifying a poten-
tially unique sequence of trades and resulting outcome.
In Figure 12.1, the horizontal axis represents the percentage of potential
savings that are achieved. Each simulation yields a different outcome, and
these outcomes are organized as a cumulative distribution function along
this dimension. The vertical axis represents probability, and the three curves
represent different cumulative distribution functions for three comparable
scenarios. One scenario involved trading between six national governments.
The nations in this example included Belgium, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Spain, and the UK.
A second scenario represents trading between 12 representative enter-
prises, two located in each of the six countries. To represent an enterprise,
each nations cost function was apportioned randomly to constitute two large
firms. In the third scenario, the same procedure was followed to represent
enterprise level trading by three large firms in each country.
In this experiment, enterprise trading outperformed trading by national
governments. This is represented in Figure 12.1, for example, by the place-
ment of the curve for trading with two firms per nation to the right of the
curve for trading directly between nations. This indicates that the expected
percentage of the potential savings that were realized across repeated sim-
ulations was greater when there were two firms per nation. Furthermore,
the more disaggregated the identity of the trading agents, the greater the
percentage of potential savings that were realized. For instance, in Figure
12.1 the curve for trading with three firms per nation lies to the right of
the curve for trading with two firms per nation. The mean percent of sav-
ings that were achieved under each scenario is indicated on the graph as
j1.. But perhaps more interesting is the shape of the overall distributions.
An approximate first-order stochastic dominance is achieved by each level
of disaggregation in the agents designated for trade.
A systematic discussion of this simulation experiment, covering a variety
of national groupings and with sensitivity analysis, is presented in Burtraw
et aZ. (1993). A number of other scenarios combining various groupings of
nations and employing different assumptions have obtained results similar
to those in Figure 12.1, but they also indicate sensitivity to a number of
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assumptions about how the process of bilateral trading would proceed - that
is, how the sequence of potential trades is selected - and to how the national
cost functions are disaggregated to achieve representative enterprises. How-
ever, under most assumptions these simulations support the finding that
bilateral and sequential trading at the disaggregated enterprise level out-
perform trading between national governments in terms of the cost savings
that can be expected. The results for the simulation presented here are
not meant to be definitive or conclusive, but are presented for illustrative
purposes only. They are suggestive of results that may obtain in a fuller
analysis of these issues.
12.3 Comparing Performance in Promoting
Allocative Efficiency
12.3.1 Introduction
The second potential benefit attributed to IB environmental regulation is
the internalization of social costs in the product market, thereby promoting
allocative efficiency. In a system of tradable permits, the social opportu-
nity cost of emissions is reflected in the market price of a permit. If the
system works ideally, this price is internalized in private financial decisions
along with other costs such as investments in pollution abatement. A trad-
able permit system is distinguished from CAC regulation because the latter
approach internalizes only the costs of abatement, not the social cost of
residual emissions.
To illustrate this, consider a hypothetical example in which the gov-
ernment has full information about costs and emissions. In this case, CAC
regulation could achieve a cost-effective assignment of pollution abatement
by codifying in technology design standards the same outcome that would
be obtained by an IB approach, where presumably the marginal cost of
abatement would be equal to the marginal environmental benefit of emis-
sion reduction. However, even in this case, sometimes referred to as "smart"
CAC regulation, the social cost of residual pollution will not be reflected in
the price of a factor input or final product.
The internalization of social costs in product prices, including the price
of electricity, is critical to the environmental and economic objectives of the
EU. The 1987 Single European Act and the 1991 Treaty on Political Union
place environmental protection on an equal footing with economic growth,
the free movement of goods and services, and economic competition in the
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Table 12.1. The internalization of social cost under command-and-control
regulation.
Private costs of electricity production
Private costs of pollution abatement
External cost of residual pollution
Total private financial costs
Total social costs
Clean
technology
10
10
10
Dirty
technology
(unabated)
7
5
7
12
Dirty
technology
(with
abatement)
7
2
2
9
11
policies of the EU. However, it is not widely appreciated that environmental
protection and the form that it takes is essential to achieving these other eco-
nomic objectives. The internalization of social costs is critical to economic
integration because social costs, including environmental costs that are not
internalized, constitute an implicit hidden subsidy to a given technology or
industry.
This point is illustrated in Table 12.1, where the first column represents
the marginal cost for producing electricity with a hypothetical "clean" tech-
nology that has no externalities. The second column represents a "dirty"
technology that is unabated, and the third column represents the dirty tech-
nology under smart CAC regulation. Total social costs are greater for the
dirty technology, even when it is regulated by smart CAC, than they are
for the clean technology. If regulation of the environment was incentive-
based, the technology with least social cost would be selected. However,
private investment decisions made under a smart CAC policy would choose
the abated dirty technology, leading to a misallocation of resources from the
social perspective.
Subsidies have played an historic role in European energy markets. For
instance, since 1965 aid to the coal industry may have cost European taxpay-
ers more than 70 billion ECUs. This estimate includes only fiscal subsidies
and does not include hidden subsidies associated with the effects of pol-
lution (CEC, 1991; Royal Institute of International Affairs/Science Policy
Research Unit, 1989). A goal of the "polluter-pays" principle is to discour-
age member states of the EU from granting subsidies to polluters (Coudert
Brothers, 1992, p. 8). Subsidies yield anticompetitive advantage to selected
enterprises and the elimination of subsidies is recognized as a necessary
precondition for economic unification in the EU. For these reasons, the
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internalization of social costs is a fundamental precept to the attainment of
both economic and environmental goals in the ED. These goals would not
be achieved through cost-effective CAC policies. But more important for
this discussion, the incentive to perpetuate existing subsidies may permeate
the implementation of an IB approach to environmental regulation. The
next section considers how the designation of agency may be important to
whether the continuation of subsidies is possible.
12.3.2 Strategic considerations in implementation
Consider an international agreement for S02 emission control that speci-
fies (potentially tradable) emission targets for each country, but leaves the
mechanism for achieving targets up to the individual country. Hoel (1991b)
discusses the incentive for unilateral action in the setting of an environ-
mental goal, but he does not address the incentive for adopting different
mechanisms to achieve that goal. Similarly, Ottinger, (1993) discusses the
incentive for competitors within the OECD not to unilaterally adopt a car-
bon tax (see also CEC, 1992). Previously I asked whether there is reason
to believe that, acting unilaterally, national governments would implement
national systems of tradable emission permits. The suggestion was that
even in the face of an external emission cap imposed on a nation, the con-
siderable inertia associated with CAC approaches to regulation would be
likely to keep it the approach used in the design of domestic environmen-
tal policy. A second reason to question whether a nation would use IB
approaches to comply with an exogenous emission cap stems from the po-
tential for strategic behavior in the design of environmental policy, and the
effect that different types of environmental policy have on competitiveness
in an international open economy.
Imagine that a nation acting unilaterally was to adopt an emissions trad-
ing program to comply with an internationally negotiated emission cap, or
a cap achieved through international permit trading between national gov-
ernments. This approach to domestic policy would be expected to generate
savings in compliance cost expenditures compared to a CAC approach. For
instance, in England and Wales, the cost of complying with the Large Com-
bustion Plant Directive in the year 2003 with tradable permits could be
reduced by 13%, or about £45-£65 million a year in 1990 prices (London
Economics, 1992, pp. 23-24, 77). However, the national government must
weigh these savings against the detriment to international competitiveness
from including external costs in product prices (Bovenberg, 1993). As in-
dicated in Table 12.1, a consequence of IB regulation is likely to be higher
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Figure 12.2. Marginal cost of pollution control and the product market.
product prices because those prices would include not only the marginal cost
of pollution control but also the opportunity cost of using the atmosphere's
absorptive capacity. In Table 12.1, the total private cost of the clean tech-
nology is 10; this is greater than the private cost of 9, but less than the
total social cost of 11 for the abated dirty technology. The distinction be-
tween marginal and average costs makes a direct comparison difficult, but
in general it is probable that the opportunity cost of permit holdings will
constitute more than the cost savings from IB regulation.
The illustration in Figure 12.2 may help make this idea more precise.
In Figure 12.2{a) the marginal cost of pollution control for a hypothetical
industry is represented; for simplicity it is assumed to be constant. The
cost-effective marginal cost of control is labeled M CIS, with a measure of
B. The marginal cost of control with CAC regulation is labeled M CCAC,
with a measure of C. The difference between these two costs is labeled A.
In Figure 12.2{b) characteristics of the product market are depicted
when CAC regulation is in place. The constant marginal cost of produc-
tion for the industry, absent pollution abatement, is labeled M Cproduction'
The marginal cost of pollution control C is added to this to indicate the
industry's full cost. Demand is labeled D, and x* indicates the quantity of
output.
Consider a shift to the use of tradable permits. We assume this shift
would cause a dramatic 50% reduction in the cost of pollution control for
given output x*, that is, A = B. However, in the product market the
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reduction in abatement cost would be just offset by the cost of permits.
If the permit market is efficient, the price of a permit would equal the
marginal cost of abatement, or B. Assuming competitive markets, this
opportunity cost would be recognized by the industry even if permits were
endowed at zero cost. The total cost of environmental regulation would be
2B = C. Consequently, the abatement cost savings would be just offset by
the opportunity cost of permits, with no change in the marginal operating
cost of the industry or in industry output.
In comparison, imagine a less dramatic reduction in cost in shifting
from CAC to tradable permits, so that A < B. Holding output constant
at x*, the total cost of environmental regulation on the industry would
increase from A + B to 2B. Output would subsequently fall. Of course,
if cost savings from the use of tradable permits were much greater, output
could expand, but few advocates for IE regulation make claims quite this
bold. Consequently, in the typical case the costs for the industry would be
expected to rise, at least from a partial equilibrium perspective.
A concrete example may be found in examining the US trading program
for S02 allowances. The annual opportunity cost of permit holdings are
expected to be about $2.6 billion, based on an assumption that permits will
have a market value of $300 per ton of S02, compared to a potential annual
compliance cost under the system oftradable permits of perhaps $3.5 billion.
The actual market value of permits in the USA remains uncertain, but it
is likely to be between $200 and $300. The potential savings in compliance
costs of the trading program compared to a CAC approach may be as high
as $1.5 billion. This estimate is closely related to the price of permits in
a complicated manner that includes developments in secondary markets
related to compliance planning. In any case, it is fair to assume that a
lower permit price would indicate that these cost savings would be lower as
well. Hence, if the opportunity cost of permit holdings is fully recognized
by the industry and is treated as an expense (something that is unlikely to
occur fully due to the nature of the electricity industry) the trading program
could be viewed as raising prices in the industry by $1.1 billion ($2.6 billion
less $1.5 billion). If a CAC approach had been substituted, US society
might be able to subsidize electricity prices by $2.6 billion with monetary
expenditures of $1.5 billion. The remainder of the subsidy takes the form
of allocative inefficiency.
The opportunity to reduce product prices with an implicit subsidy of
the magnitude in this example suggests that the benefits to an industry of
a CAC approach may greatly outweigh the cost savings of using incentive-
based regulation. The benefits of the implicit subsidy will be distributed
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unevenly within a nations economy, providing rewards for those who utilize
polluting technology and penalizing those who utilize cleaner technology.
In the European setting, individual nations are more interdependent eco-
nomically than the USA is with its trading partners, and consequently the
national benefits of competitive pricing may be even larger.
To illustrate the potential situation in Europe, we attempted to calcu-
late the aggregate asset value of all permit holdings at an equilibrium in a
tradable S02 permit market, where spatially differentiated deposition con-
straints are in effect. To identify an equilibrium, or optimal allocation of
permits, we evaluated a scenario for a 30% uniform reduction in S02 emis-
sions from the Official Energy Pathway by all nations excluding republics
of the former Soviet Union using the RAINS model. We then took the de-
position pattern at this level of emissions as constraints for an emissions
trading scenario. In other words, we assumed that permits were allocated
or were traded so as to just satisfy the constraints implied by this deposition
pattern. A model of the transportation of emissions to deposition was based
on data for 1990 (Sandnes, 1993).
Our goal was to calculate the marginal opportunity cost of each ton
emitted and permit used. This calculation is more delicate than the exam-
ple for the USA above, because of the assumed spatially differentiated depo-
sition constraints. We calculated the maximum amount that each country i
would receive from the sale of a single permit to any other country j. Since
country i would reduce its emissions through a sale and country j would
increase its emissions, the net effect on binding deposition constraints must
be taken into account and in many cases one permit from country i would
allow country j to increase its emissions by less than one permit equiva-
lent. Therefore for each country i we searched across all possible trading
partners to find a potential buyer j of a marginal permit from i that would
pay more than any other country for that permit. The maximum amount
j would pay for a permit from i is assumed to be j's marginal abatement
cost multiplied by the ratio of allowable increases in emissions by j, subject
to the deposition constraints, if i reduced emissions by one unit. In general,
at the equilibrium, the opportunity cost of a unit of emissions will be less
than the marginal cost of emission reduction for i or it would be possible to
trade a permit and reduce cost further.
The annual opportunity cost for permit use is summed for all countries
and estimated to be DM3.68 billion. Under an assumption of competitive
markets, this sum would be internalized in the price of goods and services
and would have a sizable effect on the competitive standing of some na-
tions, and some industries in particular. The incentive to avoid this impact
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on prices and to retain the implicit subsidy for polluting industries associ-
ated with CAC regulation is clear, and would be acutely felt by national
governments saddled with responsibility to design domestic environmen-
tal policies that comply with a national emission cap. Admittedly, recent
strategic trade theory (stemming from Brander and Spencer, 1985; and
Eaton and Grossman, 1986) suggests there are only rare instances in which
fiscal subsidies such as this would make sense, so it can not be assumed that
it would be rational for a national government to institute such a subsidy
in the future. However, the subsidy that is described here is one that takes
the form of allocative inefficiency that is generally unpriced and which does
not enter the government's budget constraint. Furthermore, the political
economy of removing a subsidy that already is in place makes unilateral
changes in policy even more problematic.
Hence, in the absence of a specific mechanism to implement incentive-
based environmental regulation as a component of international environ-
mental agreements, it may not be rational for national governments unilat-
erally to adopt such an approach in Europe. The potential consequences are
twofold. One is the increase in cost due to the failure to capture the poten-
tial cost savings. The second is an undermining of the necessary precepts
for economic integration in Europe: the elimination of subsidies implicitly
provided by some national environmental policies and the maintenance of a
level playing field for trade.
12.4 A Perspective on the Role of National
Governments
Another characteristic of IB approaches to environmental regulation is that
the government's role in economic activities typically is reduced compared
to CAC regulation, because the government is relieved of having to set tech-
nical standards for production processes. This alleged virtue has nothing
to do with ideological convictions about the proper role of government. In
fact, on a practical level this is sometimes cited to bolster a position in favor
of more stringent environmental standards because those standards can be
achieved with less direct government interference in business activities, and
therefore, in principle, at less cost.
Some argue that a lessened role for government in the operations of
industrial facilities is offset by an increased role in monitoring, since the
government can not rely on the installation of specific pollution control
technologies to predict environmental compliance by firms as would typify
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a CAC approach. However, experience has taught that the installation of
specific technologies does not guarantee predicted compliance under CAC
regulation without commensurate investments in monitoring. Often control
equipment is expensive to operate, and its performance requires regular
investments in maintenance that may not occur in a CAC setting in the
absence of government supervision.
It is also sometimes suggested that IB regulation may impart a greater
incentive for firms to cheat on compliance because the firm not only saves
on its abatement costs, as it would under a CAC regime, but it saves on
the cost of permits, taxes, or other relevant policy instruments. But for
the same reason, IB approaches invite agents to monitor other agents with
regard to compliance because the competitive effects of undetected cheat-
ing are greater, and because instruments such as tradable permits have an
asset value for a potential monitoring agent that is affected by the behav-
ior of other firms. It is often suggested that IB approaches incorporate
provisions for legal standing by third parties, including nongovernmental
organizations, and a structure of fines that will encourage private parties to
complement governmental efforts in monitoring and enforcement. Nonethe-
less, on balance, one must conclude that in many cases a greater level of
involvement by government in monitoring and enforcement may be more
appropriate with IB approaches than with the CAC alternative.
However, in the case of regulating S02 emissions, it is noteworthy that
new continuous emission monitoring systems (CEMS) allow regulators to
obtain precise information about emissions at electricity generating facili-
ties through measurement at the smokestack, in the absence of information
about the fuels and processes used. The 1990 US Clean Air Act amendments
implementing tradable S02 emission allowances rely heavily on this technol-
ogy for monitoring. Hence, the degree of government involvement necessary
to perform a rigorous monitoring function may be eased considerably.
Both types of governmental activities - he specification of technology-
based standards in the operation of enterprises, and the monitoring of com-
pliance activities - require familiarity with the industrial processes at indi-
vidual facilities. Similarly, whether trading occurs between national govern-
ments or between firms, a similar role for national governments in monitor-
ing is implied. If national governments engage in trade, they must enforce
domestic regulations, just as they would presumably be assigned the pri-
mary role in enforcing the obligations of firms in an international trading
regime.
The issues examined in this chapter lead me to suggest that if gov-
ernments are the trading agents in a system of tradable permits there is
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a greater opportunity for inefficient implementation than if enterprises as-
sume that role. Resting entitlements to permits and authority for compli-
ance planning in the hands of national governments, which are open to the
influence of competing social priorities and private interests, is unlikely to
lead to the widespread adoption of IB environmental policies at the domes-
tic level. Current regulatory policies grounded in CAC approaches are likely
to change only slowly, in the absence of an impetus from the international
community. Furthermore, national governments are becoming increasingly
aware that domestic industries must compete in an increasingly competitive
global economy. Consequently, this conclusion seems especially valid where
there is an incentive noncompatibility between national interests, or the in-
terests of important constituencies, and the use of IB approaches. These
same conclusions apply a fortiori to the electric utility industry, which is
the most important sector with regard to 802 emissions.
This chapter has considered just two economic criteria - cost effective-
ness and the internalization of social costs. One might readily suggest that
other criteria are also important for the design of social policy. Among the
most important of these are social concerns about the welfare of constituen-
cies affected by dramatic changes in social policy. There may be compelling
reasons to preserve the current design of environmental policy, or at least
to ease the transition to more efficient approaches. The purpose here is
simply to consider the incentives and anticipated performance of the two
alternative approaches to agency according to rather narrow criteria.
Whether an international permit system with enterprises acting as the
trading agents would succeed further according to these criteria remains an
open question. A number of regulatory issues will likely intervene to under-
mine emissions trading in any case, as discussed in the previous sections.
However, under a system in which firms engage directly in permit trading it
appears that firms would at least be more likely to recognize the opportunity
cost for marginal acquisitions of permits, which would not occur if they were
regulated solely by CAC regulations under domestic statutes recalibrated
to comply with international agreements. Furthermore, an important point
to note is that placing permits directly into the hands of affected enterprises
removes one obvious mechanism for perpetuating current subsidies in the
form of nonpriced allocative inefficiencies.
Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of this problem does not
relate to the quality of the environment. At least in the short run, environ-
mental assets would be protected equally well whether nations or enterprises
are the trading agents in a European 802 accord. Of course, in the long
run, international support for environmental goals will depend on the cost of
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attainment, and the prospects for environmental improvement rest in large
part with the prospects for technological innovation, which are improved
if permit trading is effective. But the ultimate measure of the success of
international environmental policies in Europe may lie in their influence on
the process of economic unification in the ED and economic integration with
central and eastern Europe.
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Economic Instruments for Air Pollution Control
Economic theory and empirical models suggest that economic instruments
should help us to meet environmental goals at a lower cost. Practical experience,
however, shows that the cost savings of emission trading are smaller than
expected and charges usually have had small incentive impacts.
This book gives the first comprehensive review of economic theory, simulation
models, and practical experience of using economic instruments. It also focuses
on air pollution control.
Because of its unique blend of theoretical and empirical research, the book
provides interesting reading for both economists and those interested in environ-
mental policy.
Part I examines theoretical aspects and simulation modeling within a national
context. Part II surveys practical experience in a variety of countries. Part III
explores international issues, such as joint implementation.
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